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The early years of children’s lives are crucial to their future health and development.  
Disparities in health and skills that emerge during children’s first few years increase 
with age.  Many factors affect children’s health.  At an individual level, mother’s 
education is an influential factor.  At a societal level, public policies affect children’s 
surrounding environment that influences their health.  Therefore it is critical that 
public policies and other determinants of children’s health be studied carefully.    
 As a nation, U.S. has made significant improvements in children's health over 
the past century.  However, there is a significant increase in the number of children in 
the U.S. today that suffer from conditions and diseases that have emerged in recent 
years, including asthma and obesity.  These conditions are impediments to children's 
healthy development and have long lasting effects.   
 Investment in children’s health yields long term payoffs at the individual as 
well as societal levels.  Healthy children have more opportunities to succeed in 
schools and more likely to become healthy, productive adults.  Benefits extend to 
society as a whole including reduced dependency and disability, a healthier future 
workforce, and consequently a stronger economy.  Due to these reasons, it is 
important to understand how health care use and health among children in the U.S. 
have been affected by some of their key determinants in recent decades.   
  This dissertation is divided into three chapters.  The first chapter examines the 
feasibility of using compulsory schooling policies as instruments for mother's 
schooling to examine the causal effect of mother's schooling on children's health care 
use and health.  The second chapter examines the causal effect of insurance coverage 
on children's health care use and health using evidence from the Medicaid and SCHIP 
expansions.  The third chapter examines the causal effect of welfare reform on 
children's health care use and health.  Findings from this dissertation provide 
informative insights on key factors that shape children's health and wellbeing and 
highlight important methodological issues involving such empirical research. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
CAUTIONARY TALE ON THE USE OF COMPULSORY SCHOOLING 
POLICIES AS INSTRUMENTS FOR GRADE ATTAINMENT 
 
1.1. Introduction 
An important potential non-market benefit of greater schooling is better health for 
oneself as well as one’s children.  Theories of the role played by schooling in 
household and health production functions explained by Becker (1991) and Grossman 
(1972b) have led to several empirical attempts to quantify its magnitude. Recent 
literature on the effect of mother’s schooling on child health is disparate (e.g. Currie 
and Moretti 2003 find a positive impact on child health from college schooling spurred 
by college openings, whereas McCrary and Royer 2006 find no impact from extra 
schooling spurred by school entry age policies in California and Texas).  
As it is possible that schooling both causes and is caused by one’s own health 
status, the literature on the effect of schooling on one’s own health status has used 
three methods to correct for this problem: the inclusion of past health measures 
(Wagstaff 1993, Bolin et al 2002, Hurd and Kapteyn 2003); differencing between 
siblings or twins (Wolfe and Behrman 1987, Strauss 1990, Behrman and Rosenzweig 
1999); and instrumental variables (IV).1  
                                                 
1 Many instruments have been explored in the past, but they include variables that are potentially 
endogenous themselves: ancestry, per capita income, and expenditures on education in state of 
residence in childhood (Berger and Leigh1989); individual’s IQ, knowledge of work test scores and 
parents’ schooling (Berger and Leigh1989); parents’ schooling, number of siblings, and rural residence 
and region of residence at age 16 (Sander 1995a, 1995b); parents’ schooling, parents’ income and state 
of residence in childhood (Leigh and Dhir 1997); quarter of birth and family background (Adams 
2002).  More recent studies use policy variables as instruments for education that are more exogenous: 
compulsory attendance laws, child labor laws, and state characteristics at age 14 in the US (Lleras-
Muney 2005); compulsory education laws in Britain and Norway (Chevalier 2004, Black, Devereux, 
and Salvanes 2004), college openings in a woman’s 17th year (Currie and Moretti 2003); primary 
school construction programs in Taiwan and Indonesia (Chou, Grossman, and Liu 2003, Breierova and 
1 
Estimation concerns also affect the study of mother’s schooling and child 
health because of omitted variables that may be captured by the mother’s level of 
schooling such as endowment and time preference (Arendt 2001) both of which will 
bias the estimate of the effect of mother’s schooling upwards. While there is a 
significant interest in the intergenerational effect of schooling on health, especially in 
the developing country context (Grossman and Kaestner 1997, Grossman 2005), 
literature utilizing an IV approach to address these questions is scarce. Some recent 
exceptions in the U.S. are Currie and Moretti (2003) and McCrary and Royer (2006). 
Studies in a non-US context are Chou et al. (2004), Breierova and Duflo (2004), 
Blunch (2005) and Ahmad and Iqbal (2005).  Currie and Moretti (2003) show that 
exogenous increases in college schooling induced by college openings have a 
beneficial impact on a white infant’s health.  In contrast, McCrary and Royer (2006) 
show that school entry policies in California and Texas do not have a significant 
impact on infant health.    
To the author’s knowledge, no study to date has examined how schooling of 
low educated mothers who most likely will not get education beyond compulsory 
education affects infant, child or adolescent health in the U.S. using nationally 
representative data.  Existing studies only use a few states (Texas and California in 
McCrary and Royer 2006; subset of states from 1970-1991 and all states from 1992-
1999 in Currie and Moretti 2003) or use a subset of mothers (white mothers in Currie 
and Moretti 2003; native mothers who were born and gave birth in the same state, i.e. 
Texas or California in McCrary and Royer 2006).  With the decline in high school 
graduation over the last several decades, especially among black females (Heckman 
and LaFontaine 2007), it is important to understand how this may have affected 
children’s health.  To date, McCrary and Royer (2006) is the only study that examined 
                                                                                                                                            
Duflo 2004); a measure of draft induction risk during the Vietnam War (DeWalque 2004, MacInnis 
2006); school reforms in Denmark (Arendt 2005). 
2 
the intergenerational effect of mother’s schooling on health in the US.  Examining the 
effect of schooling of low educated mothers on their children’s health is also important 
to better understand the nonmarket returns to schooling.   
The aim of this study is to examine the causal effect of mother’s schooling on 
child health using the 1979-2002 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79), the 1986-2002 NLSY79 Child and Young Adult (NLSY79CY) and the 
Compulsory Schooling Law (CoSLAW) database collected by Dean Lillard and his 
colleagues at the Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University. 
Since mother’s schooling may potentially capture omitted factors in addition to the 
direct effect of education, this study proposes to use state compulsory schooling 
policies from the CoSLAW database as instruments for mothers’ schooling following 
earlier studies.  To the author’s knowledge, the changes in compulsory schooling laws 
were independently implemented by the states and not as a part of school reform with 
concurrent changes in other school laws.  First, feasibility of using these instruments 
for mother’s schooling is examined, specifically whether these policies are highly 
predictive of grade attainment and are not in and of themselves related to maternal or 
child health.  The findings suggest that state compulsory schooling laws are not good 
instruments for mother’s schooling for the sample mothers in this study.  They also 
suggest that there were only a few changes in compulsory schooling policies during 
the time period the sample mothers were affected and therefore only a small 
proportion of the sample mothers were affected by the policy changes.  The 
compliance rate of compulsory schooling policies was also low.  Perhaps due to the 
effect of compulsory schooling policies on academic achievement and performance, 
these policies were not good predictors of mother’s grade completion and high school 
diploma receipt.   
This study is unique in its use of detailed data.  Unlike most of the previous 
3 
studies that used compulsory schooling laws as instruments, the CoSLAW database 
provides exact dates of the changes in different provisions of the laws and thus the 
study is able to exploit the full variation in these laws.  Previous studies use data on 
fewer provisions of compulsory schooling laws taken every several years and assign 
the same laws to all children in the same cohort (Acemoglu and Angrist 2000, Lleras-
Muney 2005, Lochner and Moretti 2004).  For example, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) 
used compulsory schooling laws that were collected every 3 to 6 years and therefore 
data for the missing years were interpolated using data from older data (e.g. data for 
1924-1928 all come from information collected for 1924).  In this study, there is 
information on compulsory schooling laws for each year and therefore it is more 
accurate and detailed than the previous studies.  The only exception is Bedard and 
Dhuey (2007) who also use yearly information on compulsory schooling laws.  Even 
with the rich compulsory schooling dataset, however, the study finds that there are not 
enough variations in the compulsory schooling laws from early 1960s to early 1970s 
to estimate the causal effect of schooling faced by the NLSY79 cohort.  Moreover, this 
study investigates the possible issues of using the compulsory schooling laws for 
grade attainment (compliance, various causal pathways in which the laws affect 
outcomes, high selectivity of the children on which the laws have their main impact) 
and some of these issues have not been thoroughly examined in the previous studies.    
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews existing 
literature on mother’s schooling and child health using IV approach.  Section 3 
explains the basic model and conceptual framework underlying the study.  Section 4 
outlines the proposed identification strategy for examining the causal relationship 
between mother’s schooling and child’s health and health care use.  Section 5 
introduces the data.  Section 6 describes the testing done for the IV method, Section 7 
provides the OLS results, Section 8 provides discussions and Section 9 offers 
4 
conclusions. 
1.2. Literature 
1.2.1. The Effect of Mother’s Schooling on Children’s Health  
Many studies on the effect of mother’s schooling on child health treat mother’s 
education as exogenous.  While there is rarely a problem of reverse causality when 
examining the intergenerational effect of education2, the spurious relationship between 
mother’s education and child health may be caused by omitted third variables such as 
ability (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002) and time preference (Fuchs 1982, de Walque 
2004, 2005).  The previous studies on schooling and health addressed these 
endogeneity issues by including past health measures (Wagstaff 1993, Bolin et al 
2002, Hurd and Kapteyn 2003); exploiting differences between siblings or twins 
(Wolfe and Behrman 1987, Strauss 1990, Behrman and Rosenzweig 1999); and using 
instrumental variables (IV) approach (Berger and Leigh 1989; Currie and Moretti 
2003; Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios 2006).  However, most of the literature has not 
used instrumental variables to examine the causal relationship of parental education on 
child health.  Some recent exceptions in the U.S. are Currie and Moretti (2003) and 
McCrary and Royer (2006) and in other countries are Chou et al (2007), Breierova and 
Duflo (2004), Blunch (2005) and Ahmad and Iqbal (2005).   
 IV studies using US data yield mixed evidence of the intergenerational effect 
of schooling on health.  Currie and Moretti (2003) examine the effect of mother's 
education on birth outcomes using Vital Statistics Natality data from 1970 to 1999.  
They instrument for a mother's college educational attainment with data on college 
openings, measured as the number of two and four-year colleges in the mother's 
                                                 
2 In most studies, mother’s education is measured by her years of formal schooling, which is considered 
to be the most relevant measure of education (Grossman 2005).  However, a few studies, especially in 
the developing country context, use informal schooling and in this case, the problem of reverse 
causality may arise if parents receive schooling after the child is born. 
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county when she was 17 years old divided by the estimated number of 18 to 22 year 
olds in the county in that year.  Since Vital Statistics Natality data do not collect 
mother’s education from all states until 1992, they used data for all states only from 
1992.  Due to the nature of their data, they assume that the mother's county of 
residence at age 17 years is the same as that at the time of her child's birth.  According 
to the author’s calculations, in the full NLSY79 sample of mothers from 1979-2002, 
only about 55% of the mothers resided in the same county at the time of her child’s 
birth and when she was age 17.  Although the time period of their study is different 
from the time period of this study, this calls for further investigation to ensure 
credibility of their assumptions.  The sample consists of 10% of all first-time white 
mothers aged 24 to 45 years old in the data.  Since their identification strategy did not 
work for black mothers who are less likely to go on to college, they limit their sample 
to white mothers. They find that mother's education decreases the incidence of low 
birth weight and premature birth.  The magnitude of their IV estimates exceeds their 
OLS estimates.  They suggest that this may be due to greater than average effect of 
additional year of college education for marginal woman on infant health.   
 McCrary and Royer (2006) examine the effect of mother's education on infant 
health using Texas Natality data for 1989 to 2001 and California Natality data for 
1989 to 2002.  They instrument mother's education with the school entry policies in 
the state of her child's birth.  They assume that the state in which the mother started 
her schooling is the same as the state of her child's birth.3  Their sample includes first-
time native mothers 23 years old or younger in Texas and California who were born in 
the state in which they gave birth.  They exclude non-singleton births and find no 
                                                 
3 This assumption is a standard assumption in this literature (e.g. Lleras-Muney 2005, Bedard and 
Dhuey 2007).  McCrary and Royer (2006) mention that close to 90% of children who were born in TX 
or CA were still living in the same state according to 2000 Census.  The mobility rate is roughly the 
same for all states for all children in 2000 (Census 2003).  Although it is not the best assumption, most 
previous studies base their analyses on these assumptions. 
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evidence that mother's schooling affects the incidence of low birth weight, premature 
birth and child mortality.  While all their estimates are statistically insignificant, in all 
specifications used in the study, the coefficients of mother's education for low birth 
weight and premature birth equations consistently have unexpected signs (i.e. mother's 
education increases incidence of low birth weight and premature birth) and the 
coefficient of mother's education for child mortality consistently have expected sign 
(i.e. mother's schooling decreases incidence of child mortality).  The studies by Currie 
and Moretti (2003) and McCrary and Royer (2006) seem to suggest that schooling of 
mothers in the upper tail of educational distribution matter more than those in the 
lower tail.  This is contrary to what one would expect: that lower levels of education 
should matter more than higher education due to diminishing marginal returns to 
education. 
 IV studies from other countries find that schooling tends to improve child 
health. Chou et al. (2007) find that mother's schooling reduces low birth weight and 
premature births but has no effect on child mortality by using compulsory schooling 
reform in Taiwan as an instrument.  Breierova and Duflo (2004) find that mother’s 
schooling reduces child mortality by using primary school construction program in 
Indonesia as an instrument.  Blunch (2005) finds that mother's formal schooling 
decreases the incidence of child mortality but her adult literacy program participation 
has no effect on child mortality in Ghana by using interaction between her birth cohort 
and region of birth as an instrument.  Ahmad and Iqbal (2005) find that mother's 
schooling beyond high school increases child’s height-for-age Z score by using 
primary school construction program and introduction of universal free primary 
schooling in Nigeria as instruments.  
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1.2.2. The Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Schooling  
There is a set of research that looks into the effect of school entry laws on grade 
attainment and academic performance.  These studies find that overall, entering school 
early has an adverse effect on academic performance (Bedard and Dhuey 2006, Datar 
2006) including increased grade retention (Elder and Lubotsky 2006, Dobkin and 
Ferreira 2007) but ambiguous effect on grade attainment.4  There are studies, 
however, that found evidence for a small positive effect of entering school younger o
IQ test scores taken at age 18 (Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2
n 
008). 
                                                
The changes in age and cutoff dates of compulsory school entry affect the age 
of the youngest child that is compelled to enter school.  These policy changes 
ultimately have several effects on children’s schooling (see Bedard and Dhuey 2007 
for more details).  Theoretically, changes in the age and cutoff dates of compulsory 
school entry:  
1. Forces children who are affected to stay in school for longer/shorter number of 
years by law.  Their grade attainment will be affected if their educational 
aspirations were to only finish the minimum required years (total years of 
compulsory schooling effect) 
2. Changes the average age of the cohort (cohort effect) 
3. Changes the absolute age of the directly affected children when they enter schools 
(absolute age effect)  
4. Changes the relative age of the children who are directly affected and indirectly 
affected by the cutoff date changes (relative age effect) 
Previous literature seems to agree that in the short term, children benefit (or are 
disadvantaged) academically from entering school later (or earlier).  Since those who 
enter later are older than their peers, they learn the academic materials at a higher 
 
4 However, controlling for the age at test, children who enter school at a younger age are found to have 
higher test scores (Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2008). 
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developmental stage which may affect their academic performance and grade 
retention.  Studies found that due to the higher level of school readiness for older 
compared to younger children, older children have higher academic achievement but 
this benefit fades away with grade progression (Stipek 2002, Bedard and Dhuey 2006, 
Datarr 2006).  Consistent with benefits associated with entering school later, there 
seems to be a disadvantage associated with entering school early; younger children are 
more likely to repeat a grade (Lincove and Painter 2006).  From these evidences, 
increase in compulsory school entry age or moving the school entry date back seems 
to favor children’s academic achievement and ultimately grade attainment, despite the 
fact that they will be legally bound to stay in school for shorter number of years if 
school exit age and cutoff date remain the same.   
However, previous studies produce inconclusive results on the longer term 
effects.  On one hand, some find that the benefit for older age goes beyond 
compulsory schooling years; older students are more likely to participate in college 
preparatory courses during high school and consequently are more likely to enroll in 
colleges (Bedard and Dhuey 2006).  On the other hand, some suggest that benefit of 
older age disappears in the early years in elementary school (Stipek 2002), that older 
children do not have any long term advantages over younger children and in fact, the 
advantage reverses at some point; younger children perform at least as well as older 
children throughout high school, college and in the labor market and there is even 
some evidence that younger children have higher grade attainment (Angrist and 
Krueger 1991, Dobkin and Ferreira 2007), and are more likely to attend college and 
have higher wages (Lincove and Painter 2006, Angrist and Krueger 1991, Mayer and 
Knutson 1999).  These studies suggest that despite the academic disadvantages in the 
earlier years, younger children may end up getting more schooling if the decision to 
drop out is a function of biological age (i.e. those who enter school at a younger age 
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take more time to attain certain age, consequently receiving more education) or if peer 
effects are strong (i.e. younger children are less likely to drop out if their peers who 
are younger are still in school) (Dobkin and Ferreira 2007). 
Therefore the net effect of compulsory schooling laws on grade attainment is 
ambiguous.  Some previous studies that examined the direct (reduced form) effect of 
compulsory schooling policies on grade attainment (as opposed to the effect of being 
older as a result of the change in compulsory schooling policies) found no effects 
(Bedard and Dhuey 2007) or inconsistent results (Oreopoulos 2006).  The only effect 
that can be expected is that after the policy change, if the compliance rate is high, 
there should be a change in the number of children who have at least the minimum 
number of compulsory schooling years that was in place before the policy change (e.g. 
if the school entry age goes down and the minimum years of compulsory schooling 
were nine before the policy change, then there should be more children who have at 
least nine years of schooling after the policy change.) 
It is also found that compliance with school entry laws and grade retention 
rates vary by sex, race and parental schooling (Dobkin and Ferreira 2007).  Females, 
minorities, and children with parents who have less than a college degree are more 
compliant with school entry laws and Hispanics and parents who have less than a 
college degree are less likely to repeat a grade than whites and children with parents 
who have a college degree or more, respectively (Dobkin and Ferreira 2007).  The 
effect of compulsory schooling laws may vary by subgroups because the minority 
parents or parents with low education are less likely to make the decision to repeat a 
grade for their academically struggling children or there may be differences in the type 
of schools that children are attending (i.e. white children may be attending more 
rigorous schools than the minority children and therefore their grade retention rate 
may be higher than the minority children) (Dobkin and Ferreira 2007).   
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While school entry laws seem to have ambiguous effect on grade attainment 
for the average child, one recent study by Cascio and Schanzenbach (2007) suggest 
that the effect of age at school entry on long term educational achievement is clearly 
present when the sample is disaggregated by socioeconomic status and in fact, the 
effects for low and high socioeconomic status children go in the opposite directions.  
They found that controlling for relative age, disadvantaged children (defined by 
children who received free or reduced-price lunch in kindergarten) who are older (in 
terms of biological age) are less likely to take college entrance exams than their 
counterparts who are younger with the same relative age.  On the other hand, they 
found that more advantaged children (defined by children who did not receive free or 
reduced-price lunch in kindergarten), who are older (in terms of biological age) are 
more likely to take college entrance exams than their counter parts who are younger 
with the same relative age.  Cascio and Schanzenbach (2007) attribute this difference 
to the difference in how these two groups spend their time before entering school; 
disadvantaged children are more likely to receive less quality care while more 
advantaged children are more likely to receive high quality care in place of formal 
schooling.   
These studies suggest that there may be several problems in using school entry 
laws as instruments for grade attainment.  First, school entry laws affect children’s 
health care use and health status in various causal pathways other than through 
educational attainment such as grade retention and academic performance.  This 
violates the exclusion restriction assumption of the instrumental variable method.  The 
instrument (i.e. school entry laws) will most likely be correlated with the error term 
from the outcome equation (i.e. regression of children’s health care use and health 
status on mother’s schooling measured by her grade attainment) since there are 
omitted variables from the outcome equation (i.e. grade retention and academic 
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performance) that are correlated with both the outcome (i.e. children’s health care use 
and health status) and the instrument (i.e. school entry laws).   
Second, since school entry laws are much more likely to affect certain 
segments of the population, affect grade retention rates (i.e. high proportion of 
students who enter school early repeat grades) and produce varying responses in how 
the extra time out of school is used by children of different socioeconomic status, 
those students who actually get additional years of schooling due to changes in 
compulsory schooling laws are highly selected.  Therefore using school entry laws as 
instruments provide estimates for a highly selected group.   
Another set of research looks into the effect of school exit laws on educational 
attainment.  Overall, raising school exit age increases grade attainment and reduces 
dropout rate for the average child (Oreopoulos 2005, 2008 for U. S. and Oreopoulos 
2005, Bono and Galindo-Rueda 2004 for U. K.).  The evidence on the effect of school 
exit laws on educational attainment is consistent unlike those for the school entry 
laws.5   
In sum, with the complexities associated with compulsory schooling laws and 
grade attainment, a thorough investigation of the validity of compulsory schooling 
laws as instruments for grade attainment is necessary before moving on to examining 
the relationship between mother’s schooling and child’s health and health care use. 
 
                                                 
5 Some critics suggest that forcing children who might otherwise have dropped out to stay in school will 
not only lower their welfare (if they did actually make the correct decision to drop out), but will also 
disrupt other children’s learning experiences (White 1996) and will incur extra cost to the tax payers to 
keep unmotivated children in school.  The proponents of raising school exit age suggest that forcing 
them to stay in school will make them realize the benefits of schooling and prevent them from 
developing myopic behaviors (Spear 2000, Laibson 1997).  Therefore while raising school leaving laws 
increase grade attainment, whether they are actually ‘educated’ during the extra time in school is 
debatable.  This is also true for the effect of school entry laws.  Because of the complexities in the effect 
of school entry laws on educational attainment, academic performance, and grade retention, simply 
looking into the effect of the quantity of mother’s schooling on children’s health may not bring out the 
entire picture of the effect of her schooling. 
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1.3. Conceptual Framework 
Health production and health demand models suggest that mother’s schooling affects 
child health through changes in allocative efficiency (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982, 
Rosenzweig and Schultz 1989, Kenkel 1991, Kenkel 2000, Rosenzweig 1995, 
Goldman and Lakdawalla 2002, Glied and Lleras-Muney 2003) and productive 
efficiency (Grossman 1972a, 1972b, 2000).  Allocative efficiency suggests that 
educated mothers choose more efficient combination of inputs to produce child health.  
More educated mothers may visit doctors more often, use preventive medical care, and 
reduce risky behaviors, such as smoking and alcohol consumption that may have 
negative consequences on the health of the child.  Productive efficiency suggests that 
educated mothers produce better child health from a given set of inputs.  They may 
have more up-to-date information about health, better understand doctor’s 
prescriptions and more likely to carefully follow doctor’s prescriptions. 
Mother’s schooling may also affect children’s health through her income; her 
income may directly increase by getting access to higher paying jobs or indirectly by 
increasing paternal quality and resources through assortative mating in the marriage 
market.  The effect of mother’s schooling on children’s health can also be explained 
by quantity-quality model of fertility which suggests that the changes in income 
induces a shift in mother’s preference from quantity to quality of children (Becker 
1960, Becker 1991, Becker and Lewis 1973, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, Angrist, 
Lavy and Schlosser 2005) thereby altering her fertility decisions.  As mother’s 
schooling increases the opportunity cost of her time, she desires fewer but higher 
quality children.   
It is hypothesized is that schooling may increase a mother's allocative and 
productive efficiency of improving her child's health, may increase a mother's access 
to health care, but may also increase the opportunity cost of her time. Because of the 
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increase in mother’s opportunity cost of time, she may decrease the time spent with 
children and or time taken to visit doctors.  Therefore although the predicted impact of 
mother’s schooling on the child's health is positive, the net impact on health care use is 
theoretically ambiguous.   
1.4. Proposed Identification Strategy to Examine the Causal Relationship 
between Mother’s Schooling and Child’s Health and Health Care Use 
Earlier sections explained that compulsory schooling policies may not be very good 
instruments for mother’s schooling because they affect academic achievement and 
performance in complex ways and more likely impact highly selected group of 
children.  However, let’s suppose that these state policies are good instruments for 
mother’s schooling.  Following sections show that even with the absence of these 
problems of compulsory schooling policies as instruments for mother’s schooling, the 
policies may not serve as good instruments due to lack of variations in the policies for 
the NLSY79 cohort.  First, how compulsory schooling policies can empirically be 
used to examine the causal relationship between mother’s schooling and children’s 
health and health care use if they are good instruments will be explained.   
The effect of mother’s schooling on child health can be estimated using an IV 
approach.  In the first stage, mother’s schooling is estimated using state’s schooling 
policies as instruments: 
 
εαα ++= IVE 10         (1) 
 
where E is mother’s schooling (highest grade completed and an indicator variable for 
high school diploma receipt) and IV is a vector of state policy variables that capture 
the state’s compulsory schooling environment including: the age of compulsory entry 
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and the age of permitted school exit.  Data is merged with the instruments using 
mother’s state of residence and relevant year.  The algorithm used to assign the 
instruments to the mothers is explained in the Appendix 1.10.  The source of 
identification is the variation in the compulsory schooling laws across states over time 
that is uncorrelated with children’s health and health care use.   
 In the second stage, effect of mother’s schooling on child health is estimated 
using her predicted schooling from (1) and other exogenous variables: 
 
εββββ ++++= ∧ SCEH 2110       (2) 
 
where H is one of the several child health outcomes including: an indicator variable 
for whether the last checkup was a year ago or more, an indicator variable for whether 
the child had any illness that required medical attention or treatment in past 12 
months, the number of such illnesses, an indicator variable for whether the child had 
any fractured or dislocated bones that required medical attention or treatment in past 
12 months, percentile for height-for-age, percentile for weight-for-age, percentile for 
body mass index-for-age, an indicator for whether the child is at risk of overweight, 
and an indicator for whether the child is overweight.6  For the most part, these are 
measures that reflect both the use of health care conditional on health status, as well as 
health status itself.  
∧
E  is mother’s predicted education.  C is a vector of child’s and mother’s 
characteristics including: child’s sex, race, age, family size, mother’s age and marital 
status.  One must keep in mind that some of these control variables such as family 
size, mother’s age and marital status could themselves be causally affected by 
schooling and therefore part of the effect of mother’s schooling could be acting 
                                                 
6 I used percentile for body mass index-for-age to define at risk of overweight (85th to less than the 95th 
percentile) and overweight (95th percentile and above).   
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through the coefficients of these variables.  This issue can be addressed by running the 
regressions with and without these possible endogenous variables.  Fixed effects are 
included for 1) state of residence when child health measures are taken to capture any 
time invariant differences in child health outcomes across states with different 
educational policies, 2) year when child health measures are taken, to capture any 
trend in child health outcomes for each year across the time span, and 3) child’s age to 
capture any trend in children’s health for each cohort.  We also include S, a vector of 
time varying county level characteristics of the child’s geographical location of 
residence when the child health and health care use measures were taken including 
total active non-federal MDs, total patient care by non-fed MDs, total number of 
hospitals, total number of hospital admissions and total number of hospital beds.  For 
8% of the sample mothers, entire history of state of residence is not known (i.e. at 
birth, at age 14, current residence, and the most recent past residence), whereas for 
others, all of this information is known.  An indicator variable is included when 
schooling policies were merged assuming that she lived in the same state as her first 
reported state of residence to allow for the possibility that these women systematically 
differ from the rest of the sample in this study.  S captures state or county by year 
differences that may otherwise be confounded with the variation in state educational 
policies and child health outcomes.  Finally, ε is the error term that captures the 
remaining unobserved factors that are not captured in the equation.   
 Equations (1) and (2) will be estimated using a linear probability model for 
dummy dependent variables and a simple linear model for continuous dependent 
variables.  Since the error term is not normally distributed for categorical dependent 
variables, the use of a linear probability model will produce inefficient coefficient 
estimates.  However, this is not a major problem because estimates are generally 
similar to those produced by nonlinear models when evaluated at the sample means 
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(Greene 1993). Also, Angrist (2001) suggests that the use of linear probability models 
in the first stage do not produce fundamentally different results as the use of nonlinear 
probability models in the first stage.  The standard errors in these equations are 
clustered at mother’s state of residence when she was affected by the school exit laws.   
1.5. Data 
The data for this study comes from the 1979-2002 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the 1986-2002 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 Child and Young Adult (NLSY79CY).  The NLSY79 is a nationally 
representative dataset that consists of 12,686 individuals who were aged 14-21 as of 
December 31, 1978. They had been interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and 
biennially since 1994.  In 1986, a survey of children born to female NLSY79 
respondents began and has been conducted biannually since then.  In 1994, 
information on children aged 15 and older was collected separately and has been 
conducted biannually since then.  The NLSY79CY includes a variety of information 
on child's current health conditions and health history from mother’s reports for 
younger children and from self reports for older children except for weight and height 
information that were partly measured by interviewers.  In this study’s sample, 33.9%, 
38.1% and 47.2% of the percentile for weight-for-age, percentile for height-for-age 
and obesity measures (percentile for body mass index-for-age, an indicator for 
whether the child is at risk of overweight, and an indicator for whether the child is 
overweight) were calculated using measured height and weight information.   
The information on the key variable in this study, mothers’ schooling, is 
available in both NLSY79 and NLSY79CY.  Mother’s highest grade completed from 
NLSY79CY and mother's high school diploma receipt from NLSY79 are used.  There 
were considerable amount of measurement and reporting errors in the schooling 
17 
variables in the NLSY79 and the NLSY79CY.  A detailed discussion on the issues 
with the schooling variables in NLSY79 and NLSY79CY is provided in the Appendix 
1.11.  
The sample consists of children who are aged 0-19 whose mothers lived in the 
US when the compulsory schooling laws most likely took effect.  We exclude those 
with mothers who lived abroad when the compulsory schooling laws took effect and 
with missing information on variables used in each regression.  Each observation is at 
child-year level.  Sample sizes vary by dependent variables used for the analysis due 
to missing observations (for example, 44,401 observations for whether the child had 
any illness that required medical attention or treatment in past 12 months).  The 
sample size of the mothers in this study is 4,524 of which 3,583 mothers stayed in the 
same state from birth to at least the year in which she was permitted to leave school 
legally (hereafter referred to as non movers) and 941 are the mothers who moved 
during this time period (hereafter referred to as movers).   
It is worth noting that when determining the effect of compulsory schooling 
policies on mother’s schooling,7 the main concern is non mover mothers and how they 
were affected by the compulsory schooling policy changes because the effect of 
policies on these mothers captures the pure effect of the policies.  For mover mothers, 
interstate moves may be intentional and may be driven by choice; mover mothers may 
have moved to other states with higher school entry age to escape from the legal 
binding to enter school early.  Moreover, there may be certain state characteristics that 
drive the mothers to move to other states for some other schooling related objectives.  
In either of the cases, the interstate moves by the mover mothers will be endogenous.  
Therefore, the key comparison should be between the schooling of non mover mothers 
                                                 
7 This is what I would have used as a first stage in the initially proposed identification strategy, 2SLS 
method, but as I explain below, 2SLS using compulsory schooling policy variables as instruments does 
not seem to be a good identification strategy for the sample mothers in this study.  
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before and after the policy change in each state.  In the empirical analyses, by 
including the state fixed effects, all effects on mother’s schooling at the state level are 
controlled for and therefore essentially the comparison is between mothers within each 
state.   
 
1.5.1. Compulsory Schooling Law (CoSLAW) Database  
Data on state schooling policies regarding compulsory schooling laws on school entry 
and school exit comes from the Compulsory Schooling Law (CoSLAW) database 
collected by Dean Lillard and his colleagues at the Department of Policy Analysis and 
Management, Cornell University.  The CoSLAW dataset covers the complete history 
of compulsory schooling laws for each state.  The main source of the data comes from 
state statutes and laws.  Unlike the compulsory schooling laws that most previous 
studies used for instruments, this dataset has the exact dates of the changes in different 
provisions of the laws.8  The key variables used from this dataset are compulsory 
school entry age and permitted school exit age standardized at September 1st of that 
school year.  In other words, the age of the youngest child that is compelled to enter 
school in that school year and the age of the youngest child that is allowed to leave 
school in that school year are included.  For example, in California in 1967, children 
must enter school if they are seven years old by October 1st in that school year.  The 
value for the compulsory school entry age is 6.92 which means that children who are 
6.92 years old on September 1st in 1967 must enter school and they are the youngest 
children that are compelled to enter school in that year.  There are some discrepancies 
with the CoSLAW dataset and the datasets used by earlier studies including Angrist 
and Krueger (1992) and Bedard and Dhuey (2007).  This issue is explained in detail in 
                                                 
8 Previous studies use data on fewer provisions of compulsory education laws taken every several years 
with the exception of Bedard and Dhuey (2007).   
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Data Appendix 1.12.  In this study, the CoSLAW dataset collected by Lillard and 
colleagues are assumed to be free from errors. 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the changes in the state compulsory schooling 
policies from 1930 to 2002 graphically and show changes in policies in the average 
state during the time period the sample mothers from the study were affected by the 
policies governing school entry and exit.  While there is a general downward trend in 
school entry age (a slight decrease in the school entry age from age seven by about 
two to three months) and an upward trend in the school exit age, during the time 
period the sample mothers were affected by the policies, there were not many changes 
in schooling laws.   
During this time period, there were five school entry age changes in five states, 
one school exit age change in one state, 14 entry cutoff date changes in seven states 
and 11 school exit cutoff date change in five states.  Tables 1.1 through 1.4 provide the 
details of the compulsory schooling policy changes.  Tables 1.1 and 1.2 list the states 
that experienced policy changes in the school entry or exit age and the details of the 
policy changes including: the school year in which the change took effect, entry and 
exit ages, affected birth cohort, total number of compulsory years of schooling by birth 
cohort if stayed in the same state throughout the years in which the person was 
affected by the schooling policies, the total number of mover and non mover mothers 
that were affected and total number of non mover mothers that were affected.  For 
example, California changed its school entry age from eight to six in the 1967-1968 
school year.  The birth cohort affected by this change was 1960-1964 and the people 
in this cohort faced a school exit age of 16 if they remained in California throughout 
their compulsory schooling years.  Therefore due to this school entry age change, 
those who were born in 1957-1959, 1960, and 1961-1964 were compelled to stay in 
school for eight years, nine years, and ten years, respectively.   
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Figure 1.1. Average State-Mandated Age of First Enrollment 1930-2002   
Source: Lillard and colleagues from compulsory schooling statutes (Lillard 2007) 
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Figure 1.2. Average State Mandated Minimum Age of Permitted School Leaving 
1930-2002   
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Source: Lillard and colleagues from compulsory schooling statutes (Lillard 2007) 
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Table 1.1. Policy Changes in the Compulsory School Entry Age  
         # of mothers affected 
State SY of 
∆Entry Age ∆Entry Age 
Exit 
Age 
Affected Birth 
Cohort 
Compulsory Yrs of Ed by 
Birth Cohort M&NM NM 
CA 1967-1968 8 to 6 16 1960-1964 
1957-1959: 8 yrs 
1960: 9 yrs 
1961-1964: 10 yrs 
352 276 
DE 1969-1970 7 to 6 16 1963-1964 1957-1962: 9 yrs 1963-1964: 10 yrs 3 0 
NJ 1965-1966 7 to 6 16 1959-1964 1957-1958: 9 yrs 1959-1964: 10 yrs 120 86 
NY 1968-1969 7 to 6 16 1962-1964 1957-1961: 9 yrs 1962-1964: 10 yrs 118 84 
VA 1968-1969 7 to 6 16 1962-1964 1957-1961: 9 yrs 1962-1964: 10 yrs 48 33 
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Table 1.2. Policy Changes in the Compulsory School Exit Age  
            # of mothers affected 
State SY of ∆Exit Age Entry Age 
∆Exit 
Age 
Affected Birth  
Cohort 
Compulsory Yrs of Ed by  
Birth Cohort M&NM NM 
MS 1977-1978 7 16 to 13 1962-1964 
1957-1961: 9 yrs 
1962: 8 yrs 
1963: 7 yrs 
1964: 6 yrs 
18 11 
 
 
 
Table 1.3. Policy Changes in the Compulsory School Entry Cutoff Date 
           # of mothers affected 
State 
SY of 
∆Entry 
Cutoff 
∆Entry Cutoff Entry Age Exit Age Affected Birth Years and Months M&NM NM 
IL 1967-1968 
No specified date 
to December 1st 7 16 
1960-1964; Sep-Nov: oldest to youngest in 
cohort (enter a year early) 25 19 
KS 1965-1966 
January 1st to 
September 1st 7 15 
1958-1964; Sep-Dec: youngest to oldest in 
cohort (enter a year later) 1 1 
KS 1966-1967 
September 1st to 
January 1st 7 15 
1959-1964; Sep-Dec: oldest to youngest in 
cohort (enter a year early) 1 1 
KS 1967-1968 
January 1st to 
December 1st 7 15 
1960-1964; Dec: youngest to oldest in cohort
(enter a year later) 0 0 
KS 1968-1969 
December 1st to 
November 1st 7 15 
1961-1964; Nov: youngest to oldest in cohort
(enter a year later) 0 0 
KS 1969-1970 
Novermber 1st to 
October 1st 7 15 
1962-1964; Oct: youngest to oldest in cohort 
(enter a year later) 0 0 
KS 1970-1971 
October 1st to 
September 1st 7 15 
1963-1964; Sep: youngest to oldest in cohort 
(enter a year later) 0 0 
NM 1967-1968 
No specified date 
to January 1st 6 17 
1961-1964; Sep-Dec: oldest to youngest in 
cohort (enter a year early) 10 2 
OH 1965-1966 
September 1st to 
October 31st 6 18 
1959-1964; Sep-Oct: oldest to youngest in 
cohort (enter a year early) 38 32 
SD 1971-1972 
No specified date 
to November 1st 7 16 
1964; Sep-Oct: oldest to youngest in cohort 
(enter a year early) 1 1 
TN 1966-1967 
December 31st to 
November 30th 7 16 
1959-1964; Dec: youngest to oldest in cohort
(enter a year later) 2 2 
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 Table 1.3. (Continued) 
           # of mothers affected 
State 
SY of 
∆Entry 
Cutoff 
∆Entry Cutoff Entry Age Exit Age Affected Birth Years and Months M&NM NM 
TN 1967-1968 
Novermber 30th 
to October 31st 7 16 
1960-1964; Nov: youngest to oldest in cohort 
(enter a year later) 2 1 
TN 1968-1969 
October 31st to 
September 30th 7 16 
1961-1964; Oct: youngest to oldest in cohort 
(enter a year later) 1 1 
VA 1968-1969 
No specified date 
to September 
30th 
7 to 6 16 1961-1964; Sep: oldest to youngest in cohort (enter a year early) 8 6 
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Table 1.4. Policy Changes in the Compulsory School Exit Cutoff Date 
           # of mothers affected 
State 
SY of 
∆Exit 
Cutoff 
∆Exit Cutoff Entry Age Exit Age Affected Birth Years and Months  M&NM NM 
MS 1977-1978 January 1st to December 1st 7 16 to 13 
1961-1964; Dec: youngest to oldest in cohort
(drop a year later) 2 1 
KY 1978-1979 No specified date to December 31st 7 16 
1962-1963; Sep-Dec: oldest to youngest in 
cohort (drop a year early) 4 3 
NM 1974-1975 January 1st to December 1st 6 17 
1957-1964; Dec: youngest to oldest in cohort
(drop a year later) 0 0 
NM 1975-1976 December 1st to November 1st 6 17 
1958-1964; Nov: youngest to oldest in cohort
(drop a year later) 2 2 
NM 1976-1977 Novermber 1st to October 1st 6 17 
1959-1964; Oct: youngest to oldest in cohort
(drop a year later) 2 2 
NM 1977-1978 October 1st to September 1st 6 17 
1960-1964; Sep: youngest to oldest in cohort
(drop a year later) 9 4 
SC 1976-1977 No specified date to November 1st 7 16 
1960-1964; Sep-Oct: oldest to youngest in 
cohort (drop a year early) 5 3 
SC 1979-1980 Novermber 1st to September 1st 7 16 
1960-1964; Sep-Oct: youngest to oldest in 
cohort (drop a year later) 5 5 
VA 1974-1975 September 30th to December 31st
<=1967: 7
>=1968: 6 16 
1958-1964; Sep-Dec: oldest to youngest in 
cohort (drop a year early) 29 22 
VA 1979-1980 December 31st to November 30th 6 16 
1963-1964; Dec: youngest to oldest in cohort
(drop a year later) 5 4 
VA 1980-1981 Novermber 30th to October 31st 6 16 
1964; Nov: youngest to oldest in cohort 
(drop a year later) 1 1 
As evident from the table, there were not many changes in school entry or exit age 
during the time period when the sample mothers went to school.  Most mothers who 
were affected by school entry changes lived in California followed by New Jersey and 
New York.   
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 list the states that experienced policy changes in the school 
entry or exit cutoff dates and the details of the policy changes including: the school 
year in which the change took effect, the change in cutoff date, entry and exit ages, 
affected birth months, the total number of mothers that were affected and total number 
of non mover mothers that were affected.   For example, Kansas changed the entry 
cutoff date from January 1st to September 1st in the 1965-1966 school year.  From this 
policy change, those who were born from September to December were affected; after 
the policy change, those who were born in these months entered a year later and 
therefore they became the oldest (from the youngest) in their cohort.  Compared to the 
changes in school entry and exit ages, more states changed their cutoff dates during 
the time period of interest.  However, many cutoff date policy changes only affected 
very few mothers and some changes did not affect any sample mothers.   
The number of states with the policy changes that affected the sample mothers 
is extremely small.  Only five states (four states for school entry and one state for 
school exit) changed compulsory schooling ages during the time period.  Similarly, 
only 12 states (seven states for school entry and five states for school exit) changed 
compulsory schooling cut off dates during the time period.  Since some states changed 
both school age and cutoff date, there were basically only 13 states that experienced 
either school age or cutoff date changes during the time period.  The key here is that 
there is not much variation in compulsory schooling policies within states over time 
that affected the sample mothers in this time period.   
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Table 1.5. Number of Mothers Affected by Policy Changes in the Compulsory 
School Entry and Exit Ages  
# of Affected Mothers Total Non-Movers Movers 
School Entry Policy Only 641 479 162 
School Exit Policy Only 17 11 6 
Both Polices 1 0 1 
Neither  3865 3093 772 
Total # of Mothers 4524 3583 941 
 
 
Table 1.6. Number of Mothers Affected by Policy Changes in the Compulsory 
School Entry and Exit Cutoff Dates 
# of Affected Mothers Total Non-Movers Movers 
School Entry Policy Only 78 58 20 
School Exit Policy Only 53 39 14 
Both Polices 11 8 3 
Neither  4382 3478 904 
Total # of Mothers 4524 3583 941 
 
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 summarize the number of mothers that were affected by the 
school entry and exit policies.  As mentioned before, the main concern is the 
educational experiences of the non mover mothers.  The tables show that only very 
few mothers were affected by the laws.  Only 11% (i.e. (479+11)/4524=.11) of the 
mothers were non-movers and were affected by the school entry or exit age policy 
changes.  Moreover, only 2% (i.e. (58+39+8)/4524=.02) of the mothers were non 
movers and were affected by the school entry or exit cut off date policy change.  
Those movers who moved to states with the same compulsory schooling age or cutoff 
date can technically be counted as non movers since it is unlikely that their relocation 
to different states is driven by compulsory schooling related issues.  However, these 
types of movers were very small in number; among the movers, only about 5 mothers 
moved to a state with the same entry and exit ages and cutoff dates.  For the rest of the 
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mothers, about a half went to states with the same age but different cutoff date and a 
half went to states with both different age and cutoff date.   
1.5.2. Descriptive Statistics of Sample Children and Their Mothers 
Before proceeding with the tests for the IV method, descriptive statistics of the final 
sample of children and their mothers are presented.  Table 1.7 shows selected 
descriptive statistics for children and mothers for all children and by mother’s 
education.  The observations are at the child–year level.  The average age of the 
children is about seven years and children whose mothers do not have a high school 
diploma are older by about 0.8 years.  This is consistent with the usual trend of 
educated mothers delaying their child bearing and therefore having younger children.  
Mothers without a high school diploma are slightly younger, less likely to be married 
and more likely to be Hispanic or Black.  Children with mothers without a high school 
diploma have larger families and more likely to have a condition that require 
treatment.   
 
Table 1.7. Child’s and Mother’s Characteristics: All Children and by Mother’s 
Schooling (Dependent Variable: Ever Ill) 
Variable All HS Diploma or more 
No HS 
Diploma 
child's age 7.175 (4.086) 
6.904*** 
(4.034) 
7.778*** 
(4.137) 
child's sex: female 0.492 (0.500) 
0.489 
(0.500) 
0.496 
(0.500) 
child's race: hisp 0.192 (0.394) 
0.151*** 
(0.358) 
0.278*** 
(0.448) 
child's race: black 0.307 (0.461) 
0.293*** 
(0.455) 
0.335*** 
(0.472) 
child's race: non-black, non-hisp 0.501 (0.500) 
0.556*** 
(0.497) 
0.386*** 
(0.487) 
mother's years of education 12.479 (2.510) 
13.457*** 
(1.942) 
10.407*** 
(2.309) 
mother's age 32.711 (4.858) 
33.329*** 
(4.818) 
31.405*** 
(4.680) 
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Table 1.7. (Continued) 
Variable All HS Diploma or more 
No HS 
Diploma 
mother’s marital status: never married 0.148 (0.356) 
0.113*** 
(0.317) 
0.223*** 
(0.416) 
mother’s marital status: married 0.650 (0.477) 
0.713*** 
(0.453) 
0.519*** 
(0.500) 
mother’s marital status: separated 0.076 (0.265) 
0.059*** 
(0.235) 
0.112*** 
(0.315) 
mother’s marital status: divorced 0.117 (0.322) 
0.110*** 
(0.313) 
0.133*** 
(0.340) 
mother’s marital status: widowed 0.008 (0.089) 
0.005*** 
(0.072) 
0.014*** 
(0.117) 
Family size 4.415 (1.480) 
4.273*** 
(1.272) 
4.716*** 
(1.809) 
# of children in the family 1.966 (1.377) 
1.728*** 
(1.142) 
2.470*** 
(1.666) 
Have condition that requires treatment 0.055 (0.228) 
0.054** 
(0.225) 
0.058** 
(0.234) 
N 44649 30320 14329 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 1.8 shows children’s health measures for all children and by mother’s 
education.  Children with mothers without a high school diploma are more likely to 
have reported of having his/her last checkup more than a year ago.  However, contrary 
to the expectations, children with mothers with a high school diploma are more likely 
to have reported having at least one illness that required a doctor’s care in the past 
year and the number of such illnesses is also greater for this group.  They are also 
more likely to report having at least one bone fracture or dislocated bone that required 
a doctor’s care in the past year.  Moreover children with mothers with a high school 
diploma have higher weight and height for age but the overweight measures (i.e. BMI 
for age, at risk of being overweight and overweight) do not show any statistically 
significant differences between the two groups.   
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Table 1.8. Children’s Health Outcomes for All Children and by Mother’s 
Schooling  
Variable All HS Diploma or more 
No HS 
Diploma 
last check up: 1 yr ago or more  0.322 (0.467) 
0.311*** 
(0.463) 
0.343*** 
(0.475) 
ever been ill past year 0.349 (0.477) 
0.380*** 
(0.485) 
0.28*** 
(0.450) 
# of times ill past year 0.825 (1.942) 
0.896*** 
(1.928) 
0.673*** 
(1.957) 
ever had bone fractures past year 0.025 (0.155) 
0.026*** 
(0.159) 
0.021*** 
(0.144) 
percentile: weight-for-age 56.196 (30.549) 
56.872*** 
(30.497) 
55.123*** 
(30.602) 
percentile: height-for-age 54.946 (31.634) 
56.562*** 
(31.567) 
52.597*** 
(31.586) 
percentile: BMI-for-age 55.534 (33.308) 
55.732 
(33.324) 
55.245 
(33.285) 
% at risk of overweight 0.267 (0.442) 
0.268 
(0.443) 
0.266 
(0.442) 
% overweight 0.137 (0.344) 
0.137 
(0.344) 
0.137 
(0.344) 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
These simple bivariate relationships seem to indicate that children with less 
educated mothers have less access to preventive care but in terms of health status, they 
do not seem to be that worse off.  In fact, children with more educated mothers 
reported having more illnesses and being heavier for their age.  While positive 
association between mother’s schooling and illnesses and bone fractures seem 
contrary to what one would expect, this may imply that higher educated mothers are 
more aware of the symptoms of illness and therefore more likely to report children as 
ill (this will probably not apply to fractures since bone fractures are obvious to anyone 
regardless of the educational level) or that children of higher educated mothers are 
more likely to engage in activities that have a higher risk of illness or bone fractures 
such as outdoor sports activities and traveling to places with different climate, etc.  
Children of higher educated mothers may also seek more medical attention for their 
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illnesses (and dislocated or fractured bones to some extent although it is less likely 
that any mother will forgo medical attention for these injuries) compared to less 
educated mothers.  The children of more educated mothers may also be heavier for age 
(without being at risk overweight or being overweight) because they are more well 
nourished than their counterparts.  To find out if these associations are causal, 
multivariate analyses with corrections for endogeneity of mother’s schooling are 
necessary.    
1.6. Testing IV Method  
Using the proposed identification strategy to correct for endogeneity of mother’s 
schooling is possible only if compulsory schooling policy variables provide enough 
variation for mother’s education and satisfy other criteria.  Instrumental variable 
method is a valid method when two conditions are met: 
1. Instrument relevance: The instrument must be correlated with the treatment of 
interest.  In the regression of outcome Y on instrument Z, Y  = α0+ α1Z+ ε, the 
instrument relevance condition says that α1 ≠ 0. 
2. Exclusion restriction: The instrument must not be correlated with the error term, 
i.e. omitted variables in the outcome equation.  In the context of the regression 
above, the exclusion restriction says that Cov(Z, ε) = 0.  
In the context of this study, compulsory schooling must be correlated with mother’s 
schooling but cannot be correlated with the error term from the child health regression 
or in other words, omitted variables from the regression of child health on mother’s 
schooling.  As explained in the previous section, however, there are a few key issues 
to note about the compulsory schooling laws.  First, there were only a few changes in 
the compulsory schooling laws during the period when the sample mothers were 
affected by these laws.  In fact, only five states changed the school entry or exit age 
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laws and 12 states changed their school entry or exit cutoff dates during this time.  
Second, mainly due to the few changes in compulsory schooling laws during this time 
period, only very few mothers were actually affected by the law changes.  Only 11% 
of the mothers were non movers affected by the school entry or exit age and 2 % of 
the mothers were non movers affected by cutoff date changes.  These two issues cast a 
doubt on whether the policy changes could have really affected mother’s schooling.  
Therefore whether the policy changes had the expected effects on mothers are 
examined to determine the feasibility of using compulsory schooling policies as 
instruments for mother’s schooling.   
As one may recall, California, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia changed 
their school entry age and Mississippi changed its school exit age during the time 
period of interest.  Table 1.9 compares the mean highest grade completed by mother, 
the proportions of mothers with a high school diploma, 8th grade completion, 9th 
grade completion, and minimum years of compulsory schooling for those who were 
affected and not affected by the policy changes.  The data is from 1979 to 2002 and 
includes only those mothers who were non movers.  Since only non movers are 
examined, it was possible to calculate the minimum number of years in which the 
mothers were legally bound to stay in school.  The first column shows the means for 
all states, columns 2 and 3 show the means for all states that were affected by the 
school entry age changes, columns 3 to 10 are the means of each state that were 
affected by the school entry age changes and the last two columns are the means of 
Mississippi which was the only state that changed the policy on school exit age.  
Recall that all states that changed policies on school entry age lowered the school 
entry age (Table 1).  
 Table 1.9. Comparison of Highest Grade Completed, High School Diploma Receipt, 8th Grade completion, 9th Grade 
Completion and Minimum Years of Compulsory Schooling for All States and by Selected States for Mothers Affected and 
Not Affected by Compulsory School Entry or Exit Age Changes 
  All States CA, NJ, NY, VA 
    not affected affected
HGC 12.844 (2.608) 
12.995 
(3.096) 
12.854
(2.532) 
HS dip 0.691 (0.462) 
0.658 
(0.475) 
0.634 
(0.482) 
8th grade 0.981 (0.138) 
0.958** 
(0.201) 
0.981**
(0.136) 
9th grade 0.958 (0.201) 
0.936** 
(0.245) 
0.967**
(0.180) 
Min yrs 0.938 (0.242) 
0.943 
(0.232) 
0.927 
(0.261) 
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  CA (FIPS=6) NJ (FIPS=34) NY (FIPS=36) VA (FIPS=51) MS (FIPS=28) 
  not affected affected not affected affected not affected affected not affected affected not affected affected
HGC 12.435 (3.786) 
12.634 
(2.595) 
13.972* 
(2.602) 
13.081* 
(2.595) 
13.293 
(2.732) 
13.083 
(2.760) 
12.723 
(2.123) 
13.515
(2.108) 
12 
(2.498) 
11.727
(2.724)
HS dip 0.594 (0.493) 
0.598 
(0.491) 
0.75 
(0.439) 
0.776 
(0.419) 
0.678* 
(0.469) 
0.571* 
(0.498) 
0.696 
(0.465) 
0.727 
(0.452) 
0.654 
(0.485) 
0.545
(0.522)
8th grade 0.906*** (0.293) 
0.971*** 
(0.168)                 
9th grade     0.972 (0.167) 
0.977 
(0.152) 
0.957 
(0.204) 
0.964 
(0.187) 
0.979 
(0.146) 
1 
(0) 
0.923 
(0.272) 
0.818
(0.405)
Min yrs 0.905 (0.293) 
0.917 
(0.277) 
0.972 
(0.167) 
0.953 
(0.212) 
0.957* 
(0.204) 
0.905* 
(0.295) 
0.979 
(0.146) 
1 
(0) 
0.923 
(0.272) 
1 
(0) 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 Since the states that lowered their school entry ages did not make any changes in the 
school exit age during the time period when the sample mothers were affected by the 
school exit laws, the number of years that the mothers were legally bound to stay in 
school increased after the policy change.  If the new policy was effectively enforced, 
after the policy change, there should have been more mothers that completed the 
minimum years of compulsory schooling that was in effect before the policy change, 
i.e. eight years for California and nine years for the rest of the states.  Similarly, 
Mississippi lowered its school exit age but the school entry age remained the same 
during the sample period.  Therefore, if the new policy was effectively enforced, after 
the policy change, there should have been fewer mothers that completed the minimum 
years of compulsory schooling that was in effect before the policy change, i.e. nine 
years.  The last row shows whether the mother has completed the minimum years of 
compulsory schooling that had legally bound her.  This variable captures the 
compliance rate of the policies in place.  The compliance rate should remain the same 
regardless of whether there were changes in compulsory schooling laws.  In fact, if 
there are changes in compliance rates before and after the compulsory schooling 
policy change, it is a problem.  This is because the change in compliance rate may be 
an indication of other changes that simultaneously occurred at the time when the 
compulsory schooling policy changed in that state.  
 The effect of policy change is ambiguous for mother’s grade completion and 
high school diploma receipt.  Compulsory schooling policies dictate the amount of 
time children must stay in school but not the grade they must complete.  Therefore the 
policy change may change the number of years the mothers attended school but may 
or may not have changed their grade completion since some may have repeated or 
skipped grades (Oreopolous 2006).  Moreover, whether or not compulsory schooling 
policies affect mother’s schooling decisions depend on where they lie in the 
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 educational distribution.  For those who lie in the lower tail of the spectrum, 
compulsory schooling policies may affect high school completion if their perceived 
cost of high school graduation changes due to the policy changes (Orerpolous 2006).  
For example, if the minimum years of compulsory education increases (by a decrease 
in the school entry age or an increase in the school exit age), the remaining number of 
years until high school completion is lower thereby decreasing the perceived cost of 
high school graduation.  If the perceived cost of high school graduation decreases, 
more students are likely to stay in school until graduation.  However, for those who lie 
in the upper tail of the spectrum, change in compulsory schooling policy will not be 
binding since they are likely to continue their education beyond compulsory schooling 
anyway.   
There are certain effects of compulsory schooling policy change on mother’s 
schooling that are unlikely to happen if people respond rationally to the policy 
changes, however.  For example, going back to the previous example, if the minimum 
years of compulsory education increases, students in the lower tail of educational 
distribution will most likely increase years of schooling and those in the upper tail of 
educational distribution will most likely not change their years of schooling.  This 
means that it is highly unlikely for the overall years of schooling to decrease if the 
minimum years of compulsory education increase since no one will decrease years of 
schooling if they are making rational decisions.  Similarly, it is unlikely for the overall 
years of schooling to increase if the minimum years of compulsory education were to 
decrease.  In this study, for states that changed their compulsory schooling entry age, 
mother’s grade completion and high school diploma receipt are expected to either stay 
the same or increase whereas for states that changed their compulsory schooling exit 
age, mother’s grade completion and high school diploma receipt are expected to either 
stay the same or decrease.  In conclusion, while it is possible to eliminate some 
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 effects, the exact effects of compulsory schooling policies on mother’s grade 
completion and high school diploma receipt are ambiguous. 
 Table 1.9 shows that for all mothers, the average highest grade completed is 
higher than 12th grade.  Approximately 70% of the mothers have a high school 
diploma.  98% and 96% of the mothers have completed 8th grade and 9th grade, 
respectively.  The overall compliance rate is about 94%.   When only the states that 
were affected by school entry age policies are examined, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the affected and unaffected mothers only for 8th and 9th 
grade completion.  As briefly explained before, mothers should have more minimum 
years of schooling before policy change than after policy change.  Effects on grade 
completion and high school diploma receipt should either remain the same or increase 
after policy change.  Compliance rate is also expected to remain the same even after 
policy change.   
The effect of the policy change on the proportion of mothers with 8th or 9th 
grade completion is positive, consistent with the expectations.  The compliance rate 
decreased after the policy change which is not expected but this change is statistically 
insignificant.  Mother’s highest grade completed and the proportion of mothers with 
high school diploma decreased after the policy change which is also unexpected 
although they are both statistically insignificant.  This may be an indication that the 
mothers in the sample are somehow not bound by the compulsory schooling policy, 
especially after the policy change. This is a problem as policies need to be binding to 
be valid instruments.  To find out how the effects vary by state, comparisons are 
conducted by state. 
California, which had the most number of mothers that were affected by the 
policies, showed that regardless of which schooling variables used, all schooling 
variables indicated that mothers who were affected had more schooling than those 
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 who were not affected although most differences were not statistically significant.  
Recall that in 1967, California changed its compulsory entry age from eight to six.  
This should have meant that for mothers who were born between 1957 and 1959, the 
minimum years of compulsory schooling were eight years, for those who were born on 
1960, the minimum years of compulsory schooling were nine years and for those who 
were born between 1961 and 1964, the minimum years of compulsory schooling were 
ten years.  When mothers who were born before and after the policy change are 
compared (those who were born in 1957-1959 vs. those who were born in 1960-1964), 
mothers who were affected by the policy change (i.e. those who were born in 1960-
1964) are indeed more likely to have at least 8 years of education (97.1% vs. 90.6%), 
higher grade completion (12.634 vs. 12.995) and higher rate of high school diploma 
receipt (59.8% vs. 59.4%).  The compliance rate was quite low (around 90%) 
throughout the sample period in California, however, and although the rate increased 
after the policy change from 90.5% to 91.7%, this is still very low and may be 
problematic since it indicates that the policy may not have been complied with.   
Unlike California, many effects of policy change in New Jersey and New York 
were in unexpected directions (indicating that affected mothers had less schooling than 
those who were not affected) although again most effects were statistically 
insignificant.  Again recall that New Jersey lowered its entry age from seven to six in 
1965 and therefore mothers who were born in 1957-1958 had minimum of nine years 
of compulsory schooling whereas those who were born in 1959-1964 had minimum of 
ten years of compulsory schooling.  New York lowered its entry age from seven to six 
in 1968 and therefore mothers who were born in 1957-1961 had minimum of nine 
years of compulsory schooling whereas those who were born in 1962-1964 had 
minimum of ten years of compulsory schooling.  This should have meant that mothers 
who were born in 1959-1964 in New Jersey and in 1962-1964 in New York should 
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 have been exposed to greater minimum number of years in school and therefore these 
mothers are expected to have higher completion rate of nine years of compulsory 
schooling, higher (or comparable but not lower) grade attainment and higher (or 
comparable but not lower) rate of high school completion than the earlier cohorts.   
When mothers who were born before and after the policy change are compared 
(i.e. not affected vs. affected), the only statistically significant change was decrease in 
mother’s HGC after the policy change by about 0.9 years, an effect in the unexpected 
direction.  Both the proportion of mothers with high school diploma and 9th grade 
completion increased, but they were not statistically significant.  Moreover, while 
statistically insignificant, the compliance rate decreased slightly which again weakens 
the validity of compulsory schooling laws as predictors of mother’s schooling.  In 
New York, the only expected effect is seen for the proportion of mothers with 9th 
grade completion although the effect is statistically insignificant.  Both mother’s 
highest grade completed and the proportion of mothers with a high school diploma 
decreased (statistically significant effect only for the proportion of mothers with a high 
school diploma) and these effects are not in the expected direction.  The compliance 
rate is also decreasing considerably and again, this poses a big problem on the study’s 
identification method.   
As for Virginia, again recall that Virginia lowered its entry age from seven to 
six in 1977 and therefore mothers who were born in 1957-1961 had minimum of nine 
years of compulsory schooling whereas those who were born in 1962-1964 had 
minimum of ten years of compulsory schooling.  This should have meant that mothers 
who were born in 1962-1964 in Virginia should have been exposed to greater 
minimum number of years in school and therefore these mothers are expected to have 
higher completion rate of nine years of compulsory schooling, higher (or comparable 
but not lower) grade attainment and higher (or comparable but not lower) rate of high 
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 school completion than the earlier cohorts.  Similar to California, mothers in Virginia 
who were affected by the policy changes (i.e. mothers who were born in 1962-1964) 
had more schooling than those who were not affected which is consistent with the 
expectations although none of the effects are statistically significant.   
Mississippi experienced a change in the school exit age.  Again recall that 
Mississippi lowered its exit age from 16 to 13 in 1977 and therefore mothers who were 
born in 1957-1961 had a minimum of nine years of compulsory schooling whereas 
those who were born later had fewer minimum years of compulsory schooling (1962 
birth cohort had eight years, 1963 birth cohort had seven years, and 1964 birth cohort 
had six years).  This should have meant that mothers who were born in 1962-1964 in 
Virginia should have been exposed to fewer minimum number of years in school and 
therefore these mothers are expected to have lower completion rate of nine years of 
compulsory schooling, lower (or comparable but not higher) grade attainment and 
lower (or comparable but not higher) rate of high school completion than the earlier 
cohorts.  These negative effects are found for those mothers who were affected by the 
policy change as compared to those who were not, although none of the effects are 
statistically significant.  Figures 1.3 to 1.7 provide more detailed graphical pictures of 
the change in mother’s schooling by birth cohort for the above states.  The vertical 
lines are there to indicate the minimum years of compulsory schooling to which each 
birth year cohort was legally bound.  Even in the states that had the expected effects in 
the descriptive comparison above, there are no visible changes in mother’s schooling 
before and after the policy change.  Figure 1.8 shows the change in mother’s schooling 
by birth cohort for all the states that did not change their policies.  Here, no changes in 
the schooling variables are expected before and after the change.   
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Figure 1.3. Changes in the Average Years of Mother’s Schooling by Birth 
Year for California 
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Figure 1.4. Changes in the Average Years of Mother’s Schooling by Birth 
Year for New Jersey 
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Figure 1.5. Changes in the Average Years of Mother’s Schooling by Birth 
Year for New York 
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Figure 1.6. Changes in the Average Years of Mother’s Schooling by Birth 
Year for Virginia 
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Figure 1.7. Changes in the Average Years of Mother’s Schooling by Birth 
Year for Mississippi 
 
 
 
Figure 1.8. Changes in the Average Years of Mother’s Schooling by Birth 
Year for All Other States 
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 43 
this variable may not be the best one to use for mother’s schooling.   The effects of the 
policy changes are not clearly seen probably due to the small sample size for each cell 
(i.e. each state/before or after change for the tables or each state/birth year for the 
figures).  This casts a clear doubt on the validity of the compulsory schooling policies 
as instruments for mother’s educational attainment in this data set.   
Table 1.10 conducts a similar comparison as Table 1.9 but for cutoff date 
changes.  Only those non mover mothers who were born in the affected months are 
compared before and after the change and for those states that went through a cutoff 
date change only once in the sample period.  Therefore descriptive analyses are not 
shown here for Kansas and Tennessee for the effect of entry cutoff date change and 
New Mexico, South Carolina, and Virginia for the effect of exit cutoff date change 
because these states went through multiple changes and the effect on affected mothers 
are most likely too complicated to see in simple descriptive statistics.  All the states 
examined here for the effect of school entry cut off date change moved their dates 
back making those who were affected to enter school early.  Therefore the mothers 
who were affected are expected to have more years of schooling than those with the 
birth months who were not affected (i.e. those who entered school before the policy 
change).  As for the effect of school exit cut off date change, Mississippi and 
Kentucky were examined.  Mississippi moved its cutoff date forward making those 
who were affected eligible to exit from school later whereas Kentucky moved its 
cutoff date back making those who were affected eligible to exit from school earlier.  
Therefore the mothers who were affected are expected to have more years of 
schooling in Mississippi and fewer years of schooling in Kentucky than those with the 
birth months who were not affected (i.e. those who exited from school before the 
policy change).  
 Table 1.10. Comparison of Highest Grade Completed, High School Diploma Receipt, 8th Grade completion, 9th Grade 
Completion and Minimum Years of Compulsory Schooling for All States and by Selected States for Mothers Affected and 
Not Affected by Compulsory School Entry or Exit Cutoff Date Changes 
  IL (FIPS=17) NM (FIPS=35) OH (FIPS=39) SD (FIPS=46) VA (FIPS=51) 
  not affected affected 
not 
affected affected 
not 
affected affected 
not 
affected affected 
not 
affected affected
HGC 12.363 (3.749) 
12.737 
(2.281) 
13.222 
(3.420) 
12 
(4.243) 
12.929 
(2.615) 
13.156 
(2.127) 
12 
(--) 
16 
(--) 
13.125 
(1.727) 
13.667
(1.366) 
HS dip 0.818 (0.405) 
0.632 
(0.496) 
0.778 
(0.441) 
0.5 
(0.707) 
0.857 
(0.363) 
0.813 
(0.397) 
1 
(--) 
1 
(--) 
0.75 
(0.463) 
1 
(0) 
8th grade 0.909 (0.302) 
0.947 
(0.229)         
1 
(--) 
1 
(--) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
9th grade     0.778 (0.441) 
0.5 
(0.707)             
Min yrs         0.857 (0.363) 
0.938 
(0.246)         
44
 
  MS (FIPS=28) KY (FIPS=21) 
  not affected affected 
not 
affected affected 
HGC 10.333 (2.887) 
12 
(--) 
14 
(2.309) 
12 
(2) 
HS dip 0.333 (0.577) 
1 
(--) 
1 
(0) 
0.667 
(0.577) 
9th grade 0.667 (0.577) 
1 
(--) 
1 
(0) 
0.667 
(0.577) 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
 While most effects are in the expected direction except for New Mexico where 
all variables have the effect in the unexpected direction, all effects are statistically 
insignificant from zero.  Since the sample sizes are even smaller for the cutoff date 
changes, more statistically insignificant effects are found for the cutoff date changes 
than for the school entry and exit age changes.  No attempt is made here to show the 
change in mother’s schooling by birth year to show the effect of the cutoff date 
changes because the sample size is too small to even detect an effect.   
Taking all of these findings together, the number of mothers who were affected 
was too small to detect the expected effects of compulsory schooling law changes and 
therefore they provide a strong evidence against the validity of these policies as 
instruments.     
One might argue that many of the effects of compulsory schooling policies are 
not in the expected direction because of the small number of mothers that were 
affected.  To find out whether these trends are unique to the sample mothers in this 
study, the analyses were extended for all NLSY79 respondents (12686 people) and for 
all female NLSY79 respondents (6283 people).  Since these samples include people 
who are not mothers of the children in NLSY79CY, not everyone has the mother’s 
HGC variable from NLSY79CY.   
Therefore for this exercise, HGC Revised and high school diploma receipt 
variables from NLSY79 were used for all non movers as well as for non movers 
excluding those who indicated having a GED since HGC Revised variable adjusts for 
GED receipts.  Similar to the sample of mothers, only around 10% of the people were 
affected by the policy changes.  Overall results were also very similar to the sample 
mothers.  Therefore the results in the unexpected direction found for the sample 
mothers are not likely to be because of the small sample size.    
 Since the compulsory schooling policies do not seem to be binding educational 
45 
 attainment of all sample mothers, the sample mothers were restricted to only those 
mothers who are high school dropouts.  As expected, the effects of policy changes are 
stronger and more consistent with expectations, but the number of affected mothers 
became even smaller and will therefore not have enough variation for identification. 
Despite the low compliance rate for compulsory schooling policies and inconsistent 
effects of the policy changes on mother’s highest grade completed and high school 
diploma receipt, the effect of the policy changes on mother’s schooling were examined 
using simple OLS regressions.   This was done by state and with and without the basic 
control variable, race.  First, the results from the previous descriptive statistics were 
replicated using regression approach including only an indicator variable for whether 
the individual was affected by the policy change. Next the ages of compulsory school 
entry or permitted school exit were added instead of a policy change indicator 
variable.  One would expect to find a negative coefficient on the age of compulsory 
school entry and a positive coefficient on the age of permitted school exit if the 
policies had a binding effect on grade attainment.   
Tables 1.11 to 1.15 show the results from the simple regression of mother’s 
grade attainment on compulsory schooling policies by state.  Each column represents a 
regression and each row represents an independent variable included in the regression.  
First, columns (1) to (6) do not include any controls and the columns (7) to (12) 
include race as a control.  Columns (1) to (3) of Tables 1.11 to 1.15 show the results 
from the regression using an indicator variable for whether the individual was affected 
by the policy change and as expected, the results mirror exactly those found earlier.  
Columns (4) to (6) of Tables 1.11 to 1.15 show the results from the regressions with 
the age of compulsory school entry and similar to the findings from the regressions 
with an indicator variable, most effects are statistically insignificant.   
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The only statistically significant effects are found for California and New York where 
the effect is in the expected direction for California and in the unexpected direction for 
New York, both consistent with the results found in the descriptive statistics.   After 
including race, with the exception of California where the effect remains in the same 
direction in the same magnitude, all effects disappear for both the indicator variable 
and the age of compulsory school entry.  These OLS regressions reinforces the 
findings from the earlier descriptive tables that compulsory schooling policies are not 
good predictors of mother’s schooling, one more piece of evidence against the use of 
compulsory schooling laws as instruments. 
In summary, this section builds up an argument for why the compulsory 
schooling policy variables are not good instruments for the grade attainment of the 
mothers in NLSY79.  To summarize, the reasons are as follows: 
 
1. Very few mothers were affected by the laws.  Only 11% of the sample mothers 
were non movers and affected by the cut off age policy change and only 2% of the 
sample mothers were non movers and affected by the cut off date policy change.   
2. Very few states changed the compulsory schooling laws during the sample period.  
Only five states (four states for school entry and one state for school exit) changed 
compulsory schooling ages during the study period that affected non mover 
mothers.  Only 12 states (seven states for school entry and five states for school 
exit) changed compulsory schooling cut off dates during the study period that 
affected non mover mothers. 
3. The rate of compliance for the compulsory schooling law was low at about 94%.  
 Table 1.11. Effect of Compulsory Schooling Policy on Mother’s 8th Grade Completion, High School Diploma Receipt and 
Highest Grade Completed for California  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 HGC>=8 HS dip HGC HGC>=8 HS dip HGC HGC>=8 HS dip HGC HGC>=8 HS dip HGC 
Affected 0.065*** 0.004 0.199    0.061*** -0.003 0.142    
 (0.023) (0.051) (0.317)    (0.022) (0.051) (0.313)    
Entry age    -0.036*** 0.034 -0.071    -0.034*** 0.037 -0.043 
    (0.013) (0.029) (0.179)    (0.013) (0.029) (0.175) 
             
With Race No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 
R-squared 0.02 0 0.001 0.019 0.003 0 0.054 0.022 0.043 0.054 0.026 0.042 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
 48
 
Table 1.12. Effect of Compulsory Schooling Policy on Mother’s 9th Grade Completion, High School Diploma Receipt and 
Highest Grade Completed for New Jersey 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC 
Affected 0.005 0.026 -0.891*    0.000 0.049 -0.648    
 (0.031) (0.085) (0.458)    (0.000) (0.084) (0.455)    
Entry age    -0.036 0.141 0.574    0.000 0.120 0.307 
    (0.040) (0.108) (0.595)    (0.000) (0.107) (0.585) 
             
With Race No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 122 121 122 122 121 122 122 121 122 122 121 122 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.031 0.007 0.014 0.008  0.057 0.093  0.064 0.080 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
 
 Table 1.13. Effect of Compulsory Schooling Policy on Mother’s 9th Grade Completion, High School Diploma Receipt and 
Highest Grade Completed for New York  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC 
Affected 0.008 -0.106* -0.210    0.007 -0.089 -0.105    
 (0.026) (0.063) (0.361)    (0.016) (0.063) (0.356)    
Entry age    -0.015 0.090 0.626*    -0.015 0.067 0.530 
    (0.024) (0.059) (0.334)    (0.015) (0.059) (0.332) 
             
With Race No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 268 267 268 268 267 268 268 267 268 268 267 268 
R-squared 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.013 0.021 0.039 0.047 0.023 0.037 0.055 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Table 1.14. Effect of Compulsory Schooling Policy on Mother’s 9th Grade Completion, High School Diploma Receipt and 
Highest Grade Completed for Virginia  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC 
Affected 0.021 0.032 0.792    0.022 0.044 0.834*    
 (0.025) (0.105) (0.481)    (0.025) (0.102) (0.472)    
Entry age    -0.024 -0.011 -0.599    -0.027 -0.034 -0.686 
    (0.023) (0.096) (0.442)    (0.023) (0.094) (0.434) 
             
With Race No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 80 79 80 80 79 80 80 79 80 80 79 80 
R-squared 0.009 0.001 0.034 0.014 0.000 0.023 0.020 0.065 0.083 0.027 0.064 0.076 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Table 1.15. Effect of Compulsory Schooling Policy on Mother’s 9th Grade Completion, High School Diploma Receipt and 
Highest Grade Completed for Mississippi 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC HGC>=9 HS dip HGC 
Affected -0.105 -0.108 -0.273    -0.005 -0.103 -0.013    
 (0.113) (0.178) (0.922)    (0.103) (0.183) (0.889)    
Exit age    0.010 -0.040 0.027    -0.014 -0.043 -0.055 
    (0.036) (0.056) (0.292)    (0.032) (0.058) (0.281) 
             
With Race No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-squared 0.024 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.118 0.018 0.019 0.119 
Standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
 4. The direction of the effect of compulsory school entry age laws on mother’s grade 
attainment may be more complicated than simply the number of years in school 
due to the complicated ways in which these laws may have affected mother’s 
schooling. 
5. Compulsory schooling laws most likely affect highly selected group of children. 
 
Consequently, there were no evidence of the effect of compulsory schooling 
policies on mother’s schooling.  This is consistent with the finding by Bedard and 
Dhuey (2007) who also found no effect of compulsory schooling policies in the U. S. 
between 1964 and 1985 for the sample of white males regardless of the level of 
education.9  Therefore the proposed identification strategy outlined in the previous 
section will not work for the sample of this study. 
1.7. OLS Results 
Since the compulsory schooling policies were not good instruments for mother’s 
education, examining causal effects of mother’s schooling on child health using the 
proposed identification strategy cannot be done.  Therefore this section examines the 
association of mother’s schooling and child’s health and health care use using OLS to 
describe the correlation that exists and to consider other possible ways to tease out 
causal effects.  Specific focus is placed on finding the level of schooling that is 
associated with the greatest improvement in children’s health.  As already pointed out 
                                                 
9 While the validity of compulsory schooling laws as instruments is questionable in the U.S. context, 
there is no evidence so far against the use of these instruments for other countries (Bedard and Dhuey 
2007).  Oreopolous (2006) also estimated the effect of compulsory schooling policies on educational 
attainment but the study was performed to examine the compulsory schooling policies in Canada 
between 1920 and 1990 for all Canadian individuals born around the time period.  He found that the 
compulsory schooling policies significantly affected grade attainment.  However, the direction and the 
magnitude of the effect of each compulsory education policy were not consistent.  Not withstanding, he 
went on to estimate the effect of educational attainment on wages using these compulsory schooling 
policies as instruments mentioning that regardless of the varying signs and magnitude of each policy, 
taken all together, the policies were good predictors of the educational attainment.    
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 in the earlier sections, there is a vast literature documenting the positive relationship 
between mother’s schooling and children’s health (e.g. Grossman 1976, 2006).  
However, not much is known about how the magnitude of this relationship varies with 
the level of schooling, especially in the U.S. context.  The economic theory of 
diminishing marginal returns implies that the returns to mother’s schooling is greater 
for lower levels of schooling and the returns decrease as mothers get more schooling.  
The optimal level of schooling (that has the greatest association with the 
improvements in children’s health) is not very well understood empirically.   
Instead of instrumenting mother’s schooling with the compulsory schooling 
policies as proposed in section 4, here, mother’s schooling was directly included in the 
OLS equation disregarding the problem of endogeneity.  Instead of clustering the 
standard errors at the mother’s state of residence when she was affected by school exit 
laws as proposed before for the IV regressions, in these OLS regressions, they are 
clustered at the state in which children’s health measures were taken.  Table 1.16 and 
1.17 show the results from OLS regressions.10  Table 1.16 shows results from 
regressions using mother’s highest grade completed as a key independent variable.  
Table 1.17 shows results from regressions that include indicator variables for different 
levels of schooling (i.e. an indicator variable for high school completion (including 
both diploma receipt and GED), an indicator variable for GED receipt, an indicator 
variable for some college or more, an indicator variable for college graduate and an 
indicator variable for beyond 4 years of college).  The reference category is high 
school dropouts.  Therefore, for example, the association between mother’s more than 
4 years of college schooling and children’s health is given by adding the coefficients 
for high school completion, some college or more college graduate and beyond 4 years 
                                                 
10 Here, I control for state fixed effects as I explained in section 4.  However, since I would like to 
control as many unobserved variables as possible, I also try estimating the same regression with county 
fixed effects and clustering the standard errors by county.  Since the results are similar qualitatively and 
in magnitude to those with state fixed effects, I only present the results using state fixed effects here. 
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of college).  The coefficient on each level of schooling essentially captures the 
incremental increase (or decrease) in the association between mother’s schooling and 
children’s health.  Panel A includes all control variables mentioned in section 4 but 
panel B excludes family size, mother’s marital status and mother’s age from the 
regression since they may be capturing the effect of mother’s education.  
Table 1.16 from both panels suggest that increase in mother’s schooling is associated 
with greater use of prevalence care, greater weight and height for age but more 
illnesses and bone fractures in the past year that required medical attention.  The 
magnitudes are small for all child measures.  In panel A, one grade increase in 
mother’s grade completion is associated with 0.6 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of a child having the last checkup 1 year ago or more, less than a percentile 
increase in children’s weight and height for age, 1.5 percentage point increase in the 
probability of having at least one illness in the past year that required medical 
attention, an increase in the number of such illnesses in the past year by 0.04 
percentage points and 0.1 percentage point increase in the probability of having bone 
fractures in the past year that required medical attention.  There was no relationship 
for the prevalence of overweight children.  These results are similar with or without 
the possible endogenous covariates of mother’s education.  This is similar to the 
findings from the simple descriptive tables earlier.   
Table 1.17 provides insight as to how different levels of schooling are 
associated with children’s health.  Some college schooling seems to be associated with 
the greatest increase in children’s weight and height-for-age.  Schooling level beyond 
some college does not seem to have any statistically significant incremental effect on 
children’s health.  
 Table 1.16. OLS Regression of Various Child’s Health and Health Care Use Outcomes on Mother’s Highest Grade 
Completed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Checkup Wt-for-age Ht-for-
age 
BMI-for-
age 
At risk 
overwt 
Overwt Ever ill # of 
illnesses 
Bone 
fractures 
A.          
HGC -0.006*** 0.519*** 0.815*** 0.094 -0.000 -0.003 0.015*** 0.041*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.177) (0.229) (0.165) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) 
Endog controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 44460 22153 18084 17990 17990 17990 44707 44646 36847 
R-squared 0.125 0.031 0.037 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.118 0.107 0.011 
          
B.          
HGC -0.008*** 0.718*** 0.849*** 0.413** 0.003 -0.000 0.016*** 0.041*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.164) (0.216) (0.163) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) 
Endog controls No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 44524 22179 18108 18014 18014 18014 44771 44709 36902 
R-squared 0.122 0.029 0.035 0.022 0.016 0.019 0.113 0.106 0.011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Note: Each regression in panel A includes controls for child’s sex, race, age, family size, mother’s age and marital status, county level 
characteristics of the child’s state of residence when the child health measure was taken (total active non-federal MDs, total patient care by 
non-fed MDs, total number of hospitals, total number of hospital admissions and total number of hospital beds). Each regression in panel B 
includes all controls in panel B except family size, mother’s age and marital status.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level (i.e. mother’s 
state of residence when she was affected by school exit laws).  All regressions include fixed effects for state of residence and year when child 
health measures are taken and child’s age.   
 
 
 
 Table 1.17. OLS Regression of Various Child’s Health and Health Care Use Outcomes on Mother’s High School Diploma 
Receipt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Checkup Wt-for-age 
Ht-for-
age 
BMI-for-
age 
At risk 
overwt Overwt Ever ill 
# of 
illnesses 
Bone 
fractures 
A.          
HS comp -0.001 2.252** 4.184*** 0.581 0.004 -0.005 0.052*** 0.106** 0.005** 
 (0.009) (1.105) (0.940) (1.075) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.041) (0.002) 
GED -0.006 0.623 -2.174 1.040 0.013 0.013 -0.022** 0.013 -0.002 
 (0.014) (1.116) (1.326) (1.150) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.044) (0.002) 
Some college -0.012 3.972*** 3.884** 2.015 0.003 0.002 0.030*** 0.042 0.005 
 (0.012) (1.130) (1.489) (1.290) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.055) (0.003) 
College graduate -0.020 -1.843 -3.014 -1.030 0.004 0.019 0.026* 0.134 -0.006 
 (0.015) (2.166) (2.810) (1.622) (0.025) (0.020) (0.015) (0.083) (0.005) 
More than college -0.001 -0.748 0.229 0.468 -0.005 -0.032* 0.011 0.025 0.003 
 (0.012) (1.909) (2.022) (1.734) (0.024) (0.019) (0.013) (0.064) (0.003) 
Endog controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43508 21788 17799 17707 17707 17707 43755 43695 35982 
R-squared 0.125 0.033 0.039 0.027 0.020 0.024 0.119 0.107 0.011 
          
B.          
HS comp -0.007 2.886** 4.411*** 1.470 0.013 0.003 0.062*** 0.127*** 0.005** 
 (0.009) (1.113) (0.929) (1.092) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.041) (0.002) 
GED -0.005 0.249 -2.168 0.338 0.005 0.006 -0.023** 0.012 -0.002 
 (0.015) (1.193) (1.398) (1.162) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.045) (0.002) 
Some college -0.014 4.184*** 3.776** 2.445* 0.008 0.006 0.031*** 0.042 0.005 
 (0.012) (1.139) (1.507) (1.309) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.054) (0.004) 
College graduate -0.021 -1.612 -3.112 -0.455 0.008 0.022 0.024 0.127 -0.006 
 (0.015) (2.120) (2.723) (1.635) (0.025) (0.020) (0.016) (0.083) (0.005) 
More than college -0.005 -0.433 0.225 0.933 0.001 -0.027 0.006 0.015 0.003 
 (0.012) (1.921) (2.038) (1.727) (0.024) (0.019) (0.014) (0.065) (0.003) 
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Table 1.17. (Continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Checkup Wt-for-age 
Ht-for-
age 
BMI-for-
age 
At risk 
overwt Overwt Ever ill 
# of 
illnesses 
Bone 
fractures 
          
Endog controls No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 43567 21812 17821 17729 17729 17729 43814 43753 36032 
R-squared 0.122 0.031 0.037 0.024 0.017 0.019 0.114 0.106 0.011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
See note from Table 12 
 For example, in panel A, compared to high school drop outs, high school completion 
(regardless of whether they have high school diploma or GEDs) is associated with 
approximately two percentile increase in children’s weight-for-age and four percentile 
increase in height-for-age.  Compared to high school drop outs, some college 
schooling is associated with approximately six percentile increase (2.252+3.972) and 
eight percentile increase (4.184+3.884) in children’s weight and height-for-age.  There 
is no statistically significant incremental effect for schooling levels beyond this level 
although there seems to be a small negative association with mother’s schooling 
beyond college and prevalence of overweight among children (i.e. by about three 
percentage points).  
 As seen before, greater schooling is associated with more illness that required 
medical attention among children but this association is mainly for high school 
completion.  The only exception is the probability of any illness in the past year that 
required medical attention where the association is greatest for some college (increase 
by eight percentage points (0.052+0.030) as compared to high school dropouts).  GED 
receipt is actually associated with smaller increase in the probability of any illness in 
the past year that required medical attention (increase by three percentage points 
(0.052-0.022) as compared to high school dropouts) than high school diploma receipt 
(increase by 5 percentage points as compared to high school dropouts).  As discussed 
in the earlier sections, these illness or bone injury measures may reflect the fact that 
mothers with more schooling are more likely to seek care due to her ability to more 
accurately evaluate the symptoms or due to greater access to care.  It may also reflect 
the fact that these children are more active and thus are more likely to get ill or 
injured.  The magnitude of the effects is small for all children’s health measures in 
general and there were no statistically significant associations for preventive care use. 
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  These OLS results most likely overestimate the true effect of mother’s 
schooling on children’s health.  For example, children with mothers with more 
schooling are also more likely to come from higher income families, more likely to be 
insured and more likely to have mothers that value health.  All of these will most 
likely affect children’s health in the same direction and therefore without accounting 
for these covariates (and many more that are unobserved), the estimates on mother’s 
schooling variables from OLS regressions will be positively biased.  It is possible to 
control for some of the observable covariates such as income although, like schooling, 
they are endogenous to children’s health.  Nevertheless, some of the observed omitted 
variables are included in the OLS regressions, specifically, children’s health insurance 
status, an indicator variable of whether the mother is working, mother’s work hours 
and mother’s wage income.11   Magnitudes of the effects are similar for almost all 
measures with slightly smaller magnitudes for weight and height-for-age measures.12  
This provides suggestive evidence that the true effect of mother’s schooling on 
children’s health has the same magnitude as the OLS estimates at most and quite 
likely is smaller due to positive bias of OLS estimates explained earlier.  Considering 
the fact that the OLS estimates are very small in magnitude to begin with, the true 
effect of mother’s schooling on children’s health is most likely negligible.   
Moreover, it is not clear whether these results are good or bad.  Increase in the 
percentiles for weight and height-for-age found here is difficult to evaluate since they 
are mainly used to determine acute or chronic under-nutrition for low weight and 
height-for-age children which is rare in the U.S (WHO 1995).  The problem that is 
more prevalent among American children is obesity which these measures are not very 
good at identifying (Stettler, Zomorrodi and Posner 2007).  In fact, the findings do not 
                                                 
11 Child’s health insurance status, mother’s labor force participation, work hours and income may be 
endogenous because they all capture unobserved mother’s characteristics such as her commitment to 
her child’s good health and health awareness.   
12 These results are not shown in this paper but are available upon request. 
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 suggest any association with mother’s schooling and prevalence of overweight among 
children other than a small decrease among children with mothers who have schooling 
beyond college education.  The illness and injury measures are also difficult to 
interpret since these measures reflect many things including morbidity, access to care, 
the ability of the mothers to accurately diagnose the symptoms of illness or injury, etc.  
More objective measures are necessary to understand the true association between 
mother’s schooling and the prevalence of illnesses and injuries among children.  
1.8. Discussion 
This study elicited the problems of using compulsory schooling laws as instruments 
for grade attainment of the mothers in the NLSY79 cohort.  During the time period 
which the NLSY79 cohort were affected by the compulsory schooling policies, there 
were not many changes in the policies to provide enough variation for identification.  
The time period in which NLSY79 respondents were affected by school entry or exit 
policies was very short (less than 10 years) and within that time period, there were 
only a few policy changes.  Previous studies that used compulsory schooling laws as 
instruments for schooling were probably more successful because they used a longer 
time period that had more policy changes that were binding.  For example, Acemoglu 
and Angrist (2000) used compulsory schooling laws and child labor laws from 1920-
1960.  Lleras-Muney (2005) used compulsory schooling laws and child labor laws 
from 1915-1939.  Lochner and Moretti (2004) used compulsory schooling laws from 
1914-1974.  McCrary and Royer (2006) used compulsory entry laws from 
approximately 1973-1993.13  These studies used earlier years (1915-1940) or more 
                                                 
13 Unlike other studies that used IV methods, McCrary and Royer (2006) used regression discontinuity 
to examine the effect of mother’s schooling on infant health.  They found that schooling discontinuity 
seen around school entry cut off date was strongest for younger mothers and weakest for older mothers 
which reinforces the argument here that compulsory schooling laws were less effective in 1963-1972 
(time period for which NLSY79 respondents were affected by school entry laws) and more effective in 
recent years (after 1975).   
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 recent years (after 1975) which were the time periods where the policies were most 
effective, binding and had most variation (Lleras-Muney 2005, Bedard and Dhuey 
2007).  Earlier years are more likely to be a better time frame to use these laws as 
instruments.  In general, people had fewer years of schooling than now.  This is 
because there was less demand for skilled or educated workers in the work force then 
than it is today, and the gains from an extra year of schooling were not as great as it is 
today (Oreopolous 2008).  There were no incentives for people to get schooling 
beyond compulsory years.  Therefore the laws were probably more binding during 
earlier years compared to more recent years.  The years 1963-1972, the time period for 
which NLSY79 respondents were affected by school entry laws, were the years when 
the compulsory schooling laws saw little change, falling between the two time periods 
that experienced compulsory schooling law changes.   Therefore despite the fact that 
CoSLAW data are more detailed than the previous studies, this study is not able to 
take advantages of it because the time period used for this study does not have many 
policy changes that are necessary for the identification to work.   
 However, as discussed in this paper, even if the compulsory schooling policies 
have relevant variations and are binding, their effect on grade attainment is 
complicated because they also affect academic achievement and grade retention that 
may have their own independent effect on the outcome.  Therefore if the compulsory 
schooling policies are used as instruments for grade attainment, not only would the IV 
estimates be difficult to interpret due to the ambiguity of the effect of the policies on 
grade attainment, but they will also violate one of the conditions for a valid 
instrument.  None of the IV studies that use compulsory schooling policies as 
instruments for grade attainment are immune from these problems although to the 
author’s knowledge, these problems are not discussed in any of the studies.14 
                                                 
14 Bedard and Dhuey (2007) provide similar discussion about the potential problems of compulsory 
schooling laws as instruments although they do not use IV methods in their study.  In a separate study 
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 One possibility of using this sample of mothers in NLSY79 to examine the 
relationship between mother’s schooling and children’s health care use and health 
status is to use different sets of instruments for mother’s schooling.  Some instruments 
that have been proven to work for this time period are graduation requirements, GED 
policies and per capita education spending (Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios 2006).  They 
used the same NLSY79 cohort to examine the effect of schooling (i.e. high school 
completion and GED receipt) on own health behavior.  Their instruments had more 
variations than the compulsory schooling policies during the relevant time period and 
their first stage confirmed the validity of the instruments.  If these instruments are used 
for mother’s schooling instead of own schooling, the study will provide an interesting 
extension to Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios’ (2006) study by exploring how schooling 
affects the health of the next generation.  However, similar to the compulsory 
schooling policies, the graduation requirement and GED policies may also change 
other aspects of schooling that may affect health outcomes independently from grade 
attainment.  If this is the case, the use of these policies may also be problematic as 
instruments for grade attainment.  Instead, these instruments (i.e. graduation 
requirements, GED policies and per capita education spending) may be suited to 
capture the quality (instead of quantity) of schooling since it is likely that the content 
of high school education may have been affected by these policies.  For example, 
graduation requirements, GED policies and per capita education spending may be used 
as instruments for the type of high school curriculum that the mother experienced to 
find out whether the quality of mother’s schooling matters for children’s health care 
                                                                                                                                            
(Bedard and Dhuey 2006), they use relative age constructed from compulsory schooling entry laws and 
birth date to instrument for observed age to examine the effect of observed age on various schooling 
outcomes including college enrollment and in that study, they do not mention about these issues related 
to the use of compulsory schooling laws as instruments. 
61 
 use and health status outcomes.15  Since most literature on the returns to schooling 
focus on the quantity of schooling, this will provide an important extension to the 
existing literature. 
Other methods may also be considered to examine the effect of mother’s 
schooling on children’s health care use and health status.  One such method is 
regression discontinuity, where children who are born right before and after the school 
entry cutoff date are compared (e.g. McCrary and Royer 2006).  Since this method 
does not depend on the changes in compulsory schooling policies, it should work for 
this time period as well.  Since NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample, the 
study will build on McCrary and Royer’ (2006) study by providing new evidence of 
mother’s schooling on children’s health care use and health status for all states.  
However, if being born right before or after the cutoff date affects children’s health 
through causal pathways other than grade attainment, then one must be cautious about 
using this method as well. 
1.9. Conclusions 
Using 1979-2002 NLSY79 and 1986-2002 NLSY79CY, this study documented that 
the compulsory schooling policies are unsatisfactory instruments for mother’s 
schooling to examine the causal effect of mother’s schooling on child’s health and 
health care use.  There were only a few changes in compulsory schooling policies 
during the time period the sample mothers were affected and therefore only a small 
proportion of the sample mothers were affected by the policy changes.  The 
compliance rate of compulsory schooling policies was also low.  Perhaps due to the 
complex ways in which the compulsory schooling policies affect academic 
achievement and performance, they were not good predictors of mother’s grade 
                                                 
15 NLSY79 has information on type of high school curriculum, i.e. vocational, commercial, college 
preparatory or general program. 
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 completion and high school diploma receipt.    
  Since causational analyses were not possible using the sample mothers of this 
study, simple OLS analyses were conducted to examine the association between 
mother’s schooling and children’s health and health care use.  Findings suggest that 
mother’s schooling is associated with greater weight and height-for-age but also with 
more illnesses and bone injuries that require medical attention.  Some college 
schooling is associated with the greatest increases in weight and height-for-age 
whereas high school completion is associated with the greatest increases in illnesses 
and bone injuries that require medical attention.  Since the magnitudes of the 
associations are very small, the causal effects are probably smaller or even close to 
zero since the OLS estimates are most likely positively biased.   
Despite the fact that CoSLAW data would have allowed the study to take 
advantage of the fullest variation in the compulsory schooling policies, these policies 
turned out to be not very good instruments for mother’s schooling because of the time 
frame of the study.  While examining the causal effect of mother’s schooling on 
child’s health and health care use was not possible, this study offers future researchers 
some cautionary tales on the use of compulsory schooling policies as instruments for 
grade attainment in general.  First, compulsory schooling policies affect only a subset 
of people who would drop out of school if the law does not bind them from leaving 
school.  Previous studies suggest that this is a highly selected group and therefore the 
policies do not necessarily serve as the best predictors for educational attainment for 
the average child.  Second, because of the complex ways in which compulsory school 
policies impact academic achievement or performance, compulsory schooling laws 
may be an invalid instrument.  Third, this study also found that the compliance rate for 
compulsory schooling laws is quite low.  Since there is no reason to believe that the 
low compliance rate seen during the time period of interest is unique to this cohort, it 
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 calls for a careful examination into compliance issue even if the laws are valid 
instruments.  
64 
 APPENDIX 
 
1.10. Algorithms Used to Merge in Compulsory Schooling Policies  
 
To estimate the IV model, instruments (compulsory schooling policies on school entry 
and school leaving) were merged with the mother’s record by mother’s state of 
residence in the relevant years.  The instruments were used in the first stage regression 
on mother’s own education.  The way mother’s data were merged with each type of 
instruments is explained below. 
 
Table A.1. Compulsory Schooling Laws in Hypothetical States X and Y 
 
year age 
State X State Y 
age 
of comp 
entry 
age 
of perm 
leaving 
age 
of comp 
entry 
age 
of perm 
leaving 
1960 0 5 14 7 14 
1961 1 5 14 7 14 
1962 2 5 14 7 14 
1963 3 5 14 7 14 
1964 4 5 14 7 14 
1965 5 6 14 7 14 
1966 6 6 14 7 14 
1967 7 6 14 7 14 
1968 8 6 14 8 14 
1969 9 6 14 8 14 
1970 10 6 14 8 14 
1971 11 6 14 8 14 
1972 12 6 14 8 14 
1973 13 6 14 8 14 
1974 14 6 15 8 14 
1975 15 6 15 8 16 
1976 16 6 15 8 16 
1977 17 6 15 8 16 
1978 18 6 15 8 16 
 
 
1. Compulsory Schooling Policies: School Entry 
Age of compulsory entry was assigned to each mother using her state of birth and 
the year she was required to enter school in her state of birth.  Consider mother A 
who was born in state X in 1960.  She became age 4 in 1964, age 5 in 1965, age 6 
in 1966, age 7 in 1967, age 8 in 1968, age 9 in 1969, and age 10 in 1970.  The age 
of compulsory entry in state X in 1964 was 5, in 1965 was 6, in 1966 was 6, in 
1967 was 6, in 1968 was 6, in 1969 was 6, and in 1970 was 6.  Therefore she was 
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 required to enter school in 1966.  If the same mother A were born in state Y, she 
will be required to enter school in 1967. 
 
2. Compulsory Schooling Policies: School Leaving 
Age of permitted school leaving were assigned to each mother using her state of 
birth and the year she became eligible to drop out from school in her state of birth.  
Again consider mother A who was born in state X in 1960.  She became age 12 in 
1972, age 13 in 1973, age 14 in 1974, age 15 in 1975, age 16 in 1976, age 17 in 
1977, and age 18 in 1978.  The age of permitted school leaving in state X in 1972 
was 14, in 1973 was 14, in 1974 was 15, in 1975 was 15, in 1976 was 15, in 1977 
was 15, and in 1978 was 15.  Therefore she became eligible to drop out from 
school in 1975.  If the same mother A were born in state Y, she will be eligible to 
drop out from school in 1974.  Note that although state Y increased the age of 
permitted school leaving to age 16 in 1975 when she is still age 15, she does not 
need to go back to school since she has already reached age 14 when age 14 was 
the age of permitted school leaving in state Y. 
 
 
1.11. Schooling Variables in NLSY79 and NLSY9CY  
 
This study thoroughly examines the schooling variables in two of the most commonly 
used datasets, NLSY79 and NLSY79CY and finds that there were considerable 
measurement and reporting errors in the schooling variables.  It is possible to check 
the consistency of the schooling variables because the reports on schooling for a 
person are longitudinal and there are several schooling variables available in NLSY79 
and NLSY79CY data that are independently reported.  The most prominent error was 
grade reversals where the respondent reports having a lower grade completed in the 
later years.  Future researchers who intend to use the schooling variables in NLSY79 
and in NLSY79CY should use caution. 
There are several schooling variables available in NLSY79 and NLSY79CY 
that can potentially be used for this study.  Here are the ones that were initially 
considered:  
 
1. Highest Grade Completed (HGC) by Mother as of the Interview from the 
NLSY79CY 
2. Highest Grade Completed (HGC) as of May 1st Survey Year from the NLSY79 
3. Highest Grade Completed (HGC) as of May 1st Survey Year (REVISED) from the 
NLSY79 
4. Do you have a high school diploma or have you ever passed a high school 
equivalency or GED test?  Yes or No? from the NLSY79 
5. Which do you have, a high school diploma, a GED or both? from the NLSY79 
 
After examining these data, 24% of the mothers had at least one discrepancy between 
mother’s HGC from the NLSY79CY and HGC Revised from the NLSY79 during 
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 their educational histories.  This prompted the study to investigate the issue further 
and it found out some of the complexities in the schooling variables in the datasets.   
 First, before going into the discrepancies among the schooling variables, the 
study found that there were some missing observations in the schooling variables in 
the mother-year level data (i.e. one observation per mother per year) that can be 
imputed with very high accuracy using a simple logic.  While these imputations ended 
up affecting only 3% of the mother-year sample data, imputation was done anyway 
because a small sample size increase at the mother-year level will translate into an 
increase of at least as much (if these mothers have more than one child or a child that 
appear in the data for multiple years) in the final sample at the child-year level.  The 
logic that was used to impute some of the missing values is as follows:   
 
1. If a mother reported that she completed high school or its equivalent in one year, 
for all the subsequent years, the missing values will be replaced by ‘completed 
high school or its equivalent’.  This also applies to high school diploma and GED. 
2. Conversely, if a mother reported that she has not completed high school or its 
equivalent in one year, for all the preceding years, the missing values will be 
replaced by ‘not completed high school or its equivalent’.  This also applies to 
high school diploma and GED. 
3. If a mother reports having both a GED and a high school diploma in the same year, 
she was categorized in a high school diploma category and not in a GED category.   
4. If a mother reports having either a GED or a high school diploma but missing in 
the other in the same year, it is assumed that she only has the one that she reported 
and does not have the one with missing value. 
 
If a mother’s HGC has the same value in both the year preceding and succeeding the 
year with the missing HGC in the middle years, then the missing years will be filled in 
with the value that precedes or succeeds that missing year (which should be the same 
value).  This logical refinement of the data did not create many noticeable changes in 
the means or the variances.  For example, before the logical adjustment, mean 
mother’s HGC from NLSY79CY is 12.487 with the standard deviation of 2.446 
whereas after logical adjustment, it is 12.471 with the standard deviation of 2.448.  
The largest change was the probability of GED and high school diploma receipts, 
where the values from the NLSY79 were 0.095 with the standard deviation of 0.294 
and 0.659 with the standard deviation of 0.474 before the logical adjustment but were 
0.103 with the standard deviation of 0.303 and 0.693 with the standard deviation of 
0.461 after the adjustment. 
 Second, there were many discrepancies among the schooling variables for each 
mother in NLSY79 and NLSY79CY.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics was contacted 
and had revealed out that while some inconsistencies originate from the definition of 
the variables, others are clearly reporting errors (McClaskie 2008).    Mother’s HGC 
from NLSY79CY actually comes from a question in NLSY79: “What is the highest 
grade or year of regular school that you have completed and gotten credit for?” (i.e. 
Q3-4) which is also the source for HGC Original in NLSY79.  This question is asked 
only for those people who answer ‘yes’ in the leading question: “At any time since 
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 (date of the interview), have you attended or been enrolled in regular school—that is, 
in an elementary school, a middle school, a high school, a college, or a graduate 
school?”  Therefore mother’s HGC from NLSY79CY (e.g. C00611.26 in 2000) should 
be the same as the HGC Original from NLSY79 (e.g. R70071.00 in 2000) but should 
be different from HGC Revised from NLSY79 (e.g. R70073.00 in 2000) since 
NLSY79 revises HGC Original using an algorithm to create NHC Revised variable.  
The main differences between mother’s HGC in NLSY79CY and HGC Revised in 
NLSY79 are: mother’s HGC in NLSY79CY is the highest grade completed as of 
survey date and there is no allowance for a GED, high school diploma, or grade 
reversal problems whereas HGC Revised in NLSY79 is the highest grade completed 
by the respondent as of May 1 survey year and there is a correction for a GED, high 
school diploma and grade reversal problems (McClaskie 2008).  More specifically, 
HGC Revised from NLSY79 follows the following decision rules (NLSY79 2008, 
McClaskie 2008): 
When there is a grade reversal (i.e. HGC reported in the later year is less than 
those reported in the earlier year) then HGC was replaced by the highest grade 
completed previously reported by the respondent: 
 
1. When the respondent reports having no high school diploma or GED but some 
college attendance (i.e. grade 13 or higher), then HGC was recoded as 12;  
2. When the respondent reports having no high school diploma or GED but some 
college attendance, then HGC was recoded as 12;  
3. When the respondent reports having high school diploma or GED but no college 
attendance, then HGC was recoded as 12;  
4. In cases where a four-year college degree had obviously been earned in 5 or more 
years, then HGC was recoded as 16;  
5. When the respondent reports “ungraded” when asked for highest grade completed, 
then HGC was replaced by the highest grade completed previously reported by the 
respondent;  
6. HGC values were revised to reflect the respondent’s status on May 1st of survey 
year date;  
7. When the HGC histories are highly erratic, then HGC was assigned “invalid 
missing” (Steve McClaskie: mcclaski@chrr.osu.edu)   
 
 In this study, the mother’s HGC from NLSY79CY is the most relevant 
measure for mother’s schooling since it does not adjust for GEDs.16  Previous studies 
have found that GED recipients are more similar to high school drop outs than high 
school graduates in all dimensions including economic and social outcomes (Heckman 
and LaFontaine 2006, 2007, 2008, Heckman and Rubinstein 2001, Cameron and 
                                                 
16 3% of the mothers had discrepancies between HGC Original from NLSY79 and the mother’s HGC 
from NLSY79CY.  Recall that the information in mother’s HGC from NLSY79CY comes from the 
same question as that for HGC Original from NLSY79 which means that both variables should have the 
same values.  An attempt was made to exclude these mothers from the sample but since the results were 
very similar, they are kept in the final sample to maintain the sample size.   
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 Heckman 1993).  Therefore combining GED recipients with those who completed 
standard high school will be problematic.   
In addition to mother’s grade completion, mother’s high school completion is 
also of great interest to this study.  Compulsory schooling policies will most likely 
affect those mothers who would otherwise dropout of school if legally not bound.  
This means that these policies will most likely affect the mother’s enrollment 
decisions for high school rather than any other levels of schooling such as college.  
For mother’s high school completion, high school diploma variable from NLSY79 
was used.  It was assumed that the mother has high school diploma if she responds that 
she has a high school diploma or both high school diploma and a GED.  This variable 
is optimal because it eliminates the possibility of including GED recipients in the high 
school completion category because the question specifically asks whether the 
respondent has a high school diploma, a GED or both. It is highly unlikely for a 
respondent to answer that she has a high school diploma when she only has a GED or 
vice versa.  Nevertheless an attempt was made to use another method to impute 
mother’s high school completion.  A mother was defined as having completed high 
school if she reported that her HGC is 12 or more.  A mother was assumed to be a 
GED recipient if one of the following was true:  
 
1. mother’s HGC from NLSY79CY is less than or equal to 10 for at least two 
consecutive years followed by a value that is greater or equal to 12 (e.g. 10, 10, 12, 
13) 
2. mother’s HGC from NLSY79CY is equal to 11 for at least two consecutive years 
when the mother was at least age 19 in the first of the two consecutive years 
followed by a value greater or equal to 12 (e.g. 10, 10, 12, 13) 
 
Table A.2.  Comparison of High School Variables Imputed from Mother’s 
Highest Grade Completed from NLSY79CY and from High School Variables 
Taken from NLSY79 for Years 1986-2002 
   
Mom/year observation data Mother’s HGC from NLSY79CY 
HS variables from 
NLSY79 
HS completion or its 
equivalent 
.764 
(.424) 
.842 
(.365) 
GED .069 (.254) 
.103 
(.303) 
HS diploma  .710 (.454) 
.693 
(.461) 
N 30557 30252, 30227 a 
Note: a Sample size for HS completion or its equivalent is 30252 and for GED and HS diploma is 
30227. 
 
A mother was defined as having a high school diploma only if she reported that her 
HGC is 12 or more but did not have a GED as defined here.  GED recipients were 
treated as high school dropouts as suggested by previous studies.  Table A.2 shows the 
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 comparison between the probabilities of mother’s high school completion, GED 
receipt and high school diploma receipt calculated from mother’s HGC from the 
NLSY79CY and reported high school information (i.e. completion, GED, and 
diploma) from the NLSY79.  The observation is at mother-year level (i.e. one 
observation per mother per year) and they are from years 1986 to 2002 which is the 
period years for the final sample of this study.  As clear from the table, there is a large 
discrepancy between these two methods of defining high school completion.  The 
probabilities of high school completion and GED receipt are lower but the probability 
of high school diploma is higher when calculated from mother’s HGC from the 
NLSY79CY.  When GED receipts are examined closely, out of 4524 mothers, 143 
mothers (3% of all mothers) had discrepancies for all the years (1979-2002) between 
GED receipt imputed from mother’s HGC from the NLSY79CY and the reported 
GED receipt from the NLSY79 and 661 mothers (15% of all mothers) had 
discrepancies in at least one year.  Considering the fact that high school variables from 
mother’s HGC from the NLSY79CY are imputed whereas those from NLSY79 are 
reported by the mothers themselves, the variables from the latter dataset is more likely 
to be reliable than the imputed variables from the former dataset.  Therefore this study 
uses high school diploma receipt from the NLSY79 for mother’s high school 
completion.  One point that must be taken away from this is that mother’s HGC from 
the NLSY79CY must be used with caution when determining her high school 
schooling completion status.  These discrepancies provide strong evidence that using 
mother’s HGC from the NLSY79CY to impute her high school completion may be 
very misleading if her own report about high school education in NLSY79 is correct.   
 Third, another important finding of this study is that there are many mothers 
with inconsistent longitudinal schooling trajectories in mother’s HGC from the 
NLSY79CY.  Some mothers report a lower HGC in the later years after reporting a 
higher HGC in the earlier year and this logically does not make sense.  In all, 13% of 
mothers have this discrepancy in their schooling histories.  This problem is also 
recognized by NLSY79 and the appendix in their codebook supplement makes a note 
of this (NLSY79 2008).  As explained earlier, their HGC Revised from NLSY79 
accounts for these grade reversals.   
 
Table A.3. Number of Mothers Affected by Grade Reversals in Mother’s Highest 
Grade Completed Variable from NLSY79CY  
  # of Mothers 
# of Grade Reversals  All mothers Only those who are in the sample 
1 507 481 
2 109 107 
3 14 14 
4 1 1 
5 1 1 
Total 632 604 
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 Table A.3 provides the number of mothers affected by grade reversals in mother’s 
HGC from NLSY79CY.  The majority of mothers who are affected by this problem 
have only one grade reversal in their schooling histories.  Considering the fact that 
NLSY79 revises the HGC Original from NLSY79 to create HGC Revised in cases of 
grade reversals by replacing the affected value by the highest grade completed 
previously reported by the respondent and the fact that most affected mothers are 
affected by grade reversal only once in their grade completion histories, the most 
reasonable way to adjust for the grade reversal is to follow the NLSY79 method.  
Nevertheless, previous research was examined to find out how the studies have dealt 
with this problem.  Although there were many studies that used HGC variables from 
NLSY79 or NLSY79CY,17 there was only one study that did mention in passing the 
problem of grade reversal, but not how the authors dealt with the issue (Keane and 
Wolpin 2000).18  Therefore in this study, it was assumed that if a mother reports 
having lower HGC in the later years in NLSY79CY, the value was reassigned with the 
highest grade completed previously as reported by the mother.  The mean and variance 
did not change much due to this adjustment.  Before adjusting for grade reversal 
problem, the mean of mother’s HGC was 12.804 with the standard deviation of 2.603 
but after the adjustment, the new mean is 12.844 with the standard deviation of 2.608.  
In sum, researchers must keep in mind that the measurement errors of mother’s HGC 
in NLSY79CY are very large and may bias the research findings one way or the other.   
 
 
1.12. CoSLAW Database  
 
When these school entry age and cutoff dates in this dataset are compared with data 
from previous studies including Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Bedard and Dhuey 
(2007), there are quite a number of discrepancies.  For example, in the period of 1964-
1972 which coincides with the time period the sample mothers were affected by 
policies governing school entry, there were 29 states where the cutoff dates differed 
between the CoSLAW dataset and the dataset used by Bedard and Dhuey (2007) of 
which 16 states did not experience policy changes in either dataset.  Since the main 
interest in the study is to examine schooling experiences within each state (by running 
separate analyses for each state or by including state fixed effects when all states are 
pooled together), these 16 states that did not change their policies in either dataset are 
not of concern.  The more concerning issues are the policy changes that take place 
during the time period.  In the CoSLAW dataset, there are 14 entry cutoff date changes 
                                                 
17 There are ten studies that have ‘highest grade completed’ in the abstract that uses NLSY79 and/or 
NLSY79CY according to the NLS Annotated Bibliography online database (2008).  Although not all 
the studies may use the HGC, there are 352 studies on education attainment using NLSY79 (NLS 
Annotated Bibliography online database 2008). 
18 Kean and Wolpin (2000) mention that 20% of their observations had inconsistent longitudinal 
enrollment and highest grade completed data.  They note that they carefully scrutinized all observations 
with inconsistent data and reconstructed a reasonable grade completion history using information 
available in the NLSY including highest grade attended and highest grade completed.  They do not go 
in detail how they did the ‘reconstruction’.  Dr. Wolpin was contacted on March 28, 2008, but the 
author has received no response from him as of December 15, 2008.  
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 in seven states while there are five entry cutoff date changes in four states in the 
dataset from Bedard and Dhuey (2007).  Since the identification from the IV method 
comes from the policy changes including these cutoff date changes, if these cutoff date 
changes are incorrect, changes in mother’s schooling will be wrongfully attributed to 
the policy changes and may fail to detect the true changes in mother’s schooling due to 
policy changes.  Both Lillard (2008) who is in charge of the CoSLAW dataset and 
Bedard and Dhuey (2007) claim that the source of the compulsory school entry 
policies are from state statutes and laws.  Lillard (2008) is currently investigating the 
discrepancies in the datasets.   
 
 
1.13. More on Identification  
 
The use of compulsory school entry and exit ages as instruments for mother’s 
schooling did not turn out to be a valid identification strategy to examine the causal 
effect of mother’s schooling on children’s health care use and health as discussed in 
the main text.  This section explains the source of identification and intuition behind 
the proposed identification strategy.  It examines whether the strategy worked and 
summarizes the reasons why it did not work in practice.  The section also discusses 
how these issues would bias the estimates if they are used as instruments.   
 If compulsory schooling laws are effective and binding, it may affect mother’s 
schooling decisions and ultimately affect her grade attainment or high school 
completion status.  When compulsory school entry and exit ages are used as 
instruments for mother’s schooling, the identification comes from states that changed 
either school entry and/or exit age or cutoff dates during the study period and from 
mothers who potentially changed grade attainment or high school completion status 
due to the policy changes.  Since the regressions control for state and year fixed 
effects, the study compares schooling of mothers who got exposed to different 
schooling policies within each state and correlates these schooling differences with the 
intensity and timing of the policy changes that happened in each state.   
Instrumental variables produce estimates of the effects of mother’s schooling 
for mothers they are affecting, not for the average mothers.  From the previous 
literature, it has been found that females, minorities, children with parents who have 
less than a college degree or from low income families are more compliant with 
compulsory schooling policies (Dobkin and Ferreira 2007, Elder and Lubotsky 2008).  
It has also been found that these policies mostly affect schooling decisions around 
high school (i.e. whether to complete high school or not) and not other educational 
margins such as primary schooling or college (McCrary and Royer 2006).  Mothers 
whose schooling decisions depend on compulsory schooling laws are unlikely to be 
those who already decided to drop out from their primary school or those who go on to 
college; these laws affect those who precisely are in the margin of dropping out of 
high school.  Therefore instrumental variable estimates using compulsory school entry 
and exit ages as instruments most likely produce estimates for mother’s high school 
education among the disadvantaged population.   
The direction of the effect of school entry age on mother’s schooling is 
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 ambiguous although that of school exit age is predictable.  As explained earlier, school 
entry law has an ambiguous effect on grade attainment due to its effect on academic 
performance and grade retention.  Previous studies have found that increase in school 
entry age indeed increased ages of children entering school which allowed them to 
enter school when they were developmentally prepared for the rigors of schooling and 
thereby had positive impacts on academic performance and lead to reduction in grade 
repetitions (e.g. Bedard and Dhuey 2006).  However, there is little agreement on how 
long these benefits last and whether it is long enough to affect grade attainment.  In 
comparison, there are consistent findings for school exit age; increasing school exit 
age increased grade attainment and reduced drop out rates (e.g. Oreopolous 2005, 
2008).  Therefore in the first stage regression where mother’s schooling is regressed 
on school entry and exit ages, while direction of the coefficient on school entry age is 
ambiguous, the coefficient on school exit age should be positive.    
However, as explained in the main text, there were problems using compulsory 
schooling laws as instruments in the study period of this study including: 1) There 
were only a few changes in compulsory schooling policies during the time period the 
sample mothers were affected and therefore only a small proportion of the sample 
mothers were affected by the policy changes; 2) Some states had compliance rates that 
were consistently low or significantly dropped after the law changes which cast a 
doubt on the laws’ efficacy; 3) Perhaps due to the complex ways in which compulsory 
schooling policies affect academic achievement and performance, they were not good 
predictors of mother’s grade completion and high school diploma receipt.  All of these 
issues are potential causes for making them weak instruments.  When an instrumental 
variables (IV) regression suffers from a weak instrument problem, 1) IV estimates will 
have larger standard errors and therefore the precision of the estimates will be low, i.e. 
asymptotic variance is higher than that of OLS estimator and it will be larger if the 
correlation between the endogenous regressor and the instrument is lower (asymptotic 
problem #1); 2) IV estimates may be inconsistent if the instrument is not entirely 
exogenous (asymptotic problem #2); and 3) in finite samples, IV estimates will be 
biased in the same direction as the OLS estimates and the magnitude of the bias is 
inversely related to sample size and the correlation between the instrument and the 
endogenous regressor (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995).   
Moreover, the complex relationship between compulsory schooling laws and 
mother’s schooling also suggests potential violation of the exclusion restriction of 
instrument validity since compulsory schooling laws, specifically school entry laws, 
affect children’s health care use and health through causal pathways other than 
mother’s grade attainment or high school completion such as academic performance 
and grade retention.  If the instruments are not valid, IV estimates will be both biased 
and inconsistent from the OLS estimates (Hahn and Hausman 2003).  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE EFFECT OF HEALTH INSURANCE ON CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
CARE USE AND HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICAID AND 
SCHIP EXPANSIONS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Although there was a steady increase in children’s health insurance coverage in the 
1990s with Medicaid expansions and the implementation of State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP), the uninsured rate among children still remains a big 
problem (Holahan and Cook 2007).  As of 2006, more than 9 million children were 
without coverage (Holahan and Cook 2007, DeNavas-Walt, Proctor and Smith 2007, 
Kaiser Family Foundation 2008).  With a large number of children still uninsured, 
addressing the low insurance coverage among children is of great concern to the 
nation because of its potential for detrimental effect on health care use and health 
(Dubay et al 2007).   
One major concern among the policy makers is the low insurance coverage 
among certain subgroups of children.  While eligibility for Medicaid and SCHIP has 
increased considerably for the children over the last decade, insurance coverage still 
remains very low for a certain subset of the children.  One such subset is immigrant 
(non-citizen) children.  A quarter of uninsured children who have income below the 
public health insurance eligibility threshold are legal immigrant children.  They are 
barred from obtaining coverage because of new eligibility rules that banned coverage 
to recent immigrants to the country (Dubay et al 2007).  Compared to the citizen 
children, immigrant children are more than twice as likely to be uninsured, more than 
three times likely not to have a usual place of care and more than twice as likely to be 
in poor reported health (Capps 2001).  Currently, 20% of the children in the United 
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States are either immigrants themselves or from immigrant families and this number is 
growing rapidly; since the 1990s, the growth rate of the number of children in 
immigrant families has been seven times faster than that of the children in the native 
families (Morse 2008).   
Another subgroup with low insurance coverage is older adolescents aged 19 
and 20.  Adolescents who are above 18 are not eligible for SCHIP and have limited 
eligibility for Medicaid (Almeida and Kenney 2000).  At age 19, adolescents also 
grow out of their parents’ employer health insurance (Collins et al 2007).  About a half 
of the older adolescents hold jobs without health insurance coverage (Callahan and 
Cooper 2004, Quinn, Schoen, Buatti 2000) and are much more likely to be in poverty 
than the older workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005).  They are often too poor to 
afford private health insurance.  Consequently they have the highest rate of 
uninsurance among any age group of the U. S. population (Risling et al 2007).  While 
there have been uncoordinated efforts by the states and private insurers to extend 
coverage to this group, there have not been any national strategies to promote these 
efforts (Callahan 2007).  This is of concern given that adolescents have a high risk of 
unintended pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases, substance abuse and injuries 
(Blum 1995, Henshaw 1998, CDC 2001, Anderson 1999). 
Insurance is important not for its own sake but for its facilitation to health care 
and ultimately better health as well as financial protection for unforeseeable health 
shocks.  Insurance is expected to improve insurers’ access to health care and indirectly 
improve health.  Insurance will have an effect on health when two conditions are met: 
1) insurance increases the use of appropriate and timely health care; and 2) this 
increased health care translates to improved health.  For children, understanding the 
relationship between health insurance status, health care use and health status is 
extremely crucial given their high needs of health care and the importance of healthy 
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growth in the formative years.  RAND randomized health insurance experiment 
conducted in the early 1970s showed that some health care uses are indeed affected by 
insurance among children; children were sensitive to price for outpatient health care 
but not for inpatient health care.  However, the experiment also found that difference 
in outpatient health care use as a result of different co-payment levels did not 
ultimately affect health (See Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 1993, 
Manning et al 1987 for summary of findings).  RAND experiment provided an 
indispensable understanding of the causal link between health insurance, health care 
use and health.  However, although the results are unfortunately outdated, social 
experiments of this comprehensiveness and magnitude are impossible to implement in 
today’s environment.1  The next best option to randomized controlled experiment is a 
quasi-experimental study that addresses endogeneity of health insurance and this is the 
main attempt in this study. 
This study examines the effect of health insurance on children’s use of health 
care and health status by using the 1992-2002 National Health Interview Survey.  This 
is the time period of expansion in public insurance programs and the increase in 
children’s insurance coverage.  Variation in Medicaid expansion and SCHIP 
implementation is used as a source of identification for the analysis.  To examine the 
effect of health insurance on children’s use of health care and health status, an 
instrumental variables (IV) fixed effects model is estimated.  Simulated eligibility 
measures for public insurance for children and their families were calculated from 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and used as instruments for health insurance 
coverage (any coverage) which are potentially endogenous to the health outcomes.  
Simulated measure of children’s own eligibility for public health insurance is the 
                                                 
1 Moreover, the RAND experiment did not have an uninsured group for comparison (group with highest 
co-payment level paid 95% of the actual medical costs) and therefore strictly speaking, it allowed 
researchers to only infer the effects of insurance by comparing outcomes of children in different co-
payment groups.   
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fraction of a nationally representative sample of children who are eligible for public 
insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) in a given state in a given month and year for each age 
(see Currie and Gruber 1996a for example).  Simulated measure of children’s family 
eligibility for public health insurance is the family mean of simulated eligibilities after 
assigning children's simulated eligibilities that vary by state, year, month and age and 
adults' simulated eligibilities that vary by state, year, month, sex and female head of 
household (see Gruber and Simon 2007 for example).  These fractions are the degrees 
to which one state or year is more generous in its treatment compared to another state 
or year.  Intuitively, the identification method exploits the fact that some states 
implemented more generous public insurance eligibility rules at different times.  It 
correlates these differences in magnitudes and periods of eligibility expansions with 
the changes in children’s health care use and health outcomes.   
This study examines the effect of health insurance coverage using the 
variations from public health insurance expansions.  The paper uses the range of 
outcomes that capture inpatient and outpatient health care as well as ultimate health 
status.  With different outcomes seen for inpatient and outpatient services by co-
payment levels, examining the use of both types of services is essential.  It examines 
the effect on all children and by different age groups since studies show varying 
effects of public insurance expansion on insurance status by age (Leininger 2007a).  It 
also separately estimates the effect on immigrant children.  The effect on older 
adolescents is explored using graphical and regression discontinuity techniques.  All 
the models control for observable individual and state characteristics and include state, 
year and child’s age fixed effects.   
 Many studies including this study examine the same fundamental question of 
whether public health insurance expansions affected health insurance coverage and 
whether this change in coverage affected outcomes such as health care use and health 
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(e.g. Currie, Decker and Lin 2008, Wang et al. 2007a, Currie 1999).  To identify the 
causal effects, all studies basically correlate change in children’s insurance status, 
from no insurance to public insurance, with public health insurance eligibility 
expansions. Levy and Meltzer (2001) concluded in their literature review that most 
evidence points toward a small, positive effect of health insurance on health with the 
effect concentrating on vulnerable populations including infants and low income 
children.  This study provides additional evidence on the effect of health insurance on 
health status by using different time periods (1992-2002, 1997-2002), for different 
subsets of children (all children, by age groups, immigrant children) and for different 
outcome measures (health care use including preventive care use, curative outpatient 
care and inpatient care and health).   
 This study also provides exploratory analyses on older adolescents.  Older 
adolescents aged 19 and above are an age group that is especially important.  Because 
they have been left out of the realm of both private and public health insurance, they 
have the highest uninsured rate among all age groups.  Given that this age group has 
its unique health vulnerabilities, this study will provide an informative preliminary 
analysis for further investigation. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 introduces some 
background information on Medicaid expansions and SCHIP implementation.  Section 
3 reviews existing literature on public health insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) and 
children’s health and health care use.  Section 4 explains the basic model and 
conceptual framework underlying the study.  Section 5 outlines the identification 
procedures.  Section 6 introduces the data.  Section 7 tests for IV method.  Section 8 
presents the results of the descriptive and the regression analyses for all children and 
by age groups.  Section 9 presents results of descriptive and regression analyses for 
immigrant children.  Section 10 presents results of descriptive and regression analyses 
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for older adolescents.  Section 11 presents discussion of the results and Section 12 
offers conclusions and implications for future research. 
2.2. Background Information on Medicaid and SCHIP Expansions 
Medicaid was initially created in 1965 to provide heath insurance to welfare receiving 
population (single parent families, elderly, blind and disabled) and soon after, states 
were given freedom to extend eligibility to the “Ribicoff children” (children who meet 
the financial criteria but not ‘categorical’ or non-financial criteria for Medicaid, e.g. 
low income children in two parent families) and to the medically needy.  But the 
beginning of the mid 1980s was when Medicaid substantially expanded eligibility for 
children and pregnant women.  From 1984 to 1987, eligibility was extended to those 
who were financially comparable to AFDC recipients but were not eligible because of 
other reasons such as family structure.  From 1987 till today, income cutoff for 
eligibility increased considerably.  The largest expansions for children occurred from 
1998 to 2000 when states created State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
programs.  SCHIP was established through the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to allow 
states to extend eligibility to low-income children under age 19 who were not eligible 
for Medicaid.  To this date, none of the states cover children beyond age 18.  SCHIP 
typically covers children who have higher incomes than those who are covered by 
Medicaid and the range of services are typically more comprehensive in Medicaid 
than SCHIP, especially when administered as a separate SCHIP program and not as a 
Medicaid expansion program (For more information about the coverage differences, 
refer to Rosenbaum et al 2004).   States began implementing SCHIP as early as 1998 
and by September 30, 1999, all states and the District of Columbia had their own 
SCHIP program in place (Cohen and Bloom 2005).  As of July 2005, majority of 
states had SCHIP eligibility at or above 200% federal poverty threshold (NASHP 
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2005).2  By December 2004, 4 million children were covered by SCHIP in all states 
and the District of Columbia (Smith and Rousseau. 2005).  Medicaid eligibility 
expansions started earlier for younger children and pregnant women in the late 1980s 
and was extended to older children in the late 1990s (Currie, Decker and Lin 2008).  
While the eligibility expansions were gradual for younger children, older children 
experienced a sharper increase in eligibility in the late 1990s (Currie, Decker and Lin 
2008).   
Expansion of parental eligibility to Medicaid/SCHIP began around the same 
time frame.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (PRWORA) delinked welfare cash assistance and Medicaid eligibility.  It also 
allowed states to apply less restrictive income eligibility rules to families as long as 
they met the categorical standards.  In August 1998, Department of Health and Human 
Services expanded eligibility to all two parent families that met income and resource 
standards by altering definition of unemployment, one of the categorical standards for 
Medicaid.  In July 2000, Health Care Financing Administration provided guidelines 
for states to obtain waivers to extend SCHIP coverage to parents.  Health Insurance 
Flexibility and Accountability initiative issued in August 2001 also gave incentives for 
states to extend parental coverage.  It provided enhanced waiver flexibility for 
designing public insurance programs to states that extend coverage to parents (For 
more details, see Gruber 2003, Dubay and Kenney 2003, Broaddus et al 2002).   
Before 1996, legal immigrants were covered by Medicaid under the same 
eligibility criteria as the citizens.  However, after the passage of PRWORA, there were 
many changes in federal regulations that made immigrant children less likely to be 
covered by public health insurance.  Legal immigrants became ineligible for Medicaid 
coverage for the first five years in the country regardless of their financial need.  
                                                 
2 Federal poverty thresholds for a family of three in 2005 were: $16,090 for 48 contiguous states and 
District of Columbia, $20,110 for Alaska and $18,510 for Hawaii. 
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Exemptions were given only to refugees, other humanitarian immigrants and active 
members or veterans of US Armed Forces and their families.  SCHIP was also 
introduced with the same eligibility criteria as Medicaid for the legal immigrants.3  
The documentation requirements also tightened.  For some legal immigrants, income 
calculations for eligibility now need to include a portion of their sponsor’s income and 
resources regardless of whether their income is shared with the sponsor.   While about 
half of the states use state funds to cover legal immigrant children and pregnant 
women, these coverages are highly responsive to state’s economic conditions.   
 Once children reach age 19, most of them become ineligible for Medicaid or 
SCHIP.  Although there have been several state proposals that extend public insurance 
coverage to children beyond age 18, none has been realized so far (Collins et al 2007).  
Only in special cases, older adolescents of age 19 or above may obtain public health 
insurance.  Medicaid is required to cover older adolescents of ages 19 and 20 if they 
are either pregnant or parents.  SCHIP is required to offer coverage if they are 
pregnant.  There are several other coverage options under Medicaid or SCHIP for 
older adolescents of ages 19 and 20 including: “Ribicoff Children” (15 states);4 
medically needy children (16 states); low income childless independent adults (15 
states); high risk children who require special health care (45 states) (those with 
disabilities, those in psychiatric facilities or other institutional care, those who were 
previously in foster care, and those who require family planning services) (Fox et al 
2007).  Although there is no literature examining the magnitude of coverage in these 
special cases, most states had not adopted broad coverage options for this age group.  
                                                 
3 Undocumented immigrants and immigrants with visas for temporary stays are continued to be barred 
from Medicaid and SCHIP.   
4 As stated earlier, “Ribicoff children” are those who meet the financial criteria but not categorical 
criteria for Medicaid such as low income children in two parent families. 
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Therefore most older adolescents did not benefit from the Medicaid expansions and 
SCHIP implementation in the 1990s.5   
 
2.3. Literature 
Health is determined not only by use of health care but also by income, health 
behavior, health awareness and other various environmental factors.  All of these also 
affect insurance status of an individual which impacts his/her use of health care and 
ultimately health.  At the same time, health affects the use of health care (sick seek 
more health care than the healthy) and the decision for insurance coverage (adverse 
selection).  This complexity where health insurance is affected both by health and by 
other underlying factors that are correlated with health (both observed and 
unobserved) necessitates addressing the issue of endogeneity of health insurance.  
Since a randomized control social experiment cannot be implemented in today’s 
environment, several approaches have been used to correct for endogeneity in quasi-
experimental studies.  One method used in recent studies is instrumental variables (IV) 
method.  Using the variation created by Medicaid and SCHIP expansions, studies have 
used simulated public insurance eligibilities (e.g. Currie and Gruber 1996a, Gruber 
and Simon 2007) or other state and family level characteristics (Wang et al. 2007a) as 
instruments for health insurance.  Other methods that have been used by other 
researchers are difference-in-differences (e.g. Leininger 2007a) and fixed effects (e.g. 
Currie and Thomas 1995).   
The main analysis in this study follows earlier studies that used simulated 
public insurance eligibility measures as instruments, such as Currie and Gruber 
(1996a) and Gruber and Simon (2007), to examine the causal effect of health 
insurance coverage on children’s use of health care and health status outcomes.  
                                                 
5 To address the low coverage of children beyond age 18, 17 states have passed laws that increased age 
dependency beyond age 18 for private insurance in the past few years (Collins et al 2007). 
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Earlier studies point out that family’s public health insurance eligibility is an 
important factor in children’s public health insurance coverage due to spillover effects 
(Cutler and Gruber 1996a, Gruber and Simon 2007).  Therefore this study uses 
simulated eligibilities at both child and family level for instruments.6  While many 
earlier studies used simulated public insurance eligibilities as instruments for actual 
public insurance eligibility (e.g. Currie and Gruber 1996a, Dafny and Gruber 2000, 
2005, Currie, Decker and Lin 2008),7 this study uses the same instruments for 
children’s insurance coverage (i.e. have insurance or not).  Since the same instruments 
are used, identification from both studies comes from the same public insurance 
eligibility expansions in 1990s and early 2000s.  Reasons for this study to examine the 
effect of any insurance coverage instead of public insurance eligibility are three fold.  
First, insurance status will have lower reporting error than actual eligibility.  Since 
children’s insurance status is available in NHIS whereas actual eligibility is not, 
eligibility needs to be calculated using various information.  The information required 
to determine eligibility include income that is often reported with great error.  
Consequently, reporting bias will be larger for eligibility than coverage.   Second, the 
issue of the effect of actual coverage induced by eligibility expansion is as important 
as the effect of eligibility expansion itself and this has not been explored as 
extensively in earlier studies.  Comparing findings from these two types of studies 
provides informative insights on the importance of policies that target increasing take 
up rates.  Lastly, although the natural extension of eligibility studies to examine 
coverage is to study the effects of public insurance coverage (instead of any coverage), 
                                                 
6 Earlier studies generally use either one of the instruments (i.e. child or family level) and not both.  
This study uses both instruments to capture effects of both child and family level expansions of public 
insurance eligibilities.   
7 These studies use eligibility as opposed to coverage for several reasons.  First, eligibility is a policy 
lever that is easier to maneuver than coverage.  Second, eligibility is less likely to be endogenous 
because it is less likely to reflect behavioral outcomes than coverage which reflects individuals’ choices 
to enroll (or not) in a program (Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine 1999). 
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this study does not do so because the instruments were not very strong when the effect 
of insurance coverage were examined by type of insurance.  A detailed comparison of 
the identification strategies between this study and previous eligibility studies are 
found in the Appendix 2.14. 
Most studies that used public insurance eligibility expansions in the 1990s to 
correct for endogeneity of insurance have looked into the effect of public insurance 
eligibility and to a much lesser extent, public insurance coverage.  Previous studies 
that focused on eligibility found that public health insurance eligibility increased 
children’s use of preventive care (Currie and Gruber 1996a).  They also found that 
eligibility decreased children’s preventable hospitalizations (i.e. hospitalizations that 
can be avoided by early contact with a primary care physician) but increased overall 
hospitalizations suggesting increased efficiency in health care (Dafny and Gruber 
2005, Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine 1999).  However, these changes in health care use 
did not seem to have affected children’s health.  A few existing studies found little 
(both positive and negative) to no effect.  They found that Medicaid increased reported 
activity limitation (Currie and Gruber 1995) and reduced child mortality (Currie and 
Gruber 1996a) but SCHIP did not impact reported general health status (Currie, 
Decker and Lin 2008).   
One recent study by Currie, Decker and Lin (2008) is important in the context 
of this paper.  They found that public insurance eligibility increased children’s use of 
preventive care (i.e. children with public insurance eligibility are 6.8 percentage points 
less likely to have gone without doctor visit in the past year) but no effect on their 
health status.  They used 1986-2005 NHIS data and controlled for the endogeneity of 
public insurance eligibility using the simulated eligibility measure for the child.  
Whereas their main focus was to understand how public insurance eligibility affected 
the importance of income in predicting children’s health care use and health status, the 
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main focus of this study is to determine how health insurance coverage affected health 
care use and health status of all children and the subgroups during the period of public 
insurance expansion.  This study builds on their study by using an additional 
instrument (family level simulated eligibility measure), a wider range of outcome 
measures and by examining subgroups of children.   
As stated earlier, to the author’s knowledge, not much work is done on the 
effect of insurance coverage on children’s health care use and health status that uses 
public insurance eligibility expansions in the 1990s for identification.  Existing 
evidence from national level studies suggest that Medicaid had no impact on the 
number of doctor visits and reported general health status for white children but a 
positive effect for Black and Hispanic children (Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine 1999).  
Medicaid also decreased the incidence of ambulatory care sensitive discharges among 
low income young children (Kaestner, Joyce, and Racine 1999).  SCHIP decreased 
unmet needs and increased use of both dental and medical care (Wang et al. 2007a, 
2007b).   
Using data from 1997-2002 NHIS, Wang et al. (2007a) found that public 
insurance coverage led to a fairly large increase in low income children’s medical care 
access and use.8  There was however no effect on the unmet need for drug or mental 
health care.  Instrumental variable approach was used to control for the endogeneity of 
public insurance coverage.  They used SCHIP availability, waiting periods, SCHIP or 
Medicaid income eligibility threshold, Food Stamps receipt and availability of 
employer health insurance for instruments.  They limit the sample to those children 
who are in the Sample Child file9 whose family incomes are below state SCHIP 
eligibility limits.  Whereas their main focus is to understand how public insurance 
                                                 
8 Children with public insurance coverage were approximately 25 and 9 percentage points, about 35% 
and 100% of the sample mean, more likely than the uninsured to have had a general and a specialty 
doctor visits in the past year. 
9 Sample Child file includes information for only one child per household. 
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coverage affected health care access and use (including usual source of care, forgone 
care or unmet need, use of health care) among low income children, the main focus of 
this study is to determine how (public) health insurance coverage affected health care 
use and ultimately health status for all children and by subgroups during the period of 
public insurance expansion.  This study builds on their research by using a different 
set of instruments, a larger sample of children,10 a longer time period, a wider range of 
outcomes including children’s health and by examining subgroups of children.11  
Few studies have focused on immigrant children.  Immigrant children are one 
of the most vulnerable populations in the country and their number is growing rapidly.  
These studies found some mixed impacts of Medicaid and SCHIP.  Currie (1999) 
found that the Medicaid eligibility expansions in the late 1980s to early 1990s 
decreased the proportion of children with no doctor visits in the past year by about 35 
percentage points.  This study adds to the small literature on the effect of public health 
insurance on immigrant children health care use by providing more recent evidence.  It 
also extends the analysis to their children’s health status which has not been explored 
before. 
                                                 
10 As mentioned in the text, Wang et al (2007a) use data from the Sample Child file which includes 
information for only one child per household.  On the other hand, this study mainly uses data from the 
person file which includes data for all children in the household and therefore the sample size is larger 
for this study and the variables used in this study come from different questions.  For example, the 
outcomes on general and specialty doctor visits comes from Sample Child file based on the following 
questions: “During the past 12 months have you seen or talked to the following about [sample child’s] 
health: (1) A general doctor who treats a variety of illnesses (a doctor in general practice, pediatrics, 
family medicine, or internal medicine) and (2) A medical doctor who specializes in a particular medical 
disease or problem (other than obstetrician/gynecologist, psychiatrist or ophthalmologist)?”  Based on 
these questions, the proportion of low income children who have had general and specialty doctor visits 
in the past year is approximately 75-85% and 9-15%, respectively (Wang et al 2007).  In this study, the 
outcomes on doctor visits for 1997-2002 comes from person file based on the following questions: 
"During those 2 weeks, did {person} see a doctor or other health care professional at a doctor's office, a 
clinic, an emergency room, or some other place? (Do not include times during an overnight hospital 
stay) [exclude any baby born during interview week]"; and "How many times did {person} visit a 
doctor or other health care professional during those 2 weeks?"  Based on these questions, the 
proportion of children who have had doctor visits in the past 2 weeks is approximately 11%.   
11 Although in the earlier versions of the study, the effects of public and private insurance coverage (as 
opposed to no insurance) on children’s health care use and health status were examined using the same 
instruments for public and private insurance coverage, these analyses were dropped in the later version 
because the instruments were too weak for public and private insurance coverage. 
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Studies found that 19 and 20 year olds have higher rates of uninsurance than 
other children in the same income category (Almeida and Kenney 2000).  In fact, they 
are the fastest growing group in the U. S. population without health insurance in the 
recent years (Collins et al 2007).  Despite this disproportionate risk of being 
uninsured, there are only a few studies that examine the effect of insurance coverage 
on older adolescents of which all of them are either correlational or descriptive.  These 
studies find that uninsured older adolescents are more likely to delay or forgo health 
care.  They have fewer doctor visits and are less likely to have a usual source of health 
care.  Consequently, they are more likely to be in poor health (Callahan and Cooper 
2005, McManus, Greaney and Newacheck 1989).  Moreover, most previous studies 
group these older adolescents with other age groups (e.g. younger adolescents, other 
children or other nonelderly adults) making it difficult to understand the problems 
unique to this age group (McManus, Greaney and Newacheck 1989).  This study 
provides informative analysis on the benefits of insurance coverage for older 
adolescents’ health and health care use.   
In sum, this study examines the effect of health insurance on children’s health 
and health care use with an emphasis on subgroups with low coverage.  It looks at 
health insurance coverage as opposed to public insurance eligibility but use the same 
variation in public insurance eligibility expansion for identification as previous 
eligibility studies.  Knowing the effect of coverage is informative in determining the 
relevance of the policies that aim to increase enrollment to public and private 
insurance programs without altering eligibility rules.  The findings from this study will 
complement Currie, Decker and Lin (2008) by examining the effects of public 
insurance expansion on children who actually took up coverage (either private or 
public) and by using a greater set of outcome measures. 
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 Lastly, this study will contribute to the small literature that exists on health 
insurance and immigrant children and older adolescents, a population that historically 
have had difficulty in the nation’s health care system.  Covering these children will 
most likely be one of the most pressing issues in the future of U.S. health care system 
because of the renewed awareness to the problem of uninsurance and the growing 
interest in improving health insurance coverage in our nation (Luo 2008). 
2.4. Conceptual Framework 
Health insurance may affect child health through several complex pathways.  Health 
insurance may affect the marginal cost of health care.  Health insurance reduces 
marginal cost of health care for the individuals by pooling individuals’ risks.  For 
private insurance, children’s families usually pay annual premiums and a co-payment 
for every health care use.  The more payment families make as premiums, the 
marginal cost of health care (i.e. co-payment) goes down.  Public insurance almost 
brings down the marginal cost of health care to zero except for a small co-payment in 
the case of SCHIP if applicable.  This reduction in the marginal cost of health care 
should in turn increase access to care and should ultimately lead to improved child 
health.   
For children who became newly eligible and signed up for Medicaid/SCHIP 
due to eligibility expansions, marginal cost of health insurance decreased considerably 
(down to zero, except for time and stigma costs of signing up for eligible children 
because they can now get coverage for free).  If children are responsive to this change 
in health care cost, then they will most likely increase health care use and this may 
ultimately affect health.  Expansions to parents that began as a part of welfare reform 
may also have affected children’s use of health care and health status by altering 
children’s health insurance coverage.  By insuring parents along with children, 
 94
marginal increase in costs of obtaining and renewing coverage is considerably less 
than the marginal increase in benefits (Sommers 2006).  For example, while the 
paperwork and procedures to renew coverage do not increase proportionally with 
family size, financial benefits of health insurance and improved health status increase 
proportionally.  Thus, expanded eligibility to parents should have a non-negative 
effect on children’s Medicaid/SCHIP coverage and this should ultimately affect 
children’s use of health care and health as explained above.   
However, child’s health insurance coverage may not change if 
Medicaid/SCHIP expansions crowd out private health insurance, i.e. children who 
were already covered by private insurance may simply switch to public insurance once 
they become eligible for public insurance.12  In this case, their health insurance status 
(i.e. covered or not) will remain the same.  If the effect of insurance on children’s 
health care use and health does not vary by type of insurance, then the ultimate effect 
on children’s use of health care and health may be nill.   
2.5. Identification Procedures 
The impact of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions on children’s health care use and child 
health is estimated using an instrumental variables (IV) fixed effects model.   
In the first stage, a child’s health insurance status is estimated using simulated 
measure of child’s and family’s public health eligibilities as instruments: 
AnyInsist = α0+α1SimPubEligist+α2SimFamEligist+ εist   (1)  
where AnyInsist is the health insurance status (i.e. have any insurance or not) of the 
child i.  SimPubEligist is the fraction of a nationally representative sample of children 
who are eligible for public insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) in a given state in a given 
month and year for each age calculated from CPS.  This simulated measure of child’s 
                                                 
12 Previous studies that found crowd out rate of about 5-30% for Medicaid and 50-60% for SCHIP 
(Gruber and Simon 2007). 
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own public health insurance eligibility varies by state, year, month, and age (see 
Currie and Gruber 1996a for example).13  SimFamilyEligist is the simulated measure of 
child’s family eligibility for public health insurance that is calculated in a similar way 
using CPS.  After assigning each child with his/her own simulated eligibility measure, 
a simulated measure of public insurance eligibility is assigned to each adult that varies 
by state, year, month, sex and female head of household.  Then the family mean of the 
simulated eligibilities are taken to be used as an instrument (see Gruber and Simon 
2007 for example).  These fractions are the degrees to which one state (or year) is 
more generous in its treatment compared to another state or year.  Instruments are 
valid methods when two conditions are met: 1) Instrument relevance: The instrument 
must be correlated with the treatment of interest.  In the regression of outcome Y on 
instrument Z, Y  = α0+ α1Z+ ε, the instrument relevance condition says that α1 ≠ 0; and 
2) Exclusion restriction: The instrument must not be correlated with the error term, i.e. 
omitted variables in the outcome equation.  In the context of the above regression, the 
exclusion restriction says that Cov(Z, ε) = 0.  Theoretically, simulated eligibilities 
satisfy both conditions.  As mentioned earlier, state’s public insurance expansions 
reduced marginal cost of health insurance.  If children are responsive to these cost 
changes, then eligibility expansions must be correlated changes in overall insurance 
coverage.  This satisfies condition 1.  It also fulfills condition 2 since the measures are 
solely based on policies that were in place in that state/year which were most likely 
exogenous and/or captured by control variables included in the regression.  However, 
if either one of the conditions is not met, the instruments are not valid.  The first 
                                                 
13 Both Davidoff et al. (2005) and Currie and Gruber (1996) calculated SCHIP and Medicaid eligibility 
with NHIS income data that are only available in categories.  Davidoff et al. (2005) do not discuss in 
detail about how they calculated eligibility.  Currie and Gruber (1996) imputed income by randomly 
choosing a point in the income bracket and for missing income data, they regressed yearly income on 
household characteristics in CPS to get the coefficients that were then used to estimate the income in 
NHIS.  This study follows the method of calculating eligibility and simulated eligibility instrument used 
by Currie and Gruber (1996).    
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condition can be tested using a conventional rule of first stage F statistic greater than 
10.  The findings from the study build on the assumption that the second condition is 
met and that there are no omitted variables that affect public insurance eligibility rules 
and children’s health care use and health.  
In the second stage, the effect of child’s health insurance status on child’s 
health care access and outcomes is estimated using his/her predicted health insurance 
status from (1) and other exogenous variables: 
Yist = β0+β1Xist+ β2Zist + β3PredAnyInsist+ β4σs+ β5ωt+ β6σist  (2) 
where Yist is one of the several access to care measures or the health outcomes of child 
i in state s in year t: a dummy indicating whether the child is in excellent health,14 a 
dummy indicating whether the child has any limitation of activity, a dummy indicating 
whether the child had doctor visits in the past two weeks and the number of such visits 
(for 1997-2002), a dummy indicating whether the child had school days lost due to 
illness or injuries in the past year and number of such days (only for ages 5 to 17 and 
for 1997-2002), a dummy indicating whether the child had short stay hospital episodes 
in the past year and the number of such episodes (for 1997-2002), and a dummy 
indicating whether the child had short stay hospital days in the past year and the 
number of such days (for 1997-2002).15  PredAnyInsist is the predicted health 
insurance status of the child i in state s in year t.   
Xist is a vector of individual characteristics including child’s age, sex, race, 
mother’s education, mother’s age, family size, mother’s marital status, family income 
as percent of federal poverty level and its square, and mother’s work status.  Zst is a 
vector of state characteristics including the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate 
                                                 
14 5 point scale for reported general health was also used to define poor health and was used as outcome.  
Since results were consistent with the findings for excellent health, the results are not presented here.  
15  Separate analyses are conducted for different periods of years because some outcome 
measures were not consistently measured over time in NHIS.  Further explanation can be found in the 
data section. 
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(data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics); real median wages (data from the CPS); the 
maximum value of the federal and state EITC for a single mother with two children 
(data from Green Book; Leigh, 2003); the annual employment growth rate (data from 
the National Bureau of Economic Analysis); the amount of federal housing money 
spent per 1,000 residents in the state (data from the U.S. Census Bureau); a dummy 
variable indicating whether the state has AFDC waiver, and a dummy indicating 
whether the state has TANF.  Child’s age is controlled as age fixed effects and not 
with a continuous variable.  As discussed earlier, the change in the generosity of 
public health insurance eligibility varied depending on the child’s age and therefore it 
is more appropriate to compare children in the same age group than to compare with 
children from all other age groups.  
If this model is estimated by OLS, β3, could be biased. As mentioned earlier, 
AnyInsist captures many characteristics about the person including income (most likely 
in a nonlinear way), unobserved health care needs and health.  Therefore, IV approach 
is used with simulated eligibility measures as instruments for children’s health 
insurance coverage in a two stage set-up from which the causal effect of children’s 
health insurance status on their health care access and health outcomes are derived.  
Mathematical explanation of endogeneity bias is provided in the Appendix 2.15.  
Basically, if there is a correlation between one or more of the regressor variables and 
the error term, OLS estimator will be biased and inconsistent.  The direction of the 
bias depends on the problem.  One may believe that higher income individuals who 
are more aware about health are more likely to have health insurance.  If so, OLS 
estimates will be positively biased because these individuals are more likely to be 
healthier due to greater access to high quality health care and healthier lifestyles.  On 
the other hand, one may believe that individuals with greater health care needs due to 
unobserved health problems (i.e. unobservable to the researchers) are more likely to 
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have health insurance.  If this is the case, then there will be a negative bias because 
individuals will be negatively selected into insurance.  
Magnitudes of the estimated effects also depend on case by case bases.  OLS 
estimates produce average treatment effect whereas IV estimates produce local 
average treatment effect or LATE.  Therefore while OLS produces estimates of the 
effects on the average individual in the sample, IV produces estimates of the effects on 
the population that is affected by the instrument.  Depending on the subgroup of 
population that the instrument is working on, magnitudes of two estimates vary.  For 
example, in this paper, public insurance eligibility expansions are used to identify the 
effect of health insurance coverage.  Since public insurance eligibility expansions 
most likely have impacted low income children and not high income children, IV 
estimates produce effects that are ‘local’ to low income children.  If one believes that 
the effects of health insurance on a low income child are greater than those on an 
average child (e.g. a low income child may have greater unmet need for health care), 
then the magnitude of the IV estimates will be larger than the OLS estimates.  On the 
other hand, if one believes that the effects on a low income child are smaller than 
those on an average child (e.g. a low income child may not be able to make the full 
use of health insurance services), then the magnitude of the IV estimates will be 
smaller than the OLS estimates.  Therefore without empirical analyses, it is difficult to 
predict the direction or the magnitude difference between IV and OLS estimates.   
All regressions include state and year fixed effects, σs and ϖt, that are used to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with the policy variable.  
If there are any differences in the effects that are unique to a state or a year, then fixed 
effects control for these effects.  εist is the error term that captures remaining 
unobservables that are not captured in the equation and are clustered at the state level.  
Equations are estimated using a linear probability model for categorical dependent 
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variables and an OLS for continuous dependent variables.  However, one should keep 
in mind that linear probability models should be used with caution for dichotomous 
outcome variables. More details are provided in the Appendix 2.16. 
2.6. Data 
2.6.1. National Health Interview Survey  
The data for this study comes from National Health Interview Survey, which is a 
cross-sectional household interview survey conducted continuously throughout each 
year since 1957.   It is a representative sample of the U.S. population from all 50 
States and the District of Columbia.  NHIS monitors the health of the U.S. population 
through collection of various health characteristics by many demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics.  It covers the civilian non-institutionalized population 
of the United States living at the time of the interview.  Patients in long-term care 
facilities, persons on active duty with the Armed Forces, and U.S. nationals living in 
foreign countries are excluded from the survey.  The annual response rate of NHIS is 
greater than 90 percent (Vital and Health Statistics Summary Health Statistics for U.S. 
Adults and Children Reports: National Health Interview Survey for various years).  
Blacks and Hispanics have been oversampled since 1995.  NHIS uses stratified 
multistage probability sampling.  NHIS underwent two changes in 1997.  The first is a 
change in the interview procedure.  Until 1997, interviews were conducted using paper 
and pencil. However, starting from 1997, they have been conducted using a computer 
assisted personal interviewer (CAPI).  The second change, which is the crucial one, is 
the questionnaire redesign that has been in effect starting with the 1997 survey.   
  This study uses the 1992-2002 NHIS data for the analyses.  The main sample 
for this study consists of children between ages 0-18 years, who lived with their 
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mothers at the time of interview, and are the children of the household reference 
person.16  Therefore all children who are the grandchildren of the household reference 
person are excluded.  In addition to the analyses for all children, the analyses are 
conducted by different age groups (ages 0-6, 7-12, 13-18).  This was done to reflect 
the varying health care needs and effectiveness of medical intervention of health by 
age.  Immigrant children include children who have at least one foreign born parent.17    
Exploratory analysis on older adolescents use samples from 1997-2002 and 
includes all adolescents between ages 16-21 regardless of their relationship to the 
household reference person.  Unlike the main sample, this sample is not limited to 
children of the household reference person.  All adolescents that met the age criteria 
were kept to understand how the proportion of adolescents living with parents change 
by age.  The analysis is also limited to the years between 1997 and 2002.  Until 1996, 
the minimum age limit to qualify as a reference person was age 19.  However, from 
1997 onwards, NHIS changed the limit to age 18.  This is important for the analysis of 
older adolescents in this study since the source of identification comes from the sharp 
discontinuity in health insurance coverage at age 18 and 19.  Therefore any other sharp 
changes that may have occurred at the same time will invalidate the method.18  During 
                                                 
16 In the sample child core, one child is randomly selected from each family and the basic information 
on health status, health care services, and behavior is collected from a responsible adult family member 
residing in the household.   
17 The results using the sample of immigrant children defined as those who have foreign born mother 
are qualitatively similar to those presented in this paper.   
18 Until 1996, NHIS defined reference person as "the first household member 19 years or older 
mentioned by the respondent in answer to question la; i.e., the person who owns or rents the sample 
unit. If no household member occupying the sample unit owns or rents the unit, the reference person is 
the first household member mentioned who is 19 years of age or older.  On rare occasions, you may 
encounter sample units occupied entirely by persons under 19 years old. When this occurs, use the 
following rules to designate the reference person: 1) If one of the household members owns or rents the 
sample unit, designate that person as the reference person; 2) If more than one household member owns 
or rents the sample unit, designate the oldest member as the reference person; 3) If none of the 
household members owns or rents the sample unit, designate the oldest household member as the 
reference person. " (NCHS 1996)  From 1997, NHIS redefined the definition of reference person as "the 
person or one of the persons, 18 years old or older, who owns or rents the sample unit, that is, the first 
person mentioned by the respondent in the household roster. If more than one household member owns 
or rents the sample unit, or if none of the household members owns or rents the sample unit, designate 
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1992-1996, since adolescents only became eligible to be a reference person once they 
reach age 19, many adolescents of age 18 (who satisfied all conditions to be a 
reference person other than age) most likely became a reference person as soon as they 
turned age 19.  This may have created a sudden increase in the proportion of 
adolescents who are reference persons at age 19.  Since this coincides with the drop in 
coverage seen at age 19, it becomes difficult to attribute the change in outcomes to the 
change in insurance status.  By limiting the years to 1997-2002, the problem is solved 
since adolescents are already eligible to be a reference person from age 18.   
Most variables used in this study come from the person file or from the 
supplement files that provide information about all children included in the person file.  
The only exception is school days lost due to illness or injury in the past year for the 
years 1997-2002.  This information comes from Sample Child file which includes 
information about only one child per household (i.e. not all children in the person file 
are included in the Sample Child file).  Therefore the sample size for regressions using 
school days lost to illness or injury in the past year for the years 1997-2002 is smaller 
compared to other regressions.  Also note that since all the other variables are for all 
persons in the person file, the samples in this study are much larger than those in the 
study by Wang et al (2007a) who use data from the Sample Child files (by 
approximately 10,000 observations).19 
 NHIS has detailed information on health insurance coverage from the health 
insurance supplement file for 1992-1996 and from the person file for 1997-2002.  For 
the years 1992-1996, respondents are asked about their health insurance coverage in 
                                                                                                                                            
the oldest household member as the reference person. If no household member is 18 years old or older, 
designate the oldest person that owns or rents the sample unit as the reference person." (NCHS 1997) 
19 Wang et al (2007a) limited the sample to children in the Sample Child files for a wider selection of 
outcome measures for access to medical care and medical service use and to avoid within family 
correlation.  Sample children file has detailed information on access (e.g. usual place for care, delayed 
care due to cost, unmet need for medical care, drug and mental care) and health care use by type of care 
(e.g. use of general and specialty doctor visit). 
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the previous month whereas for the years 1997-2002, they are asked about their 
coverage at the time of interview.  Health insurance information from the first half of 
1993 was not available in NHIS.  The 1993 Health Insurance topic was administered 
only in the last half of 1993 (Quarters 3 and 4) for everyone in the NHIS.  Therefore in 
this study, first half of 1993 is dropped from the sample.   
Many outcome measures were not consistent over time due to the 
questionnaire redesign in 1997.  The analyses for these measures had to be done for 
two separate time periods.  However, since instruments were too weak when the 
analyses were restricted to only 1992-1996, these measures were conducted only for 
1997-2002.  Details are provided in the Appendix 2.17.  Sample sizes vary by 
dependent variables used for analysis from approximately 44,000 to 241,000 due to 
missing observations and exclusion of irrelevant ages and years.20   
  Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics of all children and by age groups.  
Overall, individual characteristics are similar for all age groups.  Older children are 
from slightly higher income families than their younger counterparts.  This perhaps 
reflects that older children naturally have older parents who more likely have higher 
earning capacity than younger parents who have less work experience.  They may also 
be more likely to be in the labor force due to less child care needs at home compared 
to younger mothers.  As for insurance, perhaps reflecting more generous public 
insurance coverage for younger children, children between ages 0-6 have the highest 
public health insurance coverage rate whereas children between ages 13-18 have the 
highest employer/private health insurance coverage rate.  The youngest children have 
the highest insurance coverage among all children.  While the health status seems to 
be similar for all age groups, younger children use more health care than their older 
counterparts reflecting the higher health care needs at younger ages. 
 
20 Sample used to estimate number of school days lost to illness or injury in past 12 months includes 
children ages 5 to 17.   
Table 2.1 Descriptive Table for All Children and by Age Groups 
 All Ages 0-6 Ages 7-12 Ages 13-18 
Variables Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Individual Characteristics             
Female 0.488 0.500 243021 0.487 0.500 89227 0.491 0.500 82157 0.487 0.500 71637 
NH White 0.198 0.399 243021 0.200 0.400 89227 0.198 0.398 82157 0.197 0.397 71637 
Hispanic 0.229 0.420 243021 0.244 0.429 89227 0.227 0.419 82157 0.213 0.409 71637 
%FPL income 260.226 178.674 243021 245.101 177.874 89227 253.069 170.372 82157 287.262 185.819 71637 
Family size 4.438 1.409 243021 4.309 1.356 89227 4.584 1.412 82157 4.433 1.454 71637 
Mother's education             
HS graduate 0.190 0.392 243021 0.190 0.392 89227 0.189 0.392 82157 0.191 0.393 71637 
Some college 0.365 0.481 243021 0.352 0.478 89227 0.370 0.483 82157 0.376 0.484 71637 
College graduate 0.258 0.438 243021 0.269 0.443 89227 0.258 0.438 82157 0.246 0.430 71637 
Mother's age 35.927 7.311 243021 31.105 6.173 89227 36.410 5.976 82157 41.375 5.830 71637 
Mother married 0.782 0.413 243021 0.797 0.402 89227 0.779 0.415 82157 0.768 0.422 71637 
Mother working 0.667 0.471 243021 0.589 0.492 89227 0.685 0.464 82157 0.745 0.436 71637 
Health Insurance             
Any Insurance 0.863 0.343 243021 0.879 0.326 89227 0.861 0.346 82157 0.846 0.361 71637 
Public Insurance 0.198 0.398 243021 0.256 0.436 89227 0.189 0.392 82157 0.135 0.342 71637 
Employer/Private Insurance 0.681 0.466 243021 0.644 0.479 89227 0.687 0.464 82157 0.722 0.448 71637 
             
Health care Use             
1997-2002             
Any doctor visits (past 2 wks) 0.115 0.320 130806 0.158 0.364 46493 0.093 0.290 44630 0.092 0.289 39683 
# doctor visits (past 2 wks) 0.145 0.471 130806 0.194 0.525 46493 0.113 0.401 44630 0.122 0.472 39683 
Any hospital episodes (past yr) 0.060 0.237 125012 0.128 0.334 40689 0.017 0.131 44620 0.027 0.162 39703 
# hospital episodes (past yr) 0.073 0.379 125012 0.152 0.477 40689 0.023 0.259 44620 0.036 0.345 39703 
Any hospital days (past yr) 0.059 0.235 124997 0.126 0.331 40684 0.017 0.131 44616 0.027 0.162 39697 
# hospital days (past yr) 0.273 3.232 124997 0.513 3.623 40684 0.097 2.032 44616 0.192 3.783 39697 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 All Ages 0-6 Ages 7-12 Ages 13-18 
Variables Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Health Status             
1992-2002             
Excellent health 0.526 0.499 241614 0.543 0.498 88623 0.525 0.499 81700 0.504 0.500 71291 
Limitation in Activities 0.064 0.245 243021 0.039 0.194 89227 0.081 0.273 82157 0.076 0.266 71637 
1997-2002             
Any lost school days (past yr) 0.735 0.441 43788 0.709 0.454 6460 0.747 0.435 19579 0.731 0.443 17749 
#  lost school days (past yr) 7.478 36.979 43788 21.753 79.619 6460 3.964 14.220 19579 6.151 27.398 17749 
Note: Fractions of the children with health insurance for all ages and by age group using unweighted data from 1992-2002 NHIS.  The sample consists of 
children ages 0-18 years, who live with their mother at the time of interview, and are the children of the household reference person.  Health insurance 
information for the years 1992-1996 and for the years 1997-2002 are for the previous month and at the time of interview, respectively. 
2.6.2. Current Population Survey  
Simulated measure of child’s own and family eligibilities for public health insurance 
comes from Current Population Survey March supplement.  The Current Population 
Survey is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Census.  It 
covers the civilian non-institutionalized population of the United States.  Simulated 
eligibility measures were merged to individuals using month and year for which health 
insurance was given, i.e. previous month and year at the time of interview for the 
years 1992-1996; month and year at the time of interview for the years 1997-2002.  
 Figure 2.1 shows the change in the simulated fractions of children that are 
eligible for public health insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) from 1992 to 2002.  Panel A 
suggests that the simulated fraction of children eligible for Medicaid has risen steadily 
for all ages but more so for the older age groups.  While the rate of increase is greatest 
for older children, fraction of children eligible for Medicaid is greatest among the 
youngest age group.  Panel B shows the simulated fraction of children eligible for 
SCHIP.    Here, although the greatest fraction of children eligible for SCHIP is among 
ages 7-12 and the lowest is among the youngest age group, the greatest increase in the 
eligibilities is found in the two older age groups.  Panel C is the simulated eligibilities 
for Medicaid and SCHIP combined and this reinforces the trend from Panels A and B.  
The trends are consistent with the general trend of increase in eligibility thresholds 
seen in 1990s and early 2000s.  There are also variations in eligibility expansions 
across states.  Currie, Decker and Lin (2008) compares changes in eligibility 
thresholds by age groups over time for California, Illinois, New York and Texas and 
find a big variation across states.   Appendix Figure 2.2 shows that these four states 
indeed show different patterns of eligibility threshold changes over time.  
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 The identification from this study comes from the variation in the timing and 
intensity of Medicaid and SCHIP policies within states for each age group, i.e. the 
children are compared within the same age group within each state.   
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Figure 2.1 Simulated Fraction of Public Insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) Eligible 
Children for Years 1992-2002 for All Ages and by Age Group  
 
Note: Fraction of a nationally representative sample of children who are eligible for public insurance 
(Medicaid or SCHIP) in a given state in a given year for each age calculated from 1992-2002 CPS.  
Panel A shows the simulated fraction of children eligible for Medicaid , Panel B shows the simulated 
fraction of children eligible for SCHIP and Panel C shows the simulated eligibilities for both Medicaid 
and SCHIP. 
 
For example, if New York State increases eligibility threshold for adolescents in one 
year, adolescents in that year and beyond are more likely to have insurance than 
adolescents that were in New York State in years prior to the increase.  Moreover the 
magnitude of the difference will correlate with the intensity of the eligibility increase.  
Essentially, New York adolescents from one time period are being compared with 
other New York adolescents from other time periods who experienced different 
eligibility threshold legislation.  The main variation comes from the poor younger 
children for the early 1990s and from the higher income younger children and of older 
children for the late 1990s.     
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2.7. Trends in Insurance Coverage and First Stage Results 
Figure 2.2 shows the fractions of the children with health insurance for all ages and by 
age group using unweighted data from 1992-2002 NHIS.  As mentioned earlier, health 
insurance information for the years 1992-1996 and for the years 1997-2002 are for the 
previous month and at the time of interview, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Fraction of Children with Insurance for Years 1992 to 2002 for All 
Children and by Age Groups 
 
Note: Fractions of the children with health insurance for all ages and by age group using unweighted 
data from 1992-2002 NHIS.  The sample consists of children ages 0-18 years, who live with their 
mother at the time of interview, and are the children of the household reference person.  Health 
insurance information for the years 1992-1996 and for the years 1997-2002 are for the previous month 
and at the time of interview, respectively. 
 
It shows that the fraction of children with any insurance decreases slightly until the 
mid 1990s but increases thereafter.  Although the results are not shown, when public 
and private insurance are examined separately, in general, public health insurance 
coverage increased for all age groups during the time period but the increase was 
greatest among the youngest age group in the earlier years.  This is consistent with 
public insurance eligibility expansions: increased Medicaid eligibility for younger 
children in the late 1980s to 1990s and increased SCHIP eligibility for older children 
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in the late 1990s.  Public insurance coverage drops slightly from 1996-1998 which is 
also consistent with previous research that found decrease in public insurance 
coverage due to confusions caused by welfare reform (Garrett and Holahan 2000, 
Kaestner and Kaushal 2003, Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes 2004, Cawley, Schroeder and 
Simon 2006).  During this time period, private insurance coverage experienced a 
gradual decrease.   
 
Table 2.2 First Stage Results for Any Insurance 
 1992-2002 1992-1996 1997-2002 
Own Eligibility -0.017 0.037 -0.142*** 
 (0.023) (0.038) (0.025) 
Family Eligibility 0.090*** 0.017 0.365*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.051) 
    
Observations 243021 112069 130952 
R-squared 0.095 0.098 0.104 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses   
Each regression includes controls for child’s sex, race, mother’s education, mother’s age, family size, 
mother’s marital status, family income as percent federal poverty level and its square, mother’s work 
status and a vector of state characteristics including the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, real 
median wages, the maximum value of the federal and state EITC for a single mother with two children, 
the annual employment growth rate, the amount of federal housing money spent per 1,000 residents in 
the state, a dummy variable indicating whether the state has AFDC waiver, and a dummy indicating 
whether the state has TANF.  The instruments used for Medicaid and SCHIP eligibilities are: 1) 
Simulated measure of children’s own eligibility for public health insurance which is the fraction of a 
nationally representative sample of children who are eligible for public insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) 
in a given state in a given month and year for each age; and 2) simulated measure of child’s family 
eligibility for public health insurance is the family mean of simulated eligibilities after assigning 
children's simulated eligibilities that vary by state, year, month and age and adults' simulated 
eligibilities that vary by state, year, month, sex and whether they are a female head or not.  All 
regressions are estimated using a linear probability model on weighted data and include state, year and 
child’s age fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
In summary, during the time period when public health insurance program 
expanded, public insurance coverage increased but private insurance coverage 
decreased (suggesting a crowd out effect).  Rate of insurance consequently increased 
over the years although there was a slight drop immediately after the welfare reform.   
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Table 2.2 presents the first stage results.  It shows that children’s own public 
insurance eligibility expansion has no association with children’s insurance coverage 
except for 1997-2002 when coverage actually declines.  The negative sign for the 
coefficient of children’s own eligibility is puzzling since one would expect the 
expansion in children’s own public insurance eligibility to increase their insurance 
coverage.  To understand the nature of the unexpected sign on the instrument, each 
instrument was entered in the regression separately (Appendix Table A.1).  The results 
indicate that both children’s own and family public insurance eligibility expansions 
increased insurance coverage among children.  The effect of family eligibility is 
considerably larger than that of children's own eligibility for 1997-2002.  This may be 
a reflection of the fact that family eligibility captures children's own eligibility.  
Moreover, considering that 1997-2002 was the time when parental eligibility began to 
increase, it may also reflect parents’ higher motivation to obtain children’s coverage 
when more family members became eligible.  Overall, the positive correlation 
between insurance coverage and each instrument provides a strong case that the 
unexpected signs may be due to multicollinearity between the two simulated eligibility 
variables.  Since both instruments capture the same policies that expanded public 
insurance eligibility, there may have been high correlation between the two which 
might have led to the unexpected signs of the instrument.   
To further examine the issue of unexpected signs in the first stage of the main 
specification, public and private insurance coverages were used as alternative outcome 
variables for the years 1992-2002 (Appendix Table A.2).  Columns 1 and 4 show 
results using both instruments and columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 show results using only one 
instrument at a time.  Column 1 shows that children’s own eligibility expansions 
increased public insurance coverage but no effect was found for family eligibility 
expansions.  This is perhaps again due to the multicollinearity between two 
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instruments.  In fact, when instruments are entered separately (thereby eliminating the 
problem of multicollinearity), the results show that both children’s own and family 
eligibility expansions increased public insurance coverage (columns 2 and 3).  The 
suggested take up of public insurance is around 7%, slightly lower than what previous 
studies have found.21  As for employer or private insurance coverage, results from 
columns 4 show that expansions in children’s own eligibility had a decreasing effect 
although an opposite effect was found for expansions in family eligibility.  Negative 
coefficient for children’s own eligibility suggests a crowd out effect that is expected.  
However, a statistically significant positive effect of family eligibility on employer or 
private insurance coverage is puzzling.  Multicollinearity between children’s own and 
family eligibility may again be the cause of the problem because when instruments are 
entered separately, effect of family eligibility disappears.  Estimated crowd out rate is 
around 42% which is consistent with earlier studies.22, 23   
Since simulated eligibility variables capture expansion in public insurance 
eligibility, a natural extension of the previous eligibility studies is to examine the 
effect of public insurance coverage instead of any insurance coverage.  To examine 
the effect of public insurance coverage, two endogenous variables must be included in 
the outcome regressions (i.e. public insurance coverage and private insurance 
coverage) in order to use ‘no coverage’ as a reference category.  However, this did not 
work because when two endogenous variables were used (i.e. public insurance 
coverage and private insurance coverage), the first stage F-statistics were very low.  
Specifically, the first stage F-statistic for public insurance was very low at 3.44 when 
                                                 
21 Previous studies have found that the take up rate for Medicaid is around 10-25% percent and 10% for 
SCHIP (e.g. Card & Shore-Sheppard, 2001; Cutler & Gruber, 1996; LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004, 
Bansak and Raphael 2007, Davidson, Blewett and Call 2004).   
22 Crowd out rate is estimated using estimates from columns 2 and 5 since they are free from 
multicollinearity problem. 
23 Previous studies that found crowd out rate of about 5-30% for Medicaid and 50-60% for SCHIP 
(Gruber and Simon 2007) 
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both instruments were used.  It remained even lower when the time periods 1992-1996 
and 1997-2002 were examined separately (2.45 and 2.36).  For private insurance, the 
first stage F-statistic was slightly higher at 9.03.  When the time periods 1992-1996 
and 1997-2002 were examined separately, the F-statistic was considerably lower for 
1992-1996 compared to 1997-2002 (0.06 versus 37.91).  Large differences in 
magnitudes of the F-statistic for private insurance most likely reflect the fact that 
public insurance eligibility expansions did not affect privately insured children in 
earlier years but affected them in later years.  Expansions in 1992-1996 targeted low 
income children who were less likely to be privately insured whereas those in 1997-
2002 targeted relatively higher income young children who were more likely to be 
privately insured.   Overall, these results suggest that the instruments are not strong 
enough for identification when there are two endogenous variables in the regression. 
Another issue is the use of two instruments as opposed to only one of the 
instruments when the two instruments are correlated.  Since the strength of 
instruments are reflected in the first stage F statistics, the best set of instruments in 
terms of identification is the one with the highest first stage F statistics.  For 
regressions with any insurance coverage as a dependent variable, this would mean that 
the use of both instruments is preferred (first stage F-statistic=28.62) over only 
children's own simulated eligibility (first stage F-statistic=2.13) and only simulated 
family eligibility (first stage F-statistic=26.94).24 25  The use of both instruments to 
predict public insurance coverage yielded a first stage F-statistic of 2.36.  This was 
lower than the one from the regression with only children's own eligibility (4.12) but 
higher than using only children's family eligibility (1.9).  The stronger correlation 
between public insurance coverage and children's own eligibility, compared to 
                                                 
24 Results are from regressions using 1997-2002 when both children's and parental eligibility expanded. 
25 First stage F-statistics for regressions with only children's own simulated eligibility and only 
simulated family eligibility are calculated by taking the square of the t-statistic of the coefficient on 
each instrument. 
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correlations between public insurance coverage and either family eligibility or both 
instruments, is expected given the more direct link between children's own public 
insurance eligibility and public insurance coverage.  Although 1) the main 
identification comes from children who were initially uninsured but gained public 
insurance coverage after the eligibility expansions and 2) the children's own eligibility 
seems to be the key correlate for public insurance coverage, the main specification 
uses both instruments to improve first stage fit and to consequently increase the power 
for identification. 
The last thing to note about the first stage regressions from the main 
specification is that simulated eligibility instruments do not have any statistically 
significant effect on children’s insurance status when only the years 1992-1996 were 
used.  These results reflect relatively less steep public insurance expansions during this 
time period compared to the major Medicaid expansions that took place before 1992 
and the SCHIP implementation after 1998.  Statistically insignificant results during the 
1992-1996 time period indicate that simulated eligibility variables do not have a 
strong enough correlation with insurance status to be safely used as instruments.  
Consequently in this study, separate analyses with only earlier years will not be 
conducted.26  Moreover, since correlation between insurance and simulated 
eligibilities is weak for the years 1992-1996, the instruments will be stronger when the 
analysis is limited to later years (1997-2002) than for the entire study period (1992-
2002). 
Overall, these results provide convincing evidence of instrument validity 
despite the unexpected signs found in the main first stage regressions in Table 2.2. 
 
 
                                                 
26 First stage F statistics for regression with inconsistently measured outcomes for years 1992-1996 
were below 5. 
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2.8. Results for All Children and by Age Groups 
 
2.8.1. Descriptive Analyses: The Relationship between Insurance Status, Health 
Care Use and Health 
Appendix Figures A.3 to A.8 show the change in children’s health care use and health 
status for all ages by health insurance status.  During the time period of public health 
insurance expansion, children’s use of hospitals decreased although there was no 
change in doctor visits.  Their general health improved and fewer children were 
missing school due to illness especially in the later years although there was no change 
in the probability of having conditions that limit activities.  For most health care use 
and health status measures, children with and without insurance experienced similar 
changes.  
Panels A and B in Appendix Figure A.3 show the fraction of children who had 
any doctor visit and the number of such visits in the past 2 weeks for the years 1997-
2002.  These figures do not show much change in the trends over time, but they all 
show that more children with insurance had contact with doctor visits than the children 
without insurance.  There are no differences in the changes over time for children with 
different health insurance coverage.   
 Panels A and B in Appendix Figure A.4 show the fraction of children who had 
any short stay hospital episode and the number of such episodes in the past year for 
the years 1997-2002.  The panels show that for those with insurance, the fraction of 
children who had at least one short stay hospital episode and the number of such 
episodes declined slowly.  For those without insurance, there were also general 
declining pattern for both the fraction of children with at least one short stay hospital 
episode and the number of such days for the early 1990s.  However, the decline was 
not very consistent throughout the years.  Since hospital episodes are almost always 
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undesirable as opposed to doctor visits which may include desirable visits such as well 
care visits, these are change in the positive direction.  However, because these declines 
in hospital episodes are similar for both children with and without insurance, it is not 
clear whether insurance had any effect in the decline in hospital use.   
Panels A and B in Appendix Figure A.5 show the fraction of children who had 
any short stay hospital day and the number of such days in the past year for the years 
1992-1996 and for the years 1997-2002, respectively.  The basic trends are similar to 
those for short stay hospital episodes. 
Moving on to children’s health outcomes, both Appendix Figures A.6 and A.7 
show that the health of children remained fairly stable throughout the years. Appendix 
Figure A.6 shows the change in the fraction of children in excellent health.  The health 
of children with health insurance declined slowly until 1996 and improved afterwards.  
While their counterparts with no insurance experience similar overall changes, the 
changes were not very consistent especially in the late 1990s unlike the insured 
children.  Again with very little discernable difference in the trends, it is hard to tell 
whether public insurance expansion had any causal effect on children’s health. 
Appendix Figure A.7 shows that the proportion of children with activity 
limitation has not changed much over the years except for small fluctuations for both 
groups of children, indicating that public insurance expansions may not have had any 
effect on the fractions of children with activity limitations.  The lack of change in 
children’s functional limitations may be because functional limitation is a health 
condition that is not easily treatable with health care.  Children with insurance 
consistently have the highest proportion with activity limitation.  This may be the 
result of higher rates of diagnosed activity limitation due to better access to care or an 
evidence of adverse selection into the health insurance programs.   
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Panels A and B in Appendix Figure A.8 show the fraction of children who had 
any school days lost due to illness and the number of such days in the past year for the 
years 1997-2002.  There is a general deceasing trend in the lost school days for 
children in both groups although again the decline is not very consistent for uninsured 
children.  The overall picture seems to be that although insured children miss school 
more often (i.e. higher frequency of illness), when they do get sick, they miss a lesser 
number of school days than their uninsured counterparts (i.e. shorter duration of 
illness episode).   
When these trends are examined by age groups, the overall patterns are similar 
to those observed for all children.  The change in health care use seems to be greater 
for older age groups whereas the change in health status is greater for the youngest and 
the oldest age groups.  From all these figures, it is difficult to tell whether there were 
any causal effects of insurance coverage on children’s health care use and health 
status. 
2.8.2. Regression Analyses: The Effect of Any Insurance Coverage on Health 
Care Use and Health  
Table 2.3 presents OLS and IV results of the effect of children’s health insurance 
coverage on their health care use and health status.  First stage F statistics show that 
the instruments are strong with the exception of the outcomes for excellent health and 
activity limitation (F statistics=8.50, 8.60).27  Although the results on these outcomes 
are also presented here, one must use caution when interpreting these results since 
they may be biased from weak instruments.  If the excluded instruments are only 
weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors, then the IV estimates suffer from a 
                                                 
27 First stage F statistics vary across outcomes in the second stage due to sample size differences due to 
missing data, different set of years used and different age groups in which the outcome variables were 
available.   
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weak instrument problem.  When IV regression suffers from a weak instrument 
problem, 1) IV estimates will have larger standard errors, i.e. asymptotic variance is 
higher than that of an OLS estimator and it will be larger when there is lower 
correlation between the endogenous regressor and the instrument (asymptotic problem 
#1); 2) IV estimates may be inconsistent if the instrument is not entirely exogenous 
(asymptotic problem #2); and 
3) in finite samples, IV estimates will be biased in the same direction as the OLS 
estimates and the magnitude of the bias increases as the correlation between the 
instrument and the endogenous regressor decreases (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995).  
More explanation about the weak instrument problem is available in the Appendix 
2.18.  
In general, when compared to IV estimate, bias in OLS estimate seems to point 
out that those who have health insurance are negatively selected, i.e. those who require 
more health care (e.g. due to worse health), are more likely to be insured.  OLS 
estimates on all health care use outcomes except for any doctor visits in the past 2 
weeks have an upward bias when compared with IV estimates; the effect of health 
insurance on health care use will be overstated without any correction for endogeneity.  
When OLS and IV estimates are compared for health outcomes, there is a downward 
bias on outcome measures where higher values indicate better health (e.g. excellent 
health) and an upward bias on those where higher values indicate worse health (e.g. 
activity limitation, lost school days) both of which imply that unhealthier individuals 
are more likely to have insurance.  As expected, results show that there is adverse 
selection into health insurance among the sample population.   
When IV estimates are examined, most effects are statistically insignificant.  
The point estimates suggest that insurance coverage led to an increase in doctor visits 
but a decrease in hospital use.   
Table 2.3 OLS and IV Results for the Effect of Any Insurance Status on Children’s Health care Use and Health Status 
 
Any Doctor 
Visits (past 
2 wks) 
# of Doctor 
Visits (past 
2 wks) 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
(past year) 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
(past year) 
Any 
Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
# of 
Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Any Lost 
School 
Days (past 
year) 
# of Lost 
School 
Days (past 
year) 
 1997-2002 1992-2002 1997-2002 
OLS           
Any 
Insurance 0.049*** 0.063*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.147*** 0.010 0.021*** 0.014* -1.261* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.019) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.694) 
IV           
Any 
Insurance 0.104 0.034 -0.095*** -0.070 -0.093*** -0.693 0.647 0.001 -0.354*** -17.927 
 (0.075) (0.108) (0.033) (0.059) (0.033) (0.656) (0.432) (0.109) (0.130) (12.612) 
           
First Stage F 
stat 28.56 28.56 23.33 23.33 23.35 23.35 8.50 8.60 17.17 17.17 
Observations 130806 130806 125012 125012 124997 124997 241614 243021 43788 43788 118 Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses   
Each regression includes controls for child’s sex, race, mother’s education, mother’s age, family size, mother’s marital status, family income as percent 
federal poverty level and its square, mother’s work status and a vector of state characteristics including the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, real 
median wages, the maximum value of the federal and state EITC for a single mother with two children, the annual employment growth rate, the amount of 
federal housing money spent per 1,000 residents in the state, a dummy variable indicating whether the state has AFDC waiver, and a dummy indicating 
whether the state has TANF.  The instruments used for Medicaid and SCHIP eligibilities are: 1) Simulated measure of children’s own eligibility for public 
health insurance which is the fraction of a nationally representative sample of children who are eligible for public insurance (Medicaid or SCHIP) in a given 
state in a given month and year for each age; and 2) simulated measure of child’s family eligibility for public health insurance is the family mean of simulated 
eligibilities after assigning children's simulated eligibilities that vary by state, year, month and age and adults' simulated eligibilities that vary by state, year, 
month, sex and whether they are a female head or not. All regressions are estimated using a linear probability model for categorical dependent variables and 
an OLS for continuous dependent variables on weighted data and include state, year and child’s age fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered by 
state. 
 
 
 
They also suggest that insurance coverage improved health.  Since this study uses a 
linear probability model, the magnitude of the effects cannot be literally interpreted 
(since linear probability models do not assume the values of the dependent variable to 
be restricted to 0-1 interval).  The results do suggest however that insurance coverage 
led to a small statistically significant decrease in the probability of having had any 
hospital episodes or short overnight stays at a hospital in the past year (by 
approximately 10 percentage points from the linear probability model) and a fairly 
large decrease in the probability of having had lost school days due to illness (by 
approximately 35 percentage points from the linear probability model).28   
Table 2.4 presents the results based on age groups.  First stage F statistics show 
that the instruments are strong with the exception of outcomes for the youngest age 
group (F statistics ranges from 6.94 to 20.89).  For comprehensiveness, results for this 
age group are presented here, but these results need to be interpreted carefully due to 
possible weak instrument bias.  When IV estimates are compared with OLS estimates, 
results again suggest negative selection in health insurance with degree of selection 
comparable among all age groups.  Again, many effects suggested by IV estimates are 
statistically insignificant.  However, statistically significant results suggest that having 
health insurance coverage decreases the use of hospital care and improves health.  The 
effects are greater in magnitude for younger children in general (although one should 
note that the instruments are quite weak for this age group).  This is possibly due to 
the inherent greater need for health care for the younger children compared to the 
older children.   Health insurance coverage decreases the probability of having at least 
one hospital day or episode by approximately 17-18 percentage points for the 
youngest children but only 10 percentage points for children between ages 7-12.  
                                                 
28 Large difference between the OLS and IV estimates for outcome measures on lost school days is 
puzzling.  The only possibility is that the endogeneity bias is greater in these measures than in other 
outcome measures, i.e. those who are insured are also those children who are a lot more likely to miss 
school due to some unobserved characteristics compared to the differences for other outcomes. 
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Table 2.4 IV Results for the Effect of Any Insurance Status on Children’s Health care Use and Health Status by Age 
Groups 
 1997-2002 
 
Any Doctor 
Visits (past 2 
wks) 
# of Doctor 
Visits (past 2 
wks) 
Any Doctor 
Visits (past 2 
wks) 
# of Doctor 
Visits (past 2 
wks) 
Any Doctor 
Visits (past 2 
wks) 
# of Doctor 
Visits (past 2 
wks) 
Any Hospital 
Episodes (past 
year) 
# of Hospital 
Episodes (past 
year) 
Any Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
# of Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
 age 0-6 age7-12 age13-18 age 0-6 
OLS           
Any Insurance 0.059*** 0.079*** 0.044*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.058*** 0.024*** 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.190*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.044) 
IV           
Any Insurance 0.202 0.101 -0.058 -0.198 0.095 0.102 -0.182** -0.113 -0.173** 0.816 
 (0.134) (0.179) (0.097) (0.147) (0.097) (0.170) (0.089) (0.142) (0.087) (1.192) 
           
First Stage F stat 17.45 17.45 18.23 18.23 20.89 20.89 8.69 8.69 8.72 8.72 
Observations 46493 46493 44630 44630 39683 39683 40689 40689 40684 40684 120   
 1997-2002 
 
Any Hospital 
Episodes (past 
year) 
# of Hospital 
Episodes (past 
year) 
Any Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
# of Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
Any Hospital 
Episodes (past 
year) 
# of Hospital 
Episodes (past 
year) 
Any Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
# of Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
 age7-12 age13-18 
OLS         
Any Insurance 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.090*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.161*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.031) 
IV         
Any Insurance -0.104* -0.116 -0.104* -1.157 -0.025 0.012 -0.023 -1.292 
 (0.055) (0.097) (0.055) (0.882) (0.054) (0.098) (0.054) (1.284) 
         
First Stage F stat 19.43 19.43 19.44 19.44 17.22 17.22 17.13 17.13 
Observations 44620 44620 44616 44616 39703 39703 39697 39697 
 Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.  See notes from Table 2.3.
 
Table 2.4 (Continued) 
 1992-2002 
 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
 age 0-6 age7-12 age13-18 
OLS       
Any Insurance 0.004 0.018*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.020** 0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) 
IV       
Any Insurance 1.050*** 0.207* 1.305*** 0.085 0.700** -0.141 
 (0.381) (0.117) (0.504) (0.169) (0.327) (0.140) 
       
First Stage F stat 6.94 7.40 10.20 9.96 11.24 10.98 
Observations 88623 89227 81700 82157 71291 71637 121  
 1997-2002 
 
Any Lost 
School Days 
(past year) 
# of Lost 
School Days 
(past year) 
Any Lost 
School Days 
(past year) 
# of Lost 
School Days 
(past year) 
Any Lost 
School Days 
(past year) 
# of Lost 
School Days 
(past year) 
 age 0-6 age7-12 age13-18 
OLS       
Any Insurance 0.012 -0.094 0.014 0.107 0.013 -2.598** 
 (0.020) (4.044) (0.013) (0.532) (0.011) (1.185) 
IV       
Any Insurance 0.152 -89.750 -0.510** -11.177* -0.477* 3.163 
 (0.386) (69.053) (0.251) (6.101) (0.278) (15.686) 
       
First Stage F stat 7.61 7.61 14.46 14.46 9.15 9.15 
Observations 6460 6460 19579 19579 17749 17749 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.  See notes from Table 2.3.
 
The effects for the oldest children are statistically insignificant but the point estimates 
suggest a smaller decrease of less than 3 percentage points.  Health insurance coverage 
also increases probability of excellent health and magnitude of the effect seems 
strongest for children between ages 7-12 and lowest for the oldest children.  Although 
nothing can be concluded from statistically insignificant coefficients, directions of the 
signs also suggest that having health insurance increases doctor visits and improves 
health status with the magnitude greater for younger children.  
In general, health insurance seemed to have decreased hospital use and 
improved health while its effect on doctor visits (both preventive and curative care) is 
unclear due to statistical insignificance of the estimates.  Since there is no evidence of 
increased use of preventive care, health insurance coverage may have improved their 
health status through pathways other than preventive care such as improved health 
knowledge and behaviors (improved self management of health and illnesses).  This 
may have led to decrease in the use of hospital care.  Although this issue needs further 
investigation, the hypothesis of improved health behaviors due to health insurance 
coverage is consistent with the recent study by Courbage and de Coulon (2004). 
 
2.9. Results for Immigrant Children 
 
2.9.1. Descriptive Analyses for Immigrant Children: The Relationship between 
Insurance Status, Health Care Use and Health  
Summary statistics of immigrant children are described in Table 2.5.  Immigrant 
children have slightly less educated mothers who are more likely to be married than all 
children.  For those who are insured, immigrant children are more likely to be covered 
by public insurance than private insurance at a much higher rate than other children.   
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Only about three quarter of immigrant children are insured; uninsurance rate for 
immigrant children is more than one and a half times more than those for all children. 
Compared to all children, immigrant children use less health care and are in poorer 
health.  These data show that immigrant children are indeed suffering from lack of 
access to insurance coverage and consequently have less health care use and are in 
poorer health.   
Table 2.6 shows health care use and health status for immigrant children by 
insurance status.  Similar to all children, immigrant children with insurance are more 
likely to use health care than those without insurance.  They are in better health 
although there are reasons to believe that the reported health for uninsured immigrant 
children may more likely be biased from reporting bias as mentioned earlier.    
 
2.9.2. Regression Analyses for Immigrant Children: The Effect of Any Insurance 
Status on Health Care Use and Health  
Table 2.7 presents OLS and IV results for the effect of children’s health insurance 
coverage on their health care use and health status.  Similar to all children, in general, 
comparison of both estimates suggest negative selection although some exceptions 
exist (e.g. immigrant children who are less likely to use preventive and outpatient 
curative care are more likely to be insured).  IV results indicate that covering children 
increases doctor visits; health insurance coverage increases the probability of children 
having at least one doctor visit in the past 2 weeks by 17 percentage points and 
increases the frequency of such doctor visits by 0.155.   Statistically insignificant point 
estimates suggest that probability of immigrant children using hospitals decreases 
although among the users, the frequency of usage increases once they are covered by 
insurance.  
Table 2.5 Descriptive Tables for All Children and Immigrant Children 
 All Children Immigrants 
Variables Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Individual Characteristics       
Female 0.488 0.500 243021 0.486 0.500 57310 
NH White 0.198 0.399 243021 0.189 0.392 57310 
Hispanic 0.229 0.420 243021 0.635 0.482 57310 
%FPL income 260.226 178.674 243021 212.762 168.743 57310 
Family size 4.438 1.409 243021 4.847 1.620 57310 
Mother's education       
HS graduate 0.190 0.392 243021 0.125 0.331 57310 
Some college 0.365 0.481 243021 0.265 0.441 57310 
College graduate 0.258 0.438 243021 0.203 0.402 57310 
Mother's age 35.927 7.311 243021 35.952 7.460 57310 
Mother married 0.782 0.413 243021 0.840 0.367 57310 
Mother working 0.667 0.471 243021 0.570 0.495 57310 
Insurance       
Any Insurance  0.863 0.343 243021 0.749 0.433 57310 
Public Insurance 0.198 0.398 243021 0.254 0.435 57310 
Employer/Private Insurance 0.681 0.466 243021 0.507 0.500 57310 
       
Health care Use       
1997-2002       
Any doctor visits (past 2 wks) 0.115 0.320 130806 0.091 0.287 34887 
# doctor visits (past 2 wks) 0.145 0.471 130806 0.110 0.394 34887 
Any hospital episodes (past yr) 0.060 0.237 125012 0.055 0.229 33252 
# hospital episodes (past yr) 0.073 0.379 125012 0.066 0.330 33252 
Any hospital days (past yr) 0.059 0.235 124997 0.054 0.227 33249 
# hospital days (past yr) 0.273 3.232 124997 0.238 3.029 33249 
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Note: Fractions of the children with health insurance for all children and immigrant children using unweighted data from 1992-2002 NHIS.  The sample for all children consists of children ages 0-
18 years, who live with their mother at the time of interview, and are the children of the household reference person.  Immigrant children are children who have at least one foreign born parent.  
Health insurance information for the years 1992-1996 and for the years 1997-2002 are for the previous month and at the time of interview, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 (Continued) 
 All Children Immigrants 
Variables Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Health Status       
1992-2002       
Excellent health 0.526 0.499 241614 0.451 0.498 56969 
Limitation in Activities 0.064 0.245 243021 0.041 0.199 57310 
1997-2002       
Any lost school days (past yr) 0.735 0.441 43788 0.629 0.483 10649 
#  lost school days (past yr) 7.478 36.979 43788 6.405 35.649 10649 
Note: Fractions of the children with health insurance for all children and immigrant children using unweighted data from 1992-2002 NHIS.  The sample for 
all children consists of children ages 0-18 years, who live with their mother at the time of interview, and are the children of the household reference person.  
Immigrant children are children who have at least one foreign born parent.  Health insurance information for the years 1992-1996 and for the years 1997-
2002 are for the previous month and at the time of interview, respectively. 
Table 2.6  Descriptive Table for Immigrant Children by Insurance Status 
 Any Insurance Uninsured 
 Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Health care Use       
1997-2002       
Any doctor visits (past 2 wks) 0.106 0.308 26071 0.045 0.208 8832 
# doctor visits (past 2 wks) 0.130 0.428 26071 0.053 0.261 8832 
Any hospital episodes (past yr) 0.050 0.219 42946 0.027 0.162 14354 
# hospital episodes (past yr) 0.060 0.316 42946 0.031 0.202 14354 
Any hospital days (past yr) 0.050 0.217 42915 0.026 0.160 14347 
# hospital days (past yr) 0.268 3.374 42915 0.096 0.966 14347 
       
Health Status       
1992-2002       
Excellent health 0.473 0.499 42737 0.394 0.489 14248 
Limitation in Activities 0.045 0.208 42964 0.029 0.168 14362 
1997-2002       
Any lost school days (past yr) 0.646 0.478 7915 0.578 0.494 2736 
#  lost school days (past yr) 6.496 35.635 7915 6.228 36.176 2736 
 
The effect of any insurance on immigrant children’s health status is all statistically 
insignificant and inconsistent.  In general, the effect sizes seem to be greater for 
immigrant children compared to all children.  This suggests that immigrant children 
benefited more from public insurance expansion than other children, consistent with 
the fact that immigrant children are one of the most uninsured groups of children in 
the nation. 
 
2.10. Results for Older Adolescents 
 
2.10.1. Descriptive Analyses: The Relationship between Insurance Status, Health 
Care Use and Health  
As stated earlier, it is often claimed that adolescents grow out of the realm of both 
public and private insurance once they turn 19.  Therefore they are an age group with 
the lowest insurance coverage in the nation.   
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Table 2.7  OLS and IV Results for the Effect of Any Insurance Status on Children’s Health care Use and Health Status for 
Immigrant Children 
 
Any 
Doctor 
Visits (past 
2 wks) 
# of 
Doctor 
Visits (past 
2 wks) 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
(past year) 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
(past year) 
Any 
Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
# of 
Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Any Lost 
School Days 
(past year) 
# of Lost 
School Days 
(past year) 
 1997-2002 1992-2002 1997-2002 
OLS           
Any Insurance 0.045*** 0.059*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.134*** 0.005 0.019*** 0.039*** 1.265* 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.025) (0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.754) 
IV           
Any Insurance 0.166*** 0.155* -0.014 0.038 -0.016 0.489 0.185 -0.029 0.239 30.448** 
 (0.064) (0.089) (0.049) (0.097) (0.051) (0.930) (0.292) (0.080) (0.191) (15.495) 
           
1st Stage F 22.48 22.48 50.99 50.99 50.94 50.94 7.47 7.10 36.00 36.00 
Observations 34887 34887 33252 33252 33249 33249 56969 57310 10649 10649 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.  See notes from Table 2.3.
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The analyses in this section explore: 1) whether a break in insurance coverage at age 
19 is empirically supported by the data, 2) whether there are any other changes in 
characteristics that happen simultaneously at age 19, and 3) whether the same 
discontinuities exist even when the analysis is limited to those who are closer to the 
threshold, i.e. comparing adolescents who are about to turn 19 vs. those who just 
turned 19.   
Figure 2.3 graphs characteristics of adolescents by age.  Recall that the sample 
used in this section differs from those used in the earlier sections.  Here, data comes 
from only years 1997-2002 and includes all adolescents ages 16-21 not limiting to 
those who are children of the household reference person. Graphs in Panel A, B, C, 
and D show selected individual characteristics, insurance health insurance coverage, 
health care use and health status, respectively.  Panel A shows that the individual 
characteristics are overall similar except for a fraction of children of the household 
reference person.29  As expected, the fraction of adolescents who are children of the 
household reference person is decreasing quite sharply.  Although the gaps between 
the ages are quite consistent, i.e. the 18-19 gap does not seem to be any larger than 
other age gaps, loss of dependent status as inferred by this graph may play a big role in 
the drop in insurance coverage at the age of 19 which is discussed next. 
 Panel B shows a clear drop in health insurance coverage at 19.  This drop is 
seen for both types of insurance.  As discussed earlier, at the age of 19, most 
adolescents lose eligibility as dependents in their parents’ insurance.   
                                                 
29 Ideally one would like to know the dependent status of an adolescent and how it changes over time 
since one of the main reasons for the loss of coverage for older adolescents is loss of dependent status in 
their parents’ insurance plan.  However, since NHIS does not provide any information on dependent 
status or its closest proxy, whether an adolescent is living with his/her parents, this will be inferred here 
using a relationship to the reference person variable.  If adolescent lives with parents, then either one of 
his/her parents will most likely be a household reference person and therefore the adolescent will be 
classified as a child of reference person.  Since there may be adolescents who lives with uncles or aunts 
who are their household reference person (therefore adolescents are nieces or nephews) or with 
grandparents (in which case adolescents are grandchildren).  Therefore these fractions provide a lower 
estimate of the dependency level of adolescents.   
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A. Selected Individual Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Characteristics of Adolescents Ages 16-21 by Age  
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1997-2002 NHIS.  The sample consists of all 
adolescents ages 16-21 regardless of their relationship to the reference person.  Unlike the main sample, 
this sample does not limit to individuals who are the children of the household reference person 
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They also become ineligible for Medicaid and SCHIP which they once enjoyed as 
children.  The graphs clearly reflect these changes in coverage.   
 Graphs in Panel C show that health care use increases after 19 for both 
outpatient and inpatient health care.  This is contrary to what one would expect 
because lack of insurance may deter adolescents from using health care.  Increase in 
health care may be a reflection of increase in unique health care needs that emerge as 
children age such as reproductive health care.  It may also be an indication of poorer 
health.  Trends from graphs in Panel D show a mixed picture for health.  Consistent 
with the earlier hypothesis on increased health care use after the age of 19, 
adolescents’ health seem to deteriorate as they age although the fraction of adolescents 
with activity limitation seems to drop in later ages (from age 18).   Activity limitation 
is a health problem that requires consistent long term care and the effect only 
manifests in the long run.  Therefore the change in health insurance coverage in this 
small time frame may not be sufficient to see the effects.  The trends seen here may 
only be a spurious relationship. 
It seems clear that adolescents lose insurance coverage once they turn 19 with 
one of the reasons being decline in dependency on their parents.  To find out whether 
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the same drop exists among those who are closer to age 19 threshold, the same 
exercise was done comparing adolescents who are almost 19 and those who just turned 
19.  This was done using the public use NHIS data.  In order to classify adolescents 
into those who are about to turn 19 and those who have just turned 19, one must know 
the age dates of birth and interview.  Unfortunately public use NHIS data does not 
have exact interview date; it only has interview quarter.  If interview and birth quarters 
are the same, then it is not possible to find out whether the adolescent’s birthday fell 
before or after the interview date without the exact dates of birth and interview.30  
Instead, quarter was the unit used to classify adolescents according to their proximity 
to the cutoff.  Adolescents were classified as “cutoff+1” if their birth quarter is one 
quarter after the interviewer quarter.  Similary, adolescents were classified as 
“cutoff+2” if their birth quarter is two quarters after the interview quarter.  The same 
logic was used to define “cutoff-1” and “cutoff-2”.  Although the results are not shown 
due to space limitation, the findings from this exercise were consistent with the earlier 
results: 1) fractions of dependent adolescents and insurance coverage drops as soon as 
they turn 19 and this is likely to be due to the drop in fraction of children of the 
household reference person that happen at the age of 19 while all other individual 
characteristics remain consistent; and 2) there seems to be a slight increase in health 
care use (both outpatient and inpatient) while the results for health are  inconsistent.31  
If one can safely assume that observed and unobserved determinants of health 
insurance coverage, health care use, and health are consistent across age 19 threshold, 
then the sharp discontinuities in health insurance gap at 19 can be used to identify the 
causal effect of health insurance coverage on health care use and health.  This is called 
regression discontinuity method (RD).  The identification of RD comes from the fact 
                                                 
30 Since this is the group of adolescents one is potentially most interested in due to their proximity to the 
cutoff, the amount of information one could infer from these exploratory exercise were compromised 
due to the use of public use data.   
31 The results are available upon request. 
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that current health insurance policies (definition of a dependent in private health 
insurance policies) and laws (Medicaid and SCHIP regulations) produce sharp 
difference in health insurance coverage among older adolescents on either side of age 
19 threshold.  While previous graphical analyses showed that most mean individual 
characteristics were smooth before and after the age 19 threshold, there was a clear 
discontinuity in the fraction of children of household reference person.  This 
discontinuity is a threat to the methodology since it may be correlated with not only 
insurance status but also health care use and health.  For example, adolescents who 
still live with parents (i.e. children of the household reference person) may more likely 
use health care and be in better health because they are in good parental custody.  On 
the other hand, adolescents who live independently (i.e. not children of the household 
reference person) may more likely use health care and be in better health if they are 
responsible adolescents who take care of their health better than their counterparts 
who stay back in their parents’ homes.  In either case, both health insurance status and 
living arrangements change drastically at age 19 which independently affect health 
care use and health.  Therefore it will be difficult to separate out the effect of one from 
the other making RD not a feasible method to examine the causal effect of health 
insurance.  
2.11. Other Methods 
Some studies use methodologies other than IV to examine the effect of public 
insurance eligibility or coverage including difference in differences (e.g. Banthin and 
Selden 2003, Blumberg et al 2000, Dubay and Kenney 2003) and regression 
discontinuity methods (e.g. Card and Shore-Sheppard 2001).  Here difference in 
difference method is used to examine robustness of the main results.  For the 1992-
1996 time period, the effect of Medicaid expansion on health care use and health 
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status is examined using younger children since they were the targeted population for 
the expansion.  For the 1997-2002 time period, the effect of SCHIP on health care use 
and health status is examined using older adolescents since they experienced the 
greatest change in public insurance eligibility.  Treatment and control groups are 
constructed using the discontinuities in coverage by age and family income.  The 
regressions control for individual and state characteristics as well as state and year 
fixed effects.  
Following sets of treatment and control groups are used: 1) for 1992-1996 time 
period, children between ages 0-6 who have family incomes of 100-200% FPL 
(>=100%FPL & <200%FPL) vs. children between ages 0-6 who have family incomes 
200-300% FPL; and 2) for 1997-2002 time period, older adolescents between ages 15-
18 who have family incomes of 0-200% FPL vs. young adults between ages 19-20 
who have family incomes of 0-200% FPL.  For former analyses, years 1995-1996 and 
1992 are used for post and pre years, respectively.  For latter analyses, years 2000-
2002 and 1997-1998 are used for post and pre years, respectively.   
During the 1992-1996 time period, there were only four states with Medicaid 
eligibility at or above 200% FPL (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, Centers for Medicaid and State Operations 
referenced in Owcharenko 2006).  Therefore if the trends in health care use and health 
status of young children with family incomes of 100-200% FPL are similar to those 
with family incomes of 200-300% FPL in the absence of the Medicaid expansions, 
then the difference in the changes may be attributed to the change in expansions.  The 
misclassification of children living in the four states will produce conservative 
estimates of the effect of Medicaid expansion since the bias should move the estimates 
towards zero.  
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Table 2.8 shows the results.  As expected, insurance coverage, more 
specifically public insurance coverage, increased during this time period.  Employer 
and private insurance coverage did not experience any statistically significant 
change.32  Despite the expected effect on insurance coverage, there were no detectable 
effects on children's health care use or health.  In general, statistically insignificant 
coefficients are in line with the earlier findings for children between ages 0-6 that 
indicated a decrease in hospital use and inconsistent effect on health.  
As mentioned earlier in the study, due to the SCHIP implementation, older 
children experienced the greatest expansion in public insurance eligibility in the late 
1990s.  In 1997, eligibility thresholds were as low as 15% FPL in some states.  By 
2001, however, many states set their eligibility thresholds at 200% FPL and some even 
set it at more than 300% FPL (Morreale and English 2003).  Since children grow out 
of public insurance once they reach age 19, adolescents between ages 19-20 did not 
benefit from this public insurance eligibility increase.  Therefore, if the trends in 
health care use and health status of older adolescents between ages 15-18 are similar 
to young adults between ages 19-20 in the absence of the SCHIP implementation, then 
the difference in the changes may be attributed to SCHIP implementation. 
Table 2.9 shows the results. Contrary to expectations, differences in difference 
results suggest no effect on insurance coverage.  Signs on coefficients on any 
insurance and public insurance are also puzzling since they suggest a decrease in 
coverage albeit their statistical insignificance.  Most effects on health care use and 
health are also statistically insignificant.  The only effects that are detected are a 
decrease in the number of hospital days and an increase in excellent health.  
 
32 Although statistically insignificant, sign on the coefficient is negative consistent with the 
expectations. 
Table 2.8  Difference in Difference Results for Children Ages 0-6  for Years 1992-1996 
 Any Insurance 
Public 
Insurance 
Employer 
/ Private 
Insurance 
Any 
Doctor 
Visits 
(past 2 
wks) 
# of 
Doctor 
Visits 
(past 2 
wks) 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
(past year) 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
(past year) 
Any 
Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
# of 
Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Treatment  -0.101*** 0.092*** -0.183*** -0.004 0.001 0.013** 0.018** 0.013** 0.112 -0.060** 0.034*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.234) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.071) (0.030) (0.009) 
Post -0.075 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.102 0.041 0.560 -0.032 0.000 
 (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.108) (0.087) (1.358) (0.195) (0.000) 
Treatment * 
Post 0.041*** 0.048*** -0.001 -0.011 0.313 -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 0.014 -0.054 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.262) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.085) (0.047) (0.012) 
            
Observations 30628 30639 30620 12407 12407 12482 12482 12482 12482 3736 3775 
R-squared 0.067 0.158 0.188 0.043 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.074 0.041 
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Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Each regression includes controls for child’s sex, race, mother’s education, mother’s age, family 
size, mother’s marital status, mother’s work status and a vector of state characteristics including the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, real median wages, the maximum 
value of the federal and state EITC for a single mother with two children, the annual employment growth rate, the amount of federal housing money spent per 1,000 residents 
in the state, a dummy variable indicating whether the state has AFDC waiver, and a dummy indicating whether the state has TANF.  Treatment group is defined as children 
ages 0-6 who have family incomes of 100-200% FPL (>=100%FPL & <200%FPL) and control group is defined as children ages 0-6 who have family incomes 200-300% FPL.  
Post years include years 1995-1996 and pre year include year 1992.  All regressions are estimated using a linear probability model for categorical dependent variables and an 
OLS for continuous dependent variables on weighted data and include state and year fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
 
Although these effects are consistent with earlier findings for the oldest age group 
(ages 13-18), results should be interpreted with caution due to lack of statistical 
significance (and puzzling signs) on insurance coverage. 
Overall findings from difference in difference method are consistent with the 
main results.  Effects of eligibility expansions on children's health insurance coverage 
for younger children in the years 1992-1996 confirm appropriateness of the method 
providing confidence in the findings on children's health care use and health.  
However, the effects for older children in the years 1997-2002 are perplexing and 
therefore findings for their health care use and health are less likely to be reliable.   
Unexpected effects seen on insurance coverage of older adolescents may 
indicate a violation of the main assumption of difference in difference method.  In 
order for the method to be valid, difference in outcomes between treatment and control 
groups (older adolescents between ages 15-18 who have family incomes of 0-200% 
FPL and young adults between ages 19-20 who have family incomes of 0-200% FPL) 
must remain constant in absence of the treatment.  However, there may have been 
many differences between two groups that may have produced diverging trajectories 
over time for two groups.  For example, Section 2.10 highlighted that dependency on 
parents change drastically at the age of 19.  This, as well as any other unobserved 
differences between two age groups, may be the reasons why the difference in 
difference method failed to work for older adolescents. 
2.12. Discussion 
The lack of strong evidence of the effect of health insurance coverage (public or 
private) on children’s health care use and health status is consistent with the previous 
studies (e.g. Kaestner, Joyce and Racine 1999, Currie, Decker and Lin 2007).  Unlike 
some of the previous studies, however, main specification from this study did not 
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provide any strong evidence of the effect of health insurance coverage on children’s 
preventive care use for 1997-2002.  For example, Currie, Decker and Lin (2007) found 
that public insurance eligibility decreases the probability of children going without any 
doctor visits in the past year by 6.8 percentage points for 1986-2005 time period.  
Currie and Gruber (1996) found that public insurance eligibility decreases the 
probability of children going without any doctor visits in the past year by 9.6 
percentage points for the 1984-1992 time period.  Wang et al (2007a) found that 
public insurance coverage increases the probability of children having at least one 
general doctor visit by 25.7 percentage points for the 1997-2002 time period.33  The 
difference in the findings may be due to the difference in the specific research 
question (eligibility vs. coverage), sample size, sample definition and specific 
variables used for the analysis.    
 Currie, Decker and Lin (2007) examined the effect of public insurance 
eligibility (not coverage) on health care use.  As mentioned in the previous studies, 
since only a small portion of children who are made eligible through Medicaid and 
SCHIP expansions took up public health insurance, the effect of eligibility should be 
weaker than the effect of insurance coverage on health care use.  Although the finding 
from this study is statistically insignificant, the point estimate indeed shows that the 
effect of insurance coverage is greater (9.9 percentage point, insignificant) than the 
effect of eligibility on preventive care use found in Currie, Decker and Lin (2007)’s 
study.  The larger estimate of the eligibility found in Currie and Gruber (1996)’s study 
may be driven by the time period of their study.  They used years when the youngest 
children were most affected, an age group that seems to be most responsive to the 
eligibility expansions.  
 
33 They also found an increase in the probability of children having at least one specialty doctor visit in 
the past year by 8.8 percentage points 
Table 2.9  Difference in Difference Results for Children Ages 15-20  for Years 1997-2002 
 Any Insurance 
Public 
Insurance 
Employer 
/ Private 
Insurance 
Any 
Doctor 
Visits 
(past 2 
wks) 
# of 
Doctor 
Visits 
(past 2 
wks) 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
(past year) 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
(past year) 
Any 
Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
# of 
Hospital 
Days (past 
year) 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Treatment  0.194*** 0.147*** 0.047* 0.006 -0.005 -0.033** -0.024 -0.026* 0.038 -0.009 0.040*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.090) (0.029) (0.013) 
Post 0.095 0.169*** -0.064 -0.041 -0.027 0.000 0.000 -0.011 0.040 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.059) (0.025) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.223) (0.000) (0.034) 
Treatment * 
Post -0.023 -0.020 -0.005 0.027 0.049 0.017 -0.024 0.010 -0.264* 0.073* -0.017 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.029) (0.017) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) (0.019) (0.147) (0.041) (0.018) 
            
Observations 8160 8160 8160 8186 8186 7992 7992 7988 7988 8183 8200 
R-squared 0.113 0.169 0.191 0.042 0.035 0.026 0.020 0.025 0.012 0.047 0.036 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Each regression includes controls for child’s sex, race, mother’s education, mother’s age, family 
size, mother’s marital status, mother’s work status and a vector of state characteristics including the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, real median wages, the maximum 
value of the federal and state EITC for a single mother with two children, the annual employment growth rate, the amount of federal housing money spent per 1,000 residents 
in the state, a dummy variable indicating whether the state has AFDC waiver, and a dummy indicating whether the state has TANF.  Treatment group is defined as adolescents 
ages 15-18 who have family incomes of 0-200% FPL and control group is defined as young adults age 19-20 who have family incomes of 0-200% FPL.  Post years include 
years 2000-2002 and pre years include years 1997-1998.  All regressions are estimated using a linear probability model for categorical dependent variables and an OLS for 
continuous dependent variables on weighted data and include state and year fixed effects.   Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
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The statistical insignificance in this study may be due to its smaller sample size 
compared to these other studies.  Studies by Currie and Gruber (1996) and Currie, 
Decker and Lin (2007) have sample sizes of almost two to three times as those for this 
study.   
The finding for the effect of insurance coverage on preventive care use was 
slightly different in this study compared to the finding by Wang et al (2007a) when the 
point estimates were compared.  This study found a statistically insignificant 9.9 
percentage point increase in preventive care use whereas Wang et al (2007a) found a 
statistically significant 25.7 percentage point increase.  The main reason may be the 
differences in the sample definitions. The sample used by Wang et al (2007a) only 
included low income children with family incomes that are below state SCHIP 
eligibility limits.  This study does not limit itself to those from low income families.  
Low income children are more likely to have had poorer access to care than the 
average children.  Therefore they must have increased health care, especially 
preventive care, after obtaining insurance coverage.  Moreover, if there is an 
endogenous sample selection bias introduced by limiting the sample to low income 
children, then the bias would be in the upward direction consistent with the differences 
seen in two studies (e.g. families with children who have higher health care needs may 
make sure their income does not exceed the eligibility threshold for public insurance).  
The differences in statistical significance may be due to the differences in the question 
for which outcome measure is based.  As mentioned in the earlier section, they based 
their outcome on doctor visits on the questions found in the Sample Child file that had 
considerably higher frequency of doctor visits compared to the ones from the person 
file used in this study.  The frequency of doctor visits is higher in the Sample Child 
file because this is the measure for the past year whereas the information from the 
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person file is for the past 2 weeks.34  Magnitudes and statistical significance of the 
effects on doctor visits may perhaps be due to these differences in definitions of the 
outcome measures. 
Currie and Gruber (1996) also found that public insurance eligibility increased 
the probability of children with hospitalizations in the past year by 4 percentage 
points.  The estimates from this study suggested that the insurance coverage due to 
public insurance program expansions in the late 1990s actually decreased the 
probability of hospital use by 9 percentage points.  These results are consistent with 
the low take up of public insurance making the effect of eligibility much lower than 
the coverage.  However, this may also be a suggestive evidence that compared to the 
late 1980s to early 1990s, the care delivered to publicly insured children have become 
more efficient by reducing the use of more costly care at hospitals compared to private 
doctors and clinics. 
As mentioned earlier, Currie (1999) found that Medicaid eligibility led to a 
large increase in the preventive care use among the immigrant children.  She found 
that Medicaid eligibility decreased the probability of children without having any 
doctor visit in the past year by about 35 percentage points (more than 150% of the 
sample mean).  In this study, there was a strong effect of insurance coverage on 
children’s use of preventive care in the late 1990s when SCHIP was implemented (i.e. 
17 percentage point increase in the probability of children having at least one doctor 
visit in the past 2 weeks which is about 150% of the sample mean).  This magnitude is 
comparable to the magnitude found for the earlier time period by Currie (1999).  Since 
this study estimates the effect of insurance coverage and not eligibility like Currie 
(1999)’s study, the findings from this study imply that the magnitude of the effect of 
                                                 
34 This observation is consistent from the summary statistics from this study. 
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SCHIP on health care use were greater than those for Medicaid expansions in the early 
1990s.  
Graphical evidence of older adolescents’ drop in health insurance coverage 
occurring at the same time as the increase in their health care use suggests a 
relationship that is contrary to what previous correlational studies have found (e.g. 
Callahan and Cooper 2005, McManus, Greaney and Newacheck 1989). For example, 
these correlational studies have found that uninsured older adolescents (ages 19-24) 
had 1.5-2.5 times the adjusted risk of reporting no doctor visits in the past year when 
compared to the privately insured counterparts (Callahan and Cooper 2005).  Those 
who used less health care or reported to be in poor health were much more likely to be 
uninsured than those who used health care more often and reported to be in excellent 
health (McManus, Greaney and Newacheck 1989).  Older adolescents who did not 
have any hospital episodes in the past year were also found to be 27% more likely to 
be uninsured than those who had at least one hospital episode in the past year 
(McManus, Greaney and Newacheck 1989).  The difference between the relationships 
suggested by this study and previous studies may be another indication of 
discontinuities in major characteristics at the age of 19 that have not been examined in 
this study.  Since estimates of earlier studies are also biased due to the failure to 
address endogeneity of health insurance, it is not completely clear which relationship 
is the true one.  However, this discrepancy definitely calls for further investigation 
using methods that correct for endogeneity of health insurance.    
 
2.13. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
This study examined the effect of Medicaid expansion and SCHIP implementation on 
children’s use of health care and health in the US by using the 1992-2002 National 
Health Interview Survey.  It analyzed how insurance coverage affected children’s 
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health care use and health status.  Using the variation in the generosity of public 
insurance eligibilities by state over time, an instrumental variables model was 
estimated where the simulated fractions of children and family eligibilities for public 
insurance were used as instruments for health insurance coverage.  The effects were 
estimated separately for different age groups and for the immigrant children and older 
adolescents.   
For all children, the insurance coverage decreased hospital use and improved 
health status.  The effects seemed to be greater in magnitude for the younger children.  
For immigrant children, insurance coverage increased doctor visits (preventive and 
curative care) but there was no effect on health status.  The magnitude of the effects 
seemed to be greater for immigrant children compared to all children.  For older 
adolescents, exploratory graphical analyses suggested that at the age of 19, health 
insurance coverage dropped drastically (for all coverage as well as by types) but health 
care use increased for both outpatient and inpatient services.  The findings for health 
were inconsistent.  However, because of a clear discontinuity in living arrangements 
that simultaneously occurred at 19 and its independent correlation with older 
adolescents' health care use and health, the suggested relationship was most likely 
biased and the bias would not be corrected using a regression discontinuity method. 
The findings from this study are consistent with the conventional hypothesis 
that the health insurance increases health care use especially preventive care.  As 
Kaestner, Joyce and Racine (1999) mention in their paper, the health status measures 
that are used in this study may not be relevant measures that adequately capture the 
effect of Medicaid expansion and SCHIP implementation.  Maternal report of 
children’s general health status may not be an accurate measure of children’s health.  
Maternal report of whether the child has any activity limitation may not be a health 
condition that may easily be cured through health care use that health insurance 
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finances.  A measure that is more objective and which reflects the health conditions 
that are altered by the changes in health care use may have more accurately captured 
the effect of public insurance.  The results for the lost school days due to illness offer a 
weak indication that insurance coverage may have improved children’s health. 
Despite the limitations, in general, there is a weak evidence that health 
insurance increased children’s use of preventive and curative care but decreased 
intensive and emergency care at hospitals and, improved health status.  The findings 
also weakly suggest that the benefit was larger for immigrant children, one of the 
highest uninsured groups of children in the nation.  From this study, although there is 
a clear drop in insurance coverage at the age of 19, its effect on health care use and 
health is not clear.   These results are informative in light of the increasing health care 
costs and the recent trend of expanding coverage to the children who are left behind.  
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Figure A.1 Selected Outcome Variables for Years 1992-2002 
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1992-2002 NHIS.   
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Figure A.2 Change in Simulated Fraction of Medicaid or SCHIP Eligible 
Children for years 1992-2002 for All Ages and by Age Group 
C. New York D. Texas 
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1992-2002 NHIS.   
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B. # of DV Past 2 Weeks  A. Any DV Past 2 Weeks 
 
Figure A.3 Percentage of Children who had Any Doctor Visits (DV) and Number 
of Such Illness in the Past 2 Weeks for 1997-2002 for All Children and by Health 
Insurance Status 
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1997-2002 NHIS.   
 
 
   
A. Any Hospital Episodes Past Year B. # of Hospital Episodes Past Year  
 
Figure A.4 Percentage of Children who had Any Short Stay Hospital Episodes 
and Number of Such Episodes in the Past Year for Years 1997-2002 for All 
Children and by Health Insurance Status 
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1997-2002 NHIS.   
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   B. # of Hospital Days Past YearA. Any Hospital Days Past Year   
 
Figure A.5 Percentage of Children who had Any Short Stay Hospital Days and 
Number of Such Days in the Past Year for 1997-2002 for All Children and by 
Health Insurance Status 
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1997-2002 NHIS.   
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Figure A.6 Change in the Fraction of Children in Excellent Health for Years 
1992-2002 for All Children and by Health Insurance Status 
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1992-2002 NHIS.   
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Figure A.7 Change in the Fraction of Children with Any Activity Limitation for 
Years 1992-2002 for All Children and by Health Insurance Status 
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1992-2002 NHIS.   
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Figure A.8 Percentage of Children who had Any School Days Lost to Illness and 
Number of Such Days in the Past Year for Years 1997-2002 for All Children and 
by Health Insurance Status 
Note: Author’s calculations using unweighted data from 1997-2002 NHIS.   
 
 
Table A.1 First Stage Results for Any Insurance When Instruments Are Entered 
Separately for 1992-2002 and 1997-2002 
 Any (Own eligibility) 
Any 
(Family eligibility) 
 1992-2002 1997-2002 1992-2002 1997-2002 
Own Eligibility 0.040** 0.031   
 (0.019) (0.021)   
Family Eligibility   0.078*** 0.246*** 
   (0.020) (0.047) 
Observations 243021 130952 243021 130952 
R-squared 0.098 0.103 0.098 0.105 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses   
Column 1 and 2 use instruments individually with any insurance coverage as a dependent variable.  
Column 3 uses employer/private insurance as a dependent variable.  Column 3 uses public insurance as 
a dependent variable.  Regressions include all control variables from the main specification.  See notes 
from Table 2.2. 
Table A.2 First Stage Results for Public and Employer or Private Health 
Insurance for 1992-2002 
 Public Employer / Private 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Own Eligibility 0.069** 0.071**  -0.078*** -0.030*  
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.018)  
Family Eligibility 0.002  0.049** 0.076***  0.024 
 (0.017)  (0.024) (0.022)  (0.021) 
Observations 242768 242768 242768 242969 242969 242969 
R-squared 0.366 0.366 0.365 0.417 0.416 0.416 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses   
Column 1 and 2 use instruments individually with any insurance coverage as a dependent variable.  
Column 3 uses employer/private insurance as a dependent variable.  Column 3 uses public insurance as 
a dependent variable.  Regressions include all control variables from the main specification.  See notes 
from Table 2.2. 
A. Any Days Past Year B. # of Days Past Year 
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2.14. More on Identification  
 
Insurance status captures many characteristics about a person including income (most 
likely in a nonlinear way), unobserved health care needs and health status that cannot 
be necessarily controlled for in a regression.  Therefore ordinary least squares 
estimates of the effect of insurance on health care use and health will be biased.  
Without correction for endogeneity of insurance, coefficient on insurance will capture 
both true causal effect of insurance and effects of other variables that are correlated 
with insurance but not included in the regression.  Instrumental variable approach is 
one way to address this issue.  In an instrumental variable approach, one needs to 
choose an instrument that is correlated with the endogenous variable but not with 
outcome variable (i.e. error term in outcome regression).  Intuitively, one predicts the 
change in insurance status caused by an exogenous variation in the instrument and 
examines how this change affected the outcome.  Simulated measure of public health 
insurance eligibility is an instrument for insurance that has been used extensively in 
previous studies.  For example, a child's insurance is instrumented by their simulated 
public health insurance eligibility measure defined as the fraction of a nationally 
representative sample of children who are eligible for public insurance (Medicaid or 
SCHIP) in a given state in a given month and year for each age often calculated from 
nationally representative datasets such as CPS.      
As mentioned in the main text, this study uses these simulated eligibility 
measures as instruments to address endogeneity of insurance.  However, unlike many 
earlier studies that used simulated public insurance eligibilities as instruments for 
public insurance eligibility (e.g. Currie and Gruber 1996a, Dafny and Gruber 2000, 
2005, Currie, Decker and Lin 2008), this study uses the same instruments for 
insurance coverage (i.e. have insurance or not).  This section provides detailed 
explanations on the methodologies used in the studies.    
Both the previous studies and this study use the same simulated public 
insurance eligibility instruments.  Therefore identification for both studies comes from 
variation in public insurance eligibility expansions that differed in magnitudes and by 
child's age across states over time.  For both studies, children who took up public 
coverage after eligibility expansions provide main identification for the analyses.  
While the source of identification is the same, instrumented endogenous variables are 
different.  Whereas previous studies used public insurance eligibility, this study uses 
any insurance coverage.  If one wants to examine the effect of insurance coverage 
instead of eligibility using simulated public insurance eligibility expansions as 
instruments, a logical extension may be to examine the effect of public insurance 
coverage after controlling for public insurance coverage instead of any coverage as it 
is done in this study.  This study does not examine the effect of insurance coverage by 
types of insurance because, as mentioned in the main text, first stage F statistics were 
not very high when the effect of public insurance coverage was examined.  Low F 
statistics may have been due to the use of two instruments that are highly collinear 
when there are two endogenous variables.  Since there are two endogenous variables 
(public and private insurance coverage), minimum of two instruments are necessary 
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for the regression to be identified.  However because both instruments (simulated 
eligibilities for child’s own public insurance and child’s family’s public insurance) 
capture the same policies that expanded public insurance eligibility, there might have 
been a high correlation between the instruments which might have led to inadequate 
power of the instruments to identify the regression.    
 
 
Figure A.9  The Effect of Public Insurance Eligibility Expansions on Children's 
Health Insurance Status in Eligibility Studies 
 
Previous studies like Currie and Gruber (1996a) examined the effect of public 
insurance eligibility on children's health care use and health.  Identification comes 
from children who became eligible for public insurance due to eligibility expansions.  
As shown in Figure A.9, children who became eligible consists of different groups in 
terms of coverage; they include children who changed their health insurance status 
(uninsured to publicly insured, uninsured to privately insured, privately insured to 
publicly insured, publicly insured to privately insured, publicly insured to uninsured, 
privately insured to uninsured), and those who did not change their health insurance 
status (remained uninsured, publicly insured, or privately insured).  Essentially the 
comparison is between children who are eligible (driven by those who newly became 
eligible) and those who are ineligible.  Both groups include different types of children 
in terms of their health insurance coverage status.   
Close examination of insurance coverage is informative in determining the 
source of main identification and magnitudes of eligibility effects.  Even though there 
are six combinations of changes in insurance that children may have experienced, 
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there are no theoretical explanations for changes from uninsured to privately insured, 
from publicly insured to privately insured, and from publicly insured to uninsured.  
For example, there is no reason to believe that uninsured children would get private 
coverage when they become newly eligible for public insurance.  Therefore any 
relationship that seems to exist is most likely to be spurious and not causal.  This 
leaves three plausible changes in insurance that may have resulted from eligibility 
expansions: from uninsured to publicly insured, from privately insured to publicly 
insured, and from privately insured to uninsured.  First set of children are those who 
took up public insurance coverage after they became eligible.  Estimates of the effect 
of eligibility are mainly driven by these children.  Second set of children are those 
who switched from private to public coverage, essentially capturing crowd out effect.  
The effect that crowd out children have on estimates are ambiguous because it 
depends on the extent of coverage of private and public insurance that children had 
originally and newly acquired, respectively.  If private insurance was more extensive 
than newly acquired public insurance, then children would have most likely used less 
health care after obtaining public insurance.   
 
 
Figure A.10  The Effect of Public Insurance Eligibility Expansions on Children's 
Health Insurance Status in This Study 
 
Therefore the magnitude of estimates would decrease.  On the other hand, if the 
opposite is true, then children would have used more health care.  Therefore the 
magnitude of estimates would increase.  The latter set of children are those who 
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dropped private coverage to become eligible for public insurance since some states 
impose waiting periods before allowing children to enroll in public health insurance 
programs (CBO 2007).  These children will reduce magnitude of estimates since they 
will most likely reduce their use of health care since they are no longer covered by 
insurance.   
Among newly eligible children, there are also children who do not change their 
health insurance status despite the fact that they are now eligible for public insurance.  
Since these children most likely do not change their health care seeking behaviors, the 
overall estimate of the effect of eligibility will decrease.  As repeatedly mentioned in 
the study, this study examines the effect of any insurance coverage, not public 
insurance eligibility, on children's health care use and health.  Identification comes 
from children who changed their insurance status due to eligibility expansions.  As 
before, children who changed their insurance status consist of different groups of 
children.  They include children who changed from uninsured to publicly insured, 
from uninsured to privately insured, from privately insured to publicly insured, from 
publicly insured to privately insured, from publicly insured to uninsured, and from 
privately insured to uninsured as shown in Figure A.10.  In this study, the comparison 
is between children who are insured (driven by those who newly became insured) and 
those who are uninsured.  Both groups include different types of children in terms of 
their health insurance coverage status.   
As stated before, of the six combinations of changes in insurance that children 
may have experienced, there is no theoretical explanation for changes from uninsured 
to private insurance, public insurance to private insurance, and public insurance to 
uninsured.  Of the remaining combinations, children who experienced changes from 
uninsured to public insured provide the main identification for the study.  Those who 
change from private insurance to public insurance weaken identification because the 
change in the type of insurance coverage does not change the status of insurance status 
in terms of any coverage and therefore does not contribute to identification.  Those 
who change from private insurance to uninsured will produce wrong signs of 
coefficients in the first stage since it is hypothesized that public insurance eligibility 
increases insurance coverage among children.  
As evident from Figures A.9 and A.10, simulated public insurance eligibilities 
have more direct relationship with public insurance eligibility than insurance 
coverage.  This means that the correlation between simulated public insurance 
eligibility and actual public insurance eligibility is stronger than that between 
simulated public insurance eligibility and any insurance coverage.  Therefore first 
stage F-statistics of eligibility studies should be larger in eligibility studies than this 
study.  On the other hand, public insurance eligibility is more remotely related to 
health care use and health than insurance coverage as explained above, i.e. there are 
several combinations of changes in insurance that have reducing effect on magnitudes 
on the estimates.  Therefore, magnitude of the coefficients on public insurance 
eligibility in the second stage in eligibility studies should be smaller than those on 
insurance coverage in the second stage in this study.   
In both types of studies, children who change from uninsured to public 
insurance are those who more likely need care and are unhealthier than the average 
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child.  This is because children may not get coverage until they actually seek care.  
Some may enroll in Medicaid or SCHIP at the time of health care use (e.g. at a 
hospital) and these children are more likely to have higher need for health care or are 
less healthy than the average child.  Therefore these instruments will most likely 
produce larger estimates for effects on health care use and health than for the average 
child.   
  
 
2.15. Explanation of Endogeneity Bias 
 
In a classical case where orthogonality of one of more of the regressor variables, X 
and the disturbance term, u is assumed, least square estimate is the best linear 
unbiased estimator.  However, if this condition does not hold, e.g. in case of 
endogeneity bias, OLS estimators will be biased and inconsistent.    
 In the general linear model, y = Xβ + u, OLS estimator, b can be expressed as:   
 
bOLS = β + (X’X)-1X’u       (A1) 
 
If one or more of the regressors are correlated with the disturbance term, then bOLS 
will be biased: 
 
E[bOLS | X] = β + (X’X)-1X’u ≠β      (A2) 
 
where the (X’X)-1X’u  is the bias term.  The direction of the bias cannot be 
generalized.  When probability limit are taken, 
 
plim bOLS = β + plim(X’X/n)-1 * plim(X’u/n)     (A3) 
 
If one assumes that plim(X’X/n) =  QXX and plim(X’u/n) = QXu, then Equation A3 can 
be re-expressed as:   
 
plim bOLS = β +  QXX-1* QXu       (A4) 
 
Note that Equation A4 implies that if there are no correlations between the regressor 
variables and the disturbance term, then QXu = 0, the second term drops out of the 
equation and is left with plim bOLS = β, i.e. OLS estimates are consistent.  On the other 
hand, if there are correlations between the regressor variables and the disturbance 
term, then QXu = 0, then QXu ≠ 0 and therefore OLS estimates will not be consistent.     
 One solution to obtaining a consistent estimator when QXu ≠ 0 is to use 
instrumental variables.  Instrumental variables, Z need to satisfy two conditions: 1) Z 
must be correlated with X and plim(Z’X/n) =  QZX must be a finite matrix of full rank; 
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and 2) Z must not be correlated with u, i.e. plim(Z’u/n) = QZu = 0.  First, the general 
equation, y = Xβ + u is premultiplied by Z’: 
 
Z’y = Z’Xβ + Z’u        (A5) 
 
This suggests IV estimator to be: 
 
bIV = (X’Z(Z’Z) -1 Z’X) -1 X’Z(Z’Z) -1 Z’y 
      = (X’PZX) -1 X’PZy 
      = β + (1/n X’PZX)-1(1/n X’PZu)      (A6) 
 
 Since instruments are assumed to be uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the 
limit, plim(1/n X’PZu) = 0, and therefore in the limit, the second term drops out and IV 
estimator is consistent: 
 
plim bIV = β         (A7) 
 
One special care of endogeneity bias may arise from measurement error.  For 
example, in this paper, one can think of a case where more health conscious 
individuals are correctly reporting their health insurance status and health outcomes 
than those who are less health conscious.  In this case, without controlling for health 
awareness levels of the individuals, reported health insurance status will be 
endogenous.  In the case of measurement error, the bias on OLS estimator is towards 
zero.  Consider a simple relationship: 
 
y = βx +u         (A8) 
 
However, x is measured with error and thus a combination of true value x-tilda and an 
error, v: 
 
x = x-tilda + v         (A9) 
 
Therefore the correct relationship will be: 
 
y = βx-tilda +u        (A10) 
 
If instead of x-tilda, one uses x to estimate β, the OLS estimate will be: 
 
bOLS = ∑yx/∑x2 
  = ∑x(βx-tilda +u)/∑x2 
  = β∑xx-tilda/∑x2 + ∑xu/∑x2      (A11) 
 
Since 1) mutual independence of u, x-tilda and v; and 2) existence of appropriate 
second order moments and their probability limits are assumed, the following 
equations are true: 
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plim(1/n ∑x2) = σ2x-tilda + σ2v       (A12) 
plim(1/n ∑xx-tilda) = σ2x-tilda        (A13) 
plim(1/n ∑xu) = 0        (A14) 
 
Substituting Equations A12-A14 into Equation A11 gives: 
 
plim bOLS =  β(σ2x-tilda/(σ2x-tilda + σ2v))      (A15) 
 
Equation A15 implies that bOLS is both biased and inconsistent with the bias going 
towards zero since (σ2x-tilda/(σ2x-tilda + σ2v)) is less than 1, i.e. attenuation bias.  For 
more details, refer to econometrics text books such as Greene (2003) and Johnston and 
DiNardo (2007). 
 
 
2.16. The Use of Linear Probability Models for Dichotomous Outcome Variables 
and Sensitivity of Results to Instruments 
 
An interesting study by Leininger (2007b) examined the robustness of instrumental 
variables results in the identification of the effect of private and public health 
insurance on children’s health care use.  Using data from 1999 and 2002 waves of 
National Survey of America's Families, Leininger (2007b) found both private and 
public insurance increases health care use (any provider visit in the past year any well 
visit in the past year) among children with the effect of public insurance slightly 
greater than that of private insurance.  She controlled for the endogeneity of insurance 
coverage using different combinations of family and state level instruments.  Family 
level instruments included number of parents working in firms with 50 or more 
employees and number of parents who have worked with their current employer for 
more than one year.  State level instruments included simulated eligibility for 
Medicaid, an index of the various enrollment requirements states had in place during 
the survey year,35 the percent of all firms in the state that offer insurance to their 
employees, the percent of all firms that offer insurance, the percent of all firms that 
offer family plans with no employee contribution, and the percent of all firms that 
require a waiting period for insurance eligibility. 
The effect of insurance was very large; on an average, even the smaller 
estimates produced by two stage non-linear residual included model suggested that 
public and private insurance increased provider visit by 45 and 42 percentage points, 
respectively.  Many of her estimates from the linear probability model was out of 
range or unrealistically high; for example, the findings suggested that public and 
                                                 
35 The index compiles information on presence of an asset test, joint Medicaid/SCHIP application form 
at initial enrollment, joint Medicaid/SCHIP application form at redetermination, requirement of a face-
to-face interview at initial enrollment, requirement of a face-to-face interview at redetermination, 
presumptive eligibility, being continuously eligible for at least 12 months after approval, and 
acceptance of self-reported income as an income measure. This is a state-year level index that takes on 
values from 2 to 8 in the sample with higher values denoting a lower burden of enrollment. 
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private insurance increased provider visit by 107 and 92 percentage points, 
respectively.    
 The interesting contribution of her paper was that the effects of insurance 
status on children's health care use were very sensitive to both instruments used and 
the estimation methods employed.  She found that using state level instruments 
produced larger estimates than family level instruments and among state level 
instruments, simulated eligibility instruments seemed have produced smaller estimates 
than state level firm characteristics.  She also found that for dichotomous outcome 
measures, non linear methods may be more appropriate for estimation than the linear 
method when the values of dependent variables are close to one.   
Her findings are relevant for this study for several reasons: 1) The use of a 
linear probability model: Since the mean values of dichotomous outcome variables 
used in this study are generally low with values ranging around 0.1, the use of linear 
probability may not be a big issue.  However, especially for the outcome measure for 
lost school days has a mean of 0.7 which may be problematic, one must keep in mind 
that linear probability model may produce out of range point estimate which may not 
be appropriate and therefore nonlinear estimation techniques may be necessary to 
produce better estimates.  2) IVs: This study uses simulated public insurance eligibility 
measures as instruments for health insurance.  One must keep in mind that the 
estimates are sensitive to the instruments used and the results are only applicable to 
the population that the IVs are impacting on.   
 
 
2.17. Inconsistencies in Outcome Measures Due to 1997 NHIS Questionnaire 
Redesign  
 
Due to the questionnaire redesign that was implemented in 1997, some of the outcome 
measures used in the study were not consistently measured over time.  The affected 
measures were: doctor visits, school days lost to illness visits, short stay hospital 
episodes, short stay hospital days.  Before the 1997 redesign, the information on the 
number of school days lost to illness and the number of doctor visits were collected for 
past 2 weeks and for past year, respectively.  However, after the redesign, NHIS 
collected information on the number of school days lost to illness for past year and the 
number of doctor visits in past 2 weeks.  While past 12 months values were calculated 
by multiplying past 2 weeks values by 26 and similarly past 2 weeks values were 
calculated by dividing past 12 months values by 26 to create consistent measures over 
time, there were clear gaps in the outcomes before and after the redesign when the 
trends were observed.  While mathematically, 2 weeks multiplied by 26 is equal to one 
year, altering the recalled data in this way may not work to maintain consistency for 
several reasons.  First, past 2 weeks recall data most likely suffers from less 
measurement error than past year recall data.  If there are differences in recall errors, 
the data will not be consistent over time.  Second, since there is natural variation in 
event occurrences, incidents that happened in past 2 weeks cannot necessarily be 
generalized to what would have happened in the entire past year.   
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 1997 NHIS data codebook also warns data users of the qualitative differences 
in the questions used for doctor visits (National Center for Health Statistics 2000).  
Prior to the questionnaire redesign, doctor visits included “ (office) visits to medical 
doctors or health care professionals working with or for a medical doctor” (National 
Center for Health Statistics 2000, p.26) as well as home care visits by these 
professionals (National Center for Health Statistics 2000).  The questionnaire gave 
examples of the types of doctors or health care professionals including 
“dermatologists, psychiatrists, and ophthalmologists, as well as general practitioners 
and osteopaths” (United States Department of Health and Human Services. 1996, 
p.18).  However, after the redesign, the questionnaire separated out home visits from 
office visits and mentioned an expanded list of doctors; the respondents were asked to 
include nurses, physical therapists, and chiropractors (National Center for Health 
Statistics 2000).  This change in the context of the questions before and after the 
redesign may have produced both quantitatively and qualitatively inconsistent 
estimates.  
For some measures, NHIS changed the wording of the questionnaire and this 
created a gap in the measurement consistency.  The measures that were affected in this 
way are:  short stay hospital episodes and short stay hospital days.  Before the 
questionnaire redesign, NHIS asked for the number of short stay hospital episodes and 
the number of short stay hospital days in the past 12 months.  After the redesign, 
NHIS asked for the number of times when the person stayed in any hospital overnight 
or longer and the number of nights the person had been in the hospital in the past 12 
months.  There is a clear break in the trend between the two periods of years for all of 
these measures, and therefore two separate analyses had to be done, one for the years 
1992-1996 and one for the years 1997-2002.  Figure A.1 shows the gaps in trends for 
selected outcome variables.   
 
 
2.18. Weak Instruments Problem 
 
As mentioned in the text, when IV regression suffers from a weak instrument problem, 
1) IV estimates will have larger standard errors, i.e. asymptotic variance is higher than 
that of OLS estimator and it will be larger if the correlation between the endogenous 
regressor and the instrument is lower (asymptotic problem #1); 2) IV estimates may be 
inconsistent if the instrument is not entirely exogenous (asymptotic problem #2); and 
3) in finite samples, IV estimates will be biased in the same direction as the OLS 
estimates and the magnitude of the bias is inversely related to sample size and the 
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous regressor (Bound, Jaeger and 
Baker 1995).   
The intuition behind low precision of IV estimator (problem #1 from above) is 
as follows.  Recall that variance of OLS estimator is greater if the variation in X is 
smaller (recall that var(bOLS) = (X’X)-1σ2 ).  Since IV only uses the part of variation in 
X that is correlated with the instrument (so naturally the variation that is being used 
for IV is smaller than the total variation), the variance of IV estimator will be larger 
than that of the OLS estimator.  As an instrument becomes weaker, the variation in X 
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correlated with the instrument becomes smaller and therefore the variance of IV 
estimator increase. 
If the instrument has even a small correlation with X, then weak instrument 
leads to a large inconsistency in the IV estimate.  Suppose there is a small direct 
correlation between the instrument Z and y: 
 
y = Xβ + Zγ + ε        (A16) 
 
and therefore γ ≠ 0.  Consider just identified case.  The first line in Equation A6 
simplifies to: 
 
bIV = (Z’X) -1Z’y        (A17) 
 
Substituting Equation A16 into Equation A17 gets: 
 
bIV = β + (Z’X) -1Z’Zγ + (Z’X) -1Z’ε      (A18) 
 
When probability limits are taken, 
 
plim bIV = β + plim(Z’X/n)-1 * plim(Z’Z/n)γ 
           = β +  QZX-1* QZZγ       (A19)  
 
Equation A19 implies that when γ ≠ 0 and the instruments are weak (QZX will be small 
so QZX-1 will be large), there will be a large inconsistency in bIV. 
Finite samples properties of IV estimators are complicated.  But in general, IV 
estimates will be biased in the same direction as the OLS estimates and the magnitude 
of the bias increases as the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous 
regressor decreases.  For intuition, consider an extreme case where there is no 
correlation between Z and X.  However, in the first stage regression, since the 
regression will desperately look for correlation between Z and X, coefficient on Z will 
not be completely zero.   In this case, the variation in X that the regression picks up 
using Z is arbitrary and therefore the expectation of bIV will most likely equal 
expectation of bOLS although the variance of bIV will be much larger than bOLS due to 
all the noise in the second stage.  For more details, refer to Bound, Jaeger and Baker 
(1995).   
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE EFFECT OF WELFARE REFORM ON CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
CARE USE AND HEALTH  
 
3.1. Introduction 
The U.S. has seen a slow improvement in child health over the past several decades.  
A report by the Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics (FIFCFS 
2004) shows that general child health status had remained fairly stable since the mid 
1980s with a slight upward trend.  Although the health gap between low- and high-
income children decreased slightly over the years, low-income children remain 
consistently and considerably less healthy compared to high-income children (FIFCFS 
2004).   
In the light of slow improvements in child health and evidence that 
underscores the importance of non-medical policies for child health (Klerman 1996), it 
is critical to understand the effects of recent changes in social policy that have affected 
resources available for low-income families with children.  One of these policy 
changes is welfare reform that culminated in the passing of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.  It not only affected 
polices that directly relate to children’s health care but also made significant changes 
to their home environments.   
This study examines the effect of welfare reform on children’s use of health 
care and health status by using the 1990-2002 National Health Interview Survey, a 
survey collected by the National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  
Difference-in-difference model is estimated to compare the difference in the change in 
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outcomes between treatment and control groups before and after AFDC waiver and 
TANF implementation.  Following the earlier studies, the treatment group is defined 
as children living in a low educated single mother family and the control groups are 
defined as those living in a high-educated single mother family and those in a two-
parent family.  Alternative definitions are also used to check the robustness of the 
results.  Effects for all children and for immigrant children are estimated. 
This study extends the existing literature in several ways.  This is the first 
econometric study on welfare reform and child health using a nationally representative 
dataset.  To this date, most studies had used small-scale experimental data and hence 
the findings have low external validity and a few large scale non-experimental studies 
only examine limited outcomes (infant health and child health, i.e. birthweight) or for 
a specific population (e.g. immigrant children in Kaushal and Kaestner (2007)).   
Second, this study examines the effect of welfare reform on health care use and 
health status for immigrant children.  There is evidence that welfare reform reduced 
overall insurance coverage among the immigrant population (Kandula et al 2004) 
although Borjas (2003) found that welfare reform increased employer provided 
insurance coverage by inducing more work among immigrants.  How these changes in 
welfare policies affected health is not yet examined by previous research with the 
exception of Kaushal and Kaestner (2007).  Unlike Kaushal and Kaestner (2007), this 
study examines the effect for all children (not limiting to those ages 0-14).  Children 
who are above age 14 are less likely to be affected by changes in their environment 
due to welfare reform because health decisions for younger children are more likely 
taken by the mothers who are directly affected by welfare reform.  It is nevertheless 
important to include all children who may have been affected by the new welfare 
scheme.1  A treatment group is defined as children with low educated single mothers 
                                                 
1 Kaushal and Kaestner (2007) do not explain the reason for excluding children ages 15-18 in their 
paper. 
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where low educated is defined as those who have 12 or less years of education as 
opposed to the definition used by Kaushal and Kaestner (2007) which consists of those 
who have 15 years or less years of education.  The definition used in this study may be 
more relevant for the purpose of examining the effect of welfare reform using 
difference in difference method because previous studies had found that the majority 
of single women with less than 12 years of education are welfare recipients (Kaestner 
and Lee 2003).  Unlike Kaushal and Kaestner (2007), only pre-redesign data (years 
1990-1996) is used for some outcomes in this study (and therefore examining the 
effect of AFDC waivers and not TANF) since these measures were not consistently 
measured over time, i.e. pre and post 1997 NHIS questionnaire redesign.  By pooling 
data from all the years together, the effect captured by the TANF dummy in Kaushal 
and Kaestner (2007) may or may not reflect the true effect of TANF implementation. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In section 3.2, some 
background information on welfare reform is introduced.  Section 3.3 reviews existing 
literature on welfare reform and child health.  Section 3.4 explains the basic model and 
conceptual framework underlying the study.  Section 3.5 outlines the identification 
procedures.  Section 3.6 introduces the data.  Section 3.7 tests for the difference in 
difference method.  Section 3.8 presents the results from the descriptive analyses and 
Section 3.9 provides the results from the regression analyses.  Section 3.10 explores 
some of the pathways of the effect of welfare reform and Section 3.11 presents the 
results from the sensitivity analyses and Section 3.12 offers conclusions and 
implications for future research. 
3.2. Background Information on Welfare Reform 
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), a precursor to Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) was enacted in 1935.  Initially, ADC only covered children who 
 166
lived with a parent or a close relative.  However, after 1950, benefits were also 
extended to caretaking relatives (Office of Human Services Policy 2008).   In the same 
year, congress also required states to provide benefits to all eligible applicants, making 
AFDC benefits a need-based entitlement (Office of Human Services Policy 2008).   
Beginning in the early 1990s, many states started seeking waivers from the 
federal government to make changes to their AFDC programs under Title IV Section 
1115(a) of the Social Security Act.   This act allowed states to have more flexibility in 
designing their programs.  Most state waivers fell in one of the three categories: 
encouraging work, increasing personal responsibility, and restricting recipients’ 
eligibility (Future of Children 1997).  In essence, implementing waivers was a way for 
the states to tighten their welfare services.  States’ efforts to reform welfare 
culminated on August 22, 1996 when the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was enacted, ending the entitlement to 
cash assistance, mandating work requirements and time limits for those receiving 
assistance, and allowing states to sanction to those who did not follow the new rules.  
This was a drastic change from AFDC that served the nation for more than 60 years.2  
Instantaneously a universal safety net had turned itself into an “employment 
contingent social contract” (Haskins 2001).  The key changes of PRWORA are 
summarized in Appendix 3.13 (Urban Institute 1996, Weil and Finegold 2002).  The 
biggest change was replacing the old AFDC cash assistance program with a new 
program known as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  Table 3.1 
shows the implementation dates of AFDC waivers and TANF.  AFDC waivers were 
implemented as early as 1992 in some states and by early 1998, all states had 
implemented TANF and the new welfare system was in place. 
  
                                                 
2 By August 1996, however, 44 states had AFDC waivers in place (Future of Children 1997). 
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Table 3.1  Implementation Dates of AFDC waivers and TANF 
State AFDC Waiver Implemented 
TANF Implemented 
Official Actual 
Alabama   11/15/1996   
Alaska   7/1/1997   
Arizona 11/1/1995 10/1/1996   
Arkansas 7/1/1994 7/1/1997   
California 12/1/1992 11/26/1996 1/1/1998 
Colorado   7/1/1997   
Connecticut 1/1/1996 10/1/1996   
Delaware 10/1/1995 3/10/1997   
Dist. of Columbia   3/1/1997   
Florida (1) 10/1/1996   
Georgia 1/1/1994 1/1/1997   
Hawaii 2/1/1997 7/1/1997   
Idaho   7/1/1997   
Illinois 11/23/1993 7/1/1997   
Indiana 5/1/1995 10/1/1996   
Iowa 10/1/1993 1/1/1997   
Kansas   10/1/1996   
Kentucky   10/18/1996   
Louisiana   1/1/1997   
Maine   11/1/1996   
Maryland 3/1/1996 12/9/1996   
Massachusetts 11/1/1995 9/30/1996  
Michigan 10/1/1992 9/30/1996  
Minnesota (2) 7/1/1997  
Mississippi 10/1/1995 10/1/1996 7/1/1997 
Missouri 6/1/1995 12/1/1996   
Montana 2/1/1996 2/1/1997   
Nebraska 10/1/1995 12/1/1996   
Nevada   12/3/1996   
New Hampshire   10/1/1996   
New Jersey 10/1/1992 2/1/1997 7/1/1997 
New Mexico   7/1/1997   
New York   12/2/1996 11/1/1997 
North Carolina 7/1/1996 1/1/1997   
North Dakota (3) 7/1/1997   
Ohio 7/1/1996 10/1/1996   
Oklahoma   10/1/1996   
Oregon 2/1/1993 10/1/1996   
Pennsylvania   3/3/1997   
Rhode Island   5/1/1997   
South Carolina   10/12/1996   
South Dakota 6/1/1994 12/1/1996   
Source:  Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Setting the Baseline:  A 
Report on State Welfare Waivers and other unpublished documents. (Crouse 1999) 
Notes:  
(1) Partial implementation in Florida (two counties for time limits and eight counties for increased earning 
disregard beginning in February 1994). 
(2) Partial implementation in Minnesota (seven counties for consolidated AFDC and Food Stamp payments and 
increased earning disregard beginning in April 1994).   
(3) Partial implementation in North Dakota (11 counties for work sanctions beginning in July 1996 and ten counties 
for increased earning disregard beginning in October 1996). 
 168
Table 3.1  (Continued) 
 
State AFDC Waiver Implemented 
TANF Implemented 
Official Actual 
Tennessee 9/1/1996 10/1/1996   
Texas 6/1/1996 11/5/1996   
Utah 1/1/1993 10/1/1996   
Vermont 7/1/1994 9/20/1996   
Virginia 7/1/1995 2/1/1997   
Washington 1/1/1996 1/10/1997   
West Virginia 2/1/1996 1/11/1997   
Wisconsin 1/1/1996 9/30/1996 9/1/1997 
Wyoming   1/1/1997   
 
Before the enactment of PRWORA, there was no difference in the treatment of 
legal immigrants and citizens under the welfare laws (Wasem 2004).  They received 
the same benefits as citizens under AFDC.  After PRWORA, however, policy changes 
were made that affected the recently arrived legal immigrants in receiving welfare.  
PRWORA restricted access of the recently arrived legal immigrants within their first 5 
years of residence in the U. S. to cash payments, Medicaid, Food Stamps and 
Supplemental Security Income (Kaushal and Kaestner 2007).  Most states offered 
coverage to immigrants who had arrived before 1996 using federal funds, but since 
they were not allowed to use federal funds to cover those who arrived after 1996, 
fewer number of states used state level funds to cover the recently arrived legal 
immigrants (Kaushal and Kaestner 2007, Fix and Passel 1999).  Research found that 
legal immigrants’ use of welfare declined more sharply than the use by citizens; these 
studies attribute the decline in welfare use to the economic growth in the 1990s, 
changes in welfare policies for legal immigrants and the confusion and fear that 
enveloped the immigrant community after the welfare reform (Kaushal and Kaestner 
2005, 2007, Fix and Passel 1999).  It should be emphasized that illegal immigrants 
were barred from receiving benefits throughout the years. 
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3.3. Literature  
Considering that the welfare policies in the U. S. developed around indigent children 
and their families, it is important to see how such policies have affected children.  
However, despite many child-related goals addressed in PRWORA, research in this 
area still remains very limited with national data (Duncan and Chase-Landsdale 2001, 
Blank 2002).  This scarcity of research may be due to the lack of data on child 
outcomes of interest, especially in large datasets (Grogger et al. 2002).  It may also be 
because effects on children crystallize over a longer span and therefore it may be 
difficult to detect any changes in the short run.   
Studies on welfare reform and child health are limited in particular (Chavkin 
and Wise 2002, Smith et al 2000, Wise et al 2002).3  The few studies that exist are 
mostly experimental studies, which have produced inconclusive results.  In their 
synthesis of research, both Grogger et al. (2002) and Morris et al. (2001) found mixed 
effects of welfare reform on child health.  For example, out of 53 child health 
measures covered in 24 small-scale random assignment studies studied by Grogger et 
al. (2002), favorable outcomes were found for 29 measures and unfavorable outcomes 
for 24 measures, of which only 11 measures (7 and 4 measures, respectively) were 
statistically significant.4  More recent studies also find mixed results (Tout et al 2004).   
Non-experimental studies on infant health find mixed results as well.  Currie 
and Grogger (2002) find that increase in welfare caseloads is associated with 
insignificant decrease in very low birth weight but insignificant increase in low birth 
weight for AFDC waiver years.  A similar trend seems to continue on to TANF years; 
Kaestner and Lee (2005) find that welfare caseload is associated with insignificant 
increase in low birth weight.  Overall, existing literature suggests that welfare reform 
                                                 
3 Much still remains unknown about the effect of welfare reform on health status in general (Bitler, 
Gelbach and Hoynes 2004).   
4 For studies that conducted separate analysis for each age group, results from all children were 
reviewed whenever available and if not , middle age group (ages 6-11) were reviewed. 
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did not significantly affect health care use and health outcomes among children (Bitler 
and Hoynes 2006).   
To the author’s knowledge, there is only one study that examined the effect of 
welfare reform on health care use and health status of immigrant children.  Kaushal 
and Kaestner (2007) examined the effect of TANF on the health care use and health 
status of immigrant children.  They found no statistically significant effect except for 
some evidence of an increase in the number of school days lost to illness.  This study 
extends their study in several ways which may or may not affect the results. 
First, they defined low educated mothers as those whose education is 15 years 
or less.  This definition combines mothers with some college education with those 
who are high school dropouts.  Although this may not be a big issue if employers 
consider education obtained from foreign countries as inferior to those from the U.S., 
it may be an issue for two reasons.  First, these are different groups of mothers (those 
with some college, high school graduates and high school drop outs) combined into 
one low educated group.  Second, the meaningful education cutoff for immigrant 
welfare recipient is most likely whether or not the mother is a high school graduate.  In 
the difference in difference method, treatment and control groups must be defined as 
those groups that are similar in everyway except for the fact that one group has a high 
probability of receiving welfare whereas another group has a low probability.  
Previous studies found that the average education of welfare receiving immigrant 
mother is 11 years (Hao and Kawano 2001).  Therefore the relevant cutoff is most 
likely high school graduation and not college education.  Whether the mother has 12 
or more years of education or not is the basis of this study.   
Second, Kaushal and Kaestner (2007) used health care use and health status 
measures that were not consistently measured over time.  In their analysis of the health 
care use and health status of the children, they used outcome measures that included: 
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any doctor visits in the past 2 weeks, any doctor visits in the past 12 month, doctor 
visits in the past 12 months exceeding 10 times, any overnight stay in a hospital in the 
past 12 months, and loss of school days in past 12 months.  As discussed in another 
study of the author (Ueyama 2008), these measures were not consistently measured 
over time.  There is a clear break in the trends before and after the questionnaire 
redesign that was implemented in 1997.  Since the method of analysis is difference in 
difference, this would not be a problem if the differences in the trends in health care 
use and health status between treatment and control groups are consistent over time in 
the absence of welfare reform.  However, since welfare reform and NHIS 
questionnaire redesign occurred at the same time, it is very difficult to find out 
whether the difference in trends between treatment and control groups before and after 
1997 was due to welfare reform or questionnaire redesign.  Therefore for these 
measures, difference in difference method may not be the most appropriate method to 
examine the effect of TANF.  In this paper, to avoid these uncertainties, these 
measures are used to examine the effect of AFDC waivers that happened before 1997 
using pre-questionnaire redesign data.  Detailed discussion of this inconsistency in 
NHIS health care use and health status measures can be found in Ueyama (2008). 
Third, Kaushal and Kaestner (2007) do not include data from 1997 because 
they claim that there is no nativity data in the NHIS public use person file.  To the 
author’s knowledge, this is not true.  This study uses all years from 1990-2002 
including 1997 for the analysis of outcome measures that are consistently measured 
over time. 
3.4. Basic Model and Conceptual Framework 
The basic model used in this study is based on Kaestner, Joyce and Racine’s (1999) 
adaptation of Grossman’s (1972) model to child health.  Child health Y at age a in year 
 172
t is a function of current and past health care, HC, other market goods, OG, and 
parental time, L: 
 
),;,...,,,,...,,,,...,,( 111 νεatttatttatttt LLLOGOGOGHCHCHCfY −−−−−−=    (1) 
 
While HC, OG and L are choice variables, child’s health endowment, ε, and child 
health production efficiency parameter, ν, are not.  This model is used to derive the 
reduced form of child health function: 
 
),,;,,...,,,,...,,,,...,,,,...,,(' 1111 θνεatttatttatogtogtogathcthcthct IIIwwwppppppfY −−−−−−−−=    (2) 
 
where phc is price of health care, pog is price of other market goods, w is opportunity 
cost of parental time, I is family income and θ is taste parameter.  This study estimates 
model 2. 
Welfare Reform in the 1990s may have affected child health through several 
complex pathways.   
First, welfare reform may affect the level of family resources and income 
(Smith et al. 2000).  Changes in welfare payments, earnings, and other welfare 
transfers may influence parents’ decisions on child investment such as food, health 
care, etc. that would ultimately affect child health.  If family income (I in model 2) 
increases, child health will increase through increased household spending on child 
investments.  Previous studies suggest that although family incomes increased after 
welfare reform (e.g. Schoeni and Blank 2000), neither the total household expenditure 
nor the proportion of the household expenditure allocated to health care and food has 
seen any changes (Kaushal, Gao and Waldfogel 2007).5  
                                                 
5 Kaushal, Gao and Walfogel (2007) did find that when food expenditure was disaggregated for 
analyses, there was a decrease in spending for food prepared at home and an increase in spending for 
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Also, welfare reform may affect mothers’ interaction with children.  Due to 
work requirements under TANF, there may be changes in the quantity and quality of 
mothers’ time with children and in childcare arrangements (Smith et al. 2000).  
Changes in earnings and penalties for noncompliance with work requirements may 
change the opportunity cost of their time, i.e. w, and reduce the quantity of time spent 
with children.  The quantity of time spent with children may also simply decrease due 
to the fixed time available to the mothers (fixed time constraint).  Quantity of time 
with children may affect child health because mothers can detect more irregularities 
with their children if they spend time with them.  Their ability to detect irregularities 
may also increase as interactions with children increases.  Previous studies have found 
that work weeks and hours increased after welfare reform (e.g. Moffitt 1999, Schoeni 
and Blank 2000).   
The quality of mothers’ time with children may also decrease if employment 
negatively affects mothers’ psychological and mental conditions.  With decreased 
quality of mothers’ time with children, they may not be as efficient as they had been 
before in producing child health, i.e. decrease in ν.  On the other hand, mothers’ 
mental health, social supports and self-esteem may increase when they enter the labor 
market.  Previous studies suggest that moving welfare dependent mothers to work 
increased positive parenting and decreased harsh parenting, improving overall 
parenting styles (Dunifon, Kalil and Danziger 2003).  These effects of mothers’ 
employment may be counteracted or exacerbated by the use of child care services 
depending on the quality of these services.  If child care services are perfect substitutes 
of mothers’ time both in terms of quantity and quality, there may not be any net effect 
on child health.  However, if they are inferior substitutes, then child health will most 
likely be negatively affected.   
                                                                                                                                            
food away from home after the welfare reform.  This may or may not affect children’s health depending 
on the type of food consumed at home and outside.  
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Finally, welfare reform delinked application for Medicaid from those for 
welfare payments.  This caused confusion and increased the perceived marginal cost 
of health care among the Medicaid eligibles.  Earlier, those who applied for welfare 
payments were automatically covered by Medicaid.  After the passage of PRWORA, 
there is a separate application process for each program.  Medicaid and SCHIP 
eligibility expansions that began as a part of welfare reform may have counteracted the 
negative effect of this delinkage on children’s use of health care and health.  This 
study includes controls for the a simulated fraction of children who would be eligible 
for SCHIP or Medicaid at the state/year/age level (from CPS) that measures each 
state’s generosity of public health insurance eligibility.  Therefore if there are any 
effects of welfare reform on children’s health care use and health through public 
health insurance programs, then it should be a negative effect created by the confusion 
at the time of welfare reform. 
 There are several reasons why the effects of welfare reform on children’s 
health care use and health status may differ between natives and immigrants.  First, 
time limits imposed on cash receipts after the welfare reform may have a larger 
negative impact on the immigrants.  Since immigrants tend to stay on welfare longer 
than the natives (Borjas and Hilton 1996), they should have been receiving more 
welfare benefits than the natives.  Thus income of immigrant families should have 
decreased by a greater amount than for the native families.  Second, because of the 
restrictive provisions for immigrants’ welfare benefits after welfare reform, the 
immigrant families’ welfare receipts may have reduced more than in the native 
families.  In both cases, decrease in welfare benefits may impact children’s health if 
this decrease is not matched by increase in income through some other ways such as 
employment or naturalization.  Previous studies have shown that welfare use among 
low income immigrants was much steeper than those of their native counterparts (Fix 
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and Passel 2002).  However, this decrease does not seem to have been compensated by 
the increase in naturalization or increase in income (Fix and Passel 2002).  Third, it is 
likely that immigrant mothers may have greater barriers to employment (e.g. 
discrimination and language barriers) than the native mothers (Rosenbaum and 
Gilbertson 1995).  In this case, fulfilling work requirements may be more difficult for 
immigrant mothers.  Therefore, their welfare benefits may be cut due to incompliance 
with the work requirements or they may have to settle for inferior employment 
conditions than the native counterparts.  This may negatively affect immigrant 
children.   Although previous evidence does not provide any conclusive evidence of 
the differences in the increase in employment between the natives and the immigrants 
due to welfare reform (Kaestner and Kaushal 2005), this is very much a possibility.   
 It must be emphasized that some of the effects may take a long time to 
manifest itself.  Since the variation exploited in this study is the timing of AFDC 
waiver and TANF adoption by states that happened in the mid 1990s, the time period 
used in this study may not be long enough for the effects to show up.  Therefore this 
study will not be able to examine the long term effect of welfare reform on children’s 
health and health care use. 
3.5. Identification Procedures 
The impact of welfare reform on health care use and child health is estimated using a 
difference-in-difference model of the following form: 
 
isttsiststistststistist TPTPZXY εϖασααααααα ++++++++= 76543210 *   (3) 
 
where Yist is one of the several access to care measures or the health outcomes of child 
i in state s in year t: a dummy indicating whether the child is in excellent health (for 
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all years), a dummy indicating whether the child has any limitation of activity (for all 
years), a dummy indicating whether the child had doctor visits in the past year and the 
number of such visits (for years 1990-1996), a dummy indicating whether the child 
had school days lost to illness visits in the past two weeks and number of such days 
(only for ages 5 to 17 and for years 1990-1996), a dummy indicating whether the child 
had short stay hospital episodes in the past year and the number of such episodes (for 
years 1990-1996), and a dummy indicating whether the child had short stay hospital 
days in the past year and the number of such days (for years 1990-1996). 
These child health outcomes are used following previous experimental studies 
on welfare reform and child health (Grogger et al 2002).  While these are the best 
child health measures available in NHIS, they are not perfect.  Because all information 
on children in NHIS is provided by an (knowledgeable) adult member of the 
household, there are many reasons to believe that these child health measures are 
biased.  For example, subjective child health may decline with the education level and 
income of the reporting adult member (Dow et al. 1997, Currie 2000).  A better 
educated adult may be able to detect the symptoms of illness more accurately.  A 
greater income allows children to have more frequent doctor visits finding out 
illnesses that had gone unnoticed before.  Both lead to worse reported health 
Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that even relatively more objective measures 
used in this study such as number of school days lost due to illness, are reported, not 
measured (Currie 2000) and that they may be correlated with both observed and 
unobserved characteristics of the child.  Lack of objective measures that are well 
suited for child health assessment in existing datasets is one of the major factors 
limiting the research (Currie 2000, Stein et al. 2005). 
 Xist is a vector of individual characteristics including child’s age, sex, race, 
and mother’s age.  Zst is a vector of state characteristics including the seasonally-
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adjusted unemployment rate (data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics); real median 
wages (data from the CPS); the maximum value of the federal and state EITC for a 
single mother with two children (data from Green Book; Leigh, 2003); the income 
eligibility limit for Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women (data from the National 
Governor's Association); the annual employment growth rate (data from the National 
Bureau of Economic Analysis); the amount of federal housing money spent per 1,000 
residents in the state (data from the U.S. Census Bureau); and the simulated fraction of 
children who would be eligible for SCHIP or Medicaid at the state/year/month/age 
level (from CPS).   
 Pst is a dummy variable of the policy of interest, i.e. AFDC waiver and 
TANF for analyses using all years only AFDC waiver for analyses using years 1990-
1996, and it equals 1 if state s has a policy in year t and 0 otherwise.6  AFDC waiver 
and TANF are included separately to capture differential effect of the two policies on 
child’s health and health care use.  AFDC waiver implementation turns Pst to 1 and it 
will remain 1 even after TANF implementation, i.e. it will not switch off when TANF 
is implemented. Therefore the coefficient of the TANF variable will capture the 
additional effect that TANF implementation had on the outcome variable over and 
above the effect from AFDC waiver implementation.   
 Tist is a dummy variable that equals 1 if child i is in the treatment group and 
0 if child i is in the control group.  The treatment group is defined as the children 
living in a family headed by a single mother who has less than a high school degree.  
The control group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a single 
mother who has high school education or more.  Alternative definitions of treatment 
and control groups are used as robustness checks.  In the first alternative, the treatment 
                                                 
6 For models with outcome variables referring to the measures at the time of interview or in the past 2 
weeks, all the policy variables are merged using the month/year/state of interview.  For models with 
outcome variables referring to the measures for the past 12 months at the time of interview, all the 
policy variables are merged using the month /previous year/state of interview.   
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group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a single mother who has 
less than a high school degree and the control group is defined as the children living in 
a married family where the mother has less than a high school degree.7  In the second 
alternative, the treatment group is defined as the children living in a family headed by 
a never married mother who has less than a high school degree and the control group 
is defined as the children living in a family headed by never married mother who has 
high school education or more.  In the third alternative, the treatment group is defined 
as the children living in a family headed by a never married mother who has less than 
a high school degree and the control group is defined as the children living in a 
married family where the mother has less than a high school degree.8   
 σs  and ϖt are state and year fixed effects that are used to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with the policy variable.  Finally, εist 
is the error term that captures the remaining unobservables that are not captured in the 
equation.  The coefficient for the first order interaction term, α5, is the DD estimator of 
interest.   
 Equation 3 is estimated using linear probability model for categorical 
dependent variables and OLS for continuous dependent variables on weighted data.9,10  
Because the error term is not normally distributed for categorical dependent variables, 
the use of the linear probability model will produce inefficient coefficient estimates.  
However, this is not a major problem because estimates are generally similar to those 
produced by nonlinear models when evaluated at the sample means (Greene 1993).  In 
                                                 
7 From their analysis of 1994 Current Population Survey, Kaestner and Lee (2003) reports that majority 
of single women with less than 12 years of education are welfare recipients whereas only a portion of 
married women regardless of their education are welfare recipients. 
8 Studies found that children of never married mothers are three times more likely to be on welfare and 
stay on welfare longer than children of divorced mothers (Besharov 1995).  Note that my main 
specification of treatment and control groups use children of single mothers which include those with 
mothers who are both never married and divorced. 
9 Many DD studies with binary dependent variables used a linear probability model (Cawley et al. 2004, 
Acs and Nelson 2004, Currie and Gruber 1996, Asch and Warner 2001) 
10 The “Sample Child” weight (wtfa_sc) was used for the analysis. 
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fact, the linear probability model is more relevant for DD estimation because the 
coefficient estimate for the interaction term produced by nonlinear models cannot be 
interpreted as the DD estimator (Angrist 2001, Ai and Norton 2001).  Nevertheless, 
nonlinear models (limited dependent variables techniques) are also used to complete 
the main findings of the study.  Details are discussed in Appendix 3.14. 
 There were several changes at the state level that happened during the same 
time period as welfare reform that may have directly or indirectly affected children’s 
health care use and health.  Such changes include economic expansion of the 1990s, 
increases in Earned Income Tax Credit subsidies right before the welfare reform, the 
minimum wage increase in the mid 1990s, and the expansions of Medicaid and SCHIP 
in the 1990s.  In the model used in this study, the effects of AFDC waiver and TANF 
implementation are isolated from all the other concurrent policy and economic 
changes that occurred around the same time by including state level characteristics and 
year fixed effects.   For example, economic expansions are control by including 
variables such as unemployment rate, real median wages, and annual employment 
growth rate.  Medicaid and SCHIP expansions are controlled by including the fraction 
of a nationwide sample of children that would be eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP as a 
measure for the state’s generosity for public health insurance program and income 
eligibility limit for Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women.  The effects from EITC 
expansion and minimum wage increase are controlled by the inclusion of year fixed 
effects because they both were implemented at the same time in all states.  Despite the 
quite extensive list of state characteristics as well as state and year fixed effects 
included in the study, these measures may not fully control all the influential factors 
because there may have been possible interactions that occurred between these 
economic and other policy changes and the welfare reform.  In addition, because of 
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nonrandom selection of states that implemented AFDC waivers,11 a small time frame 
in which TANF was implemented in all states, a diversity in the content of welfare 
policies by state and the difference between enacted policies and the actual practice on 
the field (e.g. Gais et. al. 2001), like the previous studies, this study is not immune 
from the bias caused by these issues.12   
Some of these problems may be minimized by using within state control 
group.  Even if other state level changes happened at the same time as welfare reform, 
if these changes affected both treatment and control groups in the same way, then 
comparing treatment and control group within each state minimizes some of the 
concerns raised above.  However, if these other state level changes affected two 
groups in a different way at the same time as welfare reform, then the estimates 
obtained from this study will be biased.  Section 3.7 explains more in detail the 
assumptions that need to be met for difference and difference method to be valid.  
More details on the identification strategy can be found in Appendix 3.15. 
3.6. Data  
The data for this study comes from National Health Interview Survey, which is 
a cross-sectional household interview survey conducted continuously throughout each 
year since 1957.   It is a representative sample of the U.S. population from all 50 
States and the District of Columbia.  NHIS monitors the health of the U.S. population 
through collection of various health characteristics by many demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics.  It covers the civilian non-institutionalized population 
of the United States living at the time of the interview.  Patients in long-term care 
facilities, persons on active duty with the Armed Forces, and U.S. nationals living in 
                                                 
11 Previous studies suggest that states with higher unemployment rates were more likely to implement 
AFDC waivers compared to states with lower unemployment rates (eg. Schoeni and Blank 2000). 
12 More detailed discussion can be found in Blank (2002). 
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foreign countries are excluded from the survey.  The annual response rate of NHIS is 
greater than 90 percent (Vital and Health Statistics Summary Health Statistics for U.S. 
Adults and Children Reports: National Health Interview Survey for various years).  
Blacks and Hispanics have been oversampled since 1985 and 1995, respectively.  
NHIS uses stratified multistage probability sampling.  NHIS underwent two changes 
in 1997.  The first is a change in the interview procedure.  Until 1997, interviews were 
conducted using paper and pencil. However, starting from 1997, they have been 
conducted using a computer assisted personal interviewer (CAPI).  The second 
change, which is the crucial one, is the questionnaire redesign that has been in effect 
starting with the 1997 survey.   
  1990-2002 NHIS data is used for the analyses.  The sample for this study 
consists of children between ages 0-17 years, who lived with their mother at the time 
of interview, and are the children of the household reference person.13  The sample is 
limited to those who were living with their mother at the time of interview because the 
effect of welfare reform is most likely to affect children through the mother by altering 
her work schedules or income.  It is also limited to those children who are the children 
of the household reference person.  Therefore it excludes all children who are the 
grandchildren of the household reference person.  Children in mutigenerational 
families may have different ways in which their health and health care use may be 
affected than the children in standard nuclear families.  For the sample of immigrant 
children, children who have at least one foreign born parent is used.  Immigrant status 
is defined in this way since NHIS does not provide information about the citizenship 
status of the respondents.  This is the same definition used by Kaushal and Kaestner 
(2007).  Moreover, even if the citizenship status is available in NHIS, using nativity to 
                                                 
13 In the sample child core, one child is randomly selected from each family and the basic information 
on health status, health care services, and behavior is collected from a responsible adult family member 
residing in the household.   
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define immigrant status may be better because it may eliminate potential selection bias 
due to naturalization.  Some immigrants may have naturalized during the welfare 
reform due to stricter rules applied to legal immigrants under the new welfare rules 
(Kaushal and Kaestner 2005).  Considering the fact that foreign born citizens are 
miscategorized as immigrants here, the results from this study will most likely result 
in an underestimation of the true effect of welfare reform.  Sample sizes vary by 
dependent variables used for analysis due to missing observations and exclusion of 
irrelevant ages and years from 27423 to 69586 observations for all children and 11285 
to 11395 observations for immigrant children.14 
  As briefly mentioned in the earlier section and thoroughly discussed in 
Ueyama (2008), due to the NHIS questionnaire redesign, many health care use and 
health status measures were not consistently measured over time.  Most outcomes in 
this study were also not consistently measured before and after the redesign, creating a 
large break in the trends pre and post the redesign.  Therefore, two separate analyses 
are conducted.  For those outcome measures that were consistently measured over 
time, the effect of both AFDC waiver and TANF is examined.  These measures are: a 
dummy indicating whether the child is in excellent health and a dummy indicating 
whether the child has any limitation of activity.  For those measures that were not 
consistently measured over time, only the effect of AFDC waiver is examined using 
the pre redesign data, i.e. between the years 1990-1996.  These measures are:  a 
dummy indicating whether the child had doctor visits in the past year and the number 
of such visits, a dummy indicating whether the child had school days lost due to 
illness visits in the past two weeks and number of such days (only for ages 5 to 17), a 
dummy indicating whether the child had short stay hospital episodes in the past year 
and the number of such episodes, and a dummy indicating whether the child had short 
                                                 
14 Sample used to estimate number of school days lost to illness or injury in past 12 months includes 
children ages 5 to 17.   
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stay hospital days in the past year and the number of such days.  Unfortunately, since 
the questionnaire redesign occurred at the same time as TANF, it is not possible to 
examine the effect of TANF on these measures.  Since immigrant children were 
affected by tighter restriction on immigrants’ welfare receipts only after PRWORA, 
they would not have been affected by AFDC waivers.  Therefore analyses for 
immigrant children were restricted to very limited set of outcomes. 
 The identification from this study comes from within state variation in the 
change of child health and health care use over time for the treatment and control 
groups.  Therefore the changes in health and health care use for the treatment group 
children are compared with those of the control group children within each state.  The 
mean numbers of all children in the treatment and control groups in state/year cells are 
34 and 77, respectively.  The mean numbers of immigrant children in the treatment 
and control groups in state/year cells are 20 and 14, respectively.   
Upper panel of Table 3.2 compares descriptive statistics of the child’s 
individual level characteristics for all children and by treatment and control groups.  
These statistics show that the two groups are fairly comparable in terms of observed 
characteristics although those in the treatment group are slightly younger than those in 
the control group.  The difference in age between the two groups is about half a year.  
About 60% of the children in both groups are minorities although among the minority 
children, those in the treatment group are more likely to be Hispanic while those in the 
control group are more likely to be black.  Since the children are younger in the 
treatment group, their mothers are also younger by around 2 years.   
Lower panel of Table 3.2 compares the average children’s health care use and 
health status measures for all years by treatment and control groups.   Overall, the 
children in the treatment group have fewer doctor visits but higher hospital care use 
than their counterparts in the control group although the differences in hospital use 
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between the two groups are not statistically significant.  Children in the treatment 
group also fare badly in most child health measures.  
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Individual Level Control and Outcome 
Variables for All Children and by Treatment and Control Groups 
 All Children Treatment Group Control Group 
Variables Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Individual Characteristics        
Age 8.436 5.072 69586 8.371*** 5.088 19797 9.005*** 4.934 49794 
Female 0.488 0.500 69586 0.500 0.500 19797 0.495 0.500 49794 
NH White 0.200 0.400 69586 0.397*** 0.489 19797 0.410*** 0.492 49794 
Hispanic 0.217 0.412 69586 0.417*** 0.493 19797 0.174*** 0.379 49794 
Mother's age 35.445 7.206 69586 33.169*** 8.538 19797 
35.002**
* 7.563 49794 
          
Health Care Use         
1990-1996 (past year)         
Any doctor visits 0.800 0.400 29483 0.778*** 0.415 8869 0.820*** 0.384 20614 
# doctor visits 3.053 6.811 29483 2.991*** 6.142 8869 3.322*** 9.071 20614 
Any hospital 
episodes 0.027 0.163 29597 0.038 0.191 8904 0.036 0.185 20693 
# hospital episodes 0.034 0.260 29597 0.051 0.429 8904 0.047 0.302 20693 
Any hospital days 0.027 0.163 29597 0.038 0.191 8904 0.036 0.185 20693 
# hospital days 0.162 2.320 29597 0.242 2.634 8904 0.257 2.891 20693 
          
Health Status          
1990-2002          
Excellent health 0.525 0.499 69149 0.350*** 0.477 19631 0.464*** 0.499 49523 
Limitation in 
Activities 0.063 0.243 69586 0.102*** 0.303 19797 0.094*** 0.292 49794 
1990-1996 (past 2 wks)         
Any lost school 
days  0.060 0.237 27423 0.067 0.250 7964 0.080 0.271 19459 
#  lost school days  0.129 0.687 27423 0.182** 0.917 7964 0.181** 0.843 19459 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level, *** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level 
Significance levels are for a test of difference between treatment and control groups.  The treatment 
group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a single mother who has less than a high 
school degree.  The control group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a single mother 
who has high school education or more.  The summary statistics for individual characteristics are from 
the sample used for analyzing any activity limitation in the past year as a dependant variable. 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Individual Level Control and Outcome 
Variables for All Immigrant Children and by Treatment and Control Groups 
 All Children Treatment Group Control Group 
Variables Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Individual Characteristics        
Age 8.188 5.075 11395 8.835** 5.044 6018 9.041** 4.972 5381 
Female 0.487 0.500 11395 0.495 0.500 6018 0.488 0.500 5381 
NH White 0.193 0.394 11395 0.109*** 0.311 6018 0.255*** 0.436 5381 
Hispanic 0.624 0.484 11395 0.871*** 0.335 6018 0.599*** 0.490 5381 
Mother's age 35.517 7.352 11395 35.412*** 8.225 6018 36.259*** 7.543 5381 
          
Health Care Use         
1990-1996 (past yr)         
Any doctor 
visits  0.762 0.426 4196 0.781*** 0.414 2310 0.847*** 0.360 1886 
# doctor visits 2.551 4.938 4196 2.785*** 4.964 2310 3.201*** 5.268 1886 
Any hospital 
episodes 0.023 0.149 4217 0.032 0.177 2324 0.029 0.168 1893 
# hospital 
episodes 0.027 0.201 4217 0.042 0.261 2324 0.038 0.274 1893 
Any hospital 
days  0.023 0.149 4217 0.032 0.177 2324 0.029 0.168 1893 
# hospital days  0.147 2.374 4217 0.211 1.717 2324 0.291 4.373 1893 
          
Health Status          
1990-2002          
Excellent health 0.452 0.498 11285 0.313* 0.464 5968 0.436* 0.496 5321 
Limitation in 
Activities 0.041 0.197 11395 0.059** 0.236 6018 0.067** 0.251 5381 
1990-1996 (past 2 wks)         
Any lost school 
days  0.044 0.205 3788 0.055 0.227 2080 0.053 0.224 1708 
#  lost school 
days  0.100 0.632 3788 0.138 0.776 2080 0.135 0.794 1708 
 Notes: *** Significant at 1% level, *** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level 
Significance levels are for a test of difference between treatment and control groups.  The treatment 
group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a single mother who has less than a high 
school degree.  The control group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a single mother 
who has high school education or more.  The summary statistics for individual characteristics are from 
the sample used for analyzing any activity limitation in the past year as a dependant variable. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for immigrant children.  Overall, 
immigrant children are slightly younger and more likely to be a minority.  They have 
less health care use and have poorer health.  Despite their poorer health, they are less 
likely to miss school suggesting that immigrant children do not easily miss school due 
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to health reasons.  Among immigrant children, those in the treatment groups are more 
likely to be a minority, use less health care and have poorer health than those in the 
control group. 
 
3.7. Testing for Difference in Difference Method 
 Difference in difference models assume that children in treatment and control 
groups have the same trajectories in health care use and health status over time in the 
absence of the welfare reform.  The only difference between the two groups should be 
that the children in treatment group will be affected by the welfare reform whereas the 
children in the control group will not.  Although it is impossible to find out what the 
trajectories would have been for the children in treatment group in the absence of the 
welfare reform, it is possible to compare the trajectories of the children in the two 
groups before the welfare reform.  If the trajectories are similar before the welfare 
reform, then it provides convincing evidence that the trajectories would most likely be 
similar in the absence of welfare reform.  In the sample period of this study, 1990 and 
1991 are the years with no AFDC waivers or TANF.   
A. Any DV Past Year B. # of DV Past Year 
Figure 3.1 Change in the Fraction of Children who had Any Doctor Visits and 
Number of Such Illness in the Past Year for Years 1990-1996 for All Children by 
Treatment and Control Groups 
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Therefore if the trends are similar in these time periods, then it is likely that the trends 
would continue to be similar in the absence of welfare reform.  Moreover, if this is 
true, then the change in trends from 1992 onwards is mostly due to the welfare reform. 
Figures 3.1 to 3.6 show the change in children’s health care use and health status for 
all children and immigrant children over the sample period of this study.  Since 
immigrant children were affected only by TANF, only outcomes that can be analyzed, 
i.e. excellent health and activity limitation are shown.   
A. Any Hospital Episodes Past Year B. # of Hospital Episodes Past Year  
 
Figure 3.2 Change in the Fraction of Children who had Any Short Stay Hospital 
Episodes and Number of Such Episodes in the Past Year for Years 1990-1996 for 
All Children by Treatment and Control Groups 
 
A. Any Hospital Days Past Year B. # of Hospital Days Past Year  
 
Figure 3.3 Change in the Fraction of Children who had Any Short Stay Hospital 
Days and Number of Such Days in the Past Year for Years 1990-1996 for All 
Children by Treatment and Control Groups 
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Figure 3.1 shows that the trends in the fraction of children with any doctor visits in the 
past year and the number of such doctor visits are fairly similar before 1992 between 
the two groups for all children.  Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show quite different trends in 
hospital episodes and hospital days before 1992 between the two groups.   
 
A. All Children B. Immigrant Children  
 
Figure 3.4  Change in the Fraction Children in Excellent Health for Years 1990-
2002 for All Children and Immigrant Children by Treatment and Control 
Groups 
 
 
 
A. All Children B. Immigrant Children  
 
Figure 3.5  Change in the Fraction Children in with Any Limitation of Activity 
for Years 1990-2002 for All Children and Immigrant Children by Treatment and 
Control Groups  
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A. Any Days Past 2 Weeks B. # of Days Past 2 Weeks 
 
Figure 3.6 Change in the Fraction of Children who had Any School Days Lost to 
Illness and Number of Such Days in Past 2 Weeks for Years 1990-1996 for All 
Children by Treatment and Control Groups 
 
As for the health status measures, Figure 3.4 shows that trends in the fraction 
of children in excellent health are similar between the two groups before 1992 for both 
sets of children.  Figure 3.5 shows that the trends in the fractions of children with 
activity limitation are very different before 1992 between the two groups for both sets 
of children but Figure 3.6 shows fairly similar trends in the fraction of children who 
had any school days lost to illness and the number of such days in the past year before 
1992 between the two groups.   
In summary, many health care use and health status measures have trends that 
varied in treatment and control groups even before the welfare reform.  Although it is 
possible that after controlling for individual and state level characteristics, outcomes 
with completely different trajectories between two groups may actually be similar (i.e. 
hospital episodes, hospital days, activity limitation for all children; activity limitation 
for immigrant children), results should be interpreted with caution.  Other definitions 
of treatment and controls groups are used as specification tests which will be 
explained later in this study, but as shown in Appendix Figure 1, all produce trends 
that differ for the two groups for selected outcomes as seen here.  However, the 
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important issue to keep in mind is that there should be no systematic difference in the 
divergence or convergence of the gap in trends between the states that is correlated 
with the timing of welfare reform and these simple time trend graphs at the national 
level masks these points.     
3.8. Results from Descriptive Analyses 
The key to finding out the causal effect of AFDC waiver and TANF 
implementation is to see whether there is a difference in the change of children’s 
health care use and health status outcomes before and after AFDC waiver and TANF 
implementations for treatment and control groups.  If welfare reform had an effect on 
children’s health care use and health status only among those in the treatment group as 
it is assumed in the difference in difference method used in this study, the difference 
in child health measures between the groups should change after the welfare reform.  
This difference in the difference of outcomes between the two groups before and after 
the welfare reform is the causal effect of the welfare reform.  In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the 
change in children’s health care use and health status is compared (before AFDC 
waiver implementation, after AFDC waiver implementation but before TANF 
implementation, and after TANF implementation) for the treatment and control groups 
for all children and immigrant children, respectively.   
Descriptive statistics for all children suggest that the two groups experienced 
quite different trends in their use of doctor but similar trends for hospital use.  For both 
the treatment and the control group children, more children had at least one doctor 
visit in the past year after AFDC waivers but the number of doctor visits decreased.  
The magnitudes are similar for both groups.  After AFDC waivers, fewer children are 
using hospitals for both groups.  But among those who use hospitals, the numbers of 
episodes and days in hospitals increase for the control group children whereas they 
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decrease for the treatment group children.   
 
Table 3.4 Change in Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status Before AFDC 
Waiver, After AFDC Waiver but Before TANF, and After TANF for All 
Children 
 
Before AFDC 
Waiver 
After AFDC 
Waiver After TANF 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Control Group       
Any doctor visits (past yr) 0.819 0.385 0.831 0.375 n/a n/a
# doctor visits (past yr) 3.348 9.484 3.149 5.462 n/a n/a
Any hospital episodes (past yr) 0.036 0.186 0.034 0.181 n/a n/a
# hospital episodes (past yr) 0.047 0.300 0.048 0.316 n/a n/a
Any hospital days (past yr) 0.036 0.186 0.034 0.181 n/a n/a
# hospital days (past yr) 0.250 2.684 0.301 4.024 n/a n/a
Excellent Health 0.458 0.498 0.456 0.498 0.471 0.499 
Activity Limitation 0.088 0.284 0.097 0.296 0.099 0.299 
Any lost school days (past 2 wks) 0.104 0.305 0.101 0.302 n/a n/a 
#  lost school days (past 2 wks) 0.236 0.943 0.240 1.017 n/a n/a 
       
Treatment Group       
Any doctor visits (past yr) 0.777 0.416 0.783 0.412 n/a n/a
# doctor visits (past yr) 3.050 6.470 2.675 3.914 n/a n/a
Any hospital episodes (past yr) 0.039 0.193 0.031 0.175 n/a n/a
# hospital episodes (past yr) 0.054 0.457 0.036 0.222 n/a n/a
Any hospital days (past yr) 0.039 0.193 0.031 0.175 n/a n/a
# hospital days (past yr) 0.255 2.784 0.169 1.606 n/a n/a
Excellent Health 0.345 0.475 0.305 0.460 0.371 0.483 
Activity Limitation 0.108 0.311 0.078 0.268 0.104 0.305 
Any lost school days (past 2 wks) 0.094 0.292 0.088 0.283 n/a n/a 
#  lost school days (past 2 wks) 0.257 1.090 0.236 1.012 n/a n/a 
 
Table 3.4 shows the change in general health status for all children.  For both 
groups of children, general health status decreases after AFDC waivers but increases 
after TANF for both groups with the magnitude of the change being slightly higher for 
the treatment group than the control group.  Activity limitation among control children 
increases after AFDC waivers and TANF, but those among treatment group decreases 
and increases after AFDC waivers and TANF, respectively.  After AFDC waivers, 
both groups of children have fewer proportions of children with at least one school 
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day lost due to illness.  But among the children who have been absent from school at 
least once, the number decreases for the control group children whereas it is increasing 
for the treatment group children.   
 
Table 3.5 Change in Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status Before AFDC 
Waiver, After AFDC Waiver but Before TANF, and After TANF for Immigrant 
Children 
 Before AFDC Waiver After AFDC Waiver After TANF 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Control Group       
Excellent Health 0.423 0.494 0.400 0.490 0.451 0.498 
Activity Limitation 0.059 0.235 0.080 0.272 0.070 0.256 
       
Treatment Group       
Excellent Health 0.297 0.457 0.254 0.436 0.347 0.476 
Activity Limitation 0.072 0.259 0.054 0.226 0.053 0.224 
 
For immigrant children, as repeatedly mentioned before, there should not have 
been any change in outcome induced by welfare reform after AFDC waivers.  There 
should only be a change after TANF when more restrictive laws on immigrants were 
implemented.  As shown in Table 3.5, there was a slight decrease in general health 
status after AFDC waiver and an increase after TANF for both treatment and control 
groups.  Since a slight decrease in the general health status after AFDC waivers was 
experienced by both groups, it must be a natural trend in health that is not related to 
welfare reform.  The magnitude of the increase in general health status is larger for the 
treatment group than the control group.  Trends in activity limitation for the control 
group children are very different from the trends found for the treatment group 
children.  There is a consistent decrease in the activity limitation for treatment group 
whereas it fluctuates for control group children.  It is not entirely clear from this table 
whether there was any effect of the welfare reform on immigrant children. 
In summary, for all children, welfare reform does not seem to have had much 
 193
 194
effect on preventive care use, except a decrease in the frequency of curative and 
hospital care use.  This may be an indication that children’s health status improved 
after the welfare reform.  The effect of welfare reform on immigrant children’s health 
status is ambiguous although there is a slight indication of improved health.   Next 
section presents results from regression analyses that control for factors that may bias 
these descriptive results. 
3.9. Results from Regression Analyses 
Table 3.6 and 3.7 show the results from DD estimations using linear 
probability and OLS models for all children and immigrant children, respectively.  
Each column represents a different dependent variable.  As mentioned earlier, 
regressions for doctor visits, hospital episodes, hospital days and lost school days use 
data only from 1990-1996.  Since doctor visits, hospital episodes and hospital days are 
measures for the past one year, essentially capturing the outcomes up to 1995, only the 
effect of AFDC waivers can be estimated using these measures.  Since lost school 
days are measures for the past 2 weeks, the outcomes include years up to 1996 and 
therefore for this measure, the effect of AFDC waivers and the earlier years of TANF 
are estimated.   
The results for children’s health care use for all children from Table 3.6 show 
statistically insignificant effects.  While possibility of welfare reform having no effect 
on children’s health care use cannot be ruled out, overall trends seem to imply that 
children are getting basic doctor’s care (positive but statistically insignificant point 
estimate of the effect on the probability of children having at least one doctor visit in 
the past year) thereby reducing the incidence of hospital usage (negative but 
statistically insignificant point estimates of the effects on children’s hospital episodes 
and hospital days).   
Table 3.6. The Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF on Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status for All Children 
 
Any 
Doctor 
Visits 
# of 
Doctor 
Visits 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
# of 
Hospital 
Days 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Any Lost 
School 
Days 
# of Lost 
School 
Days 
AFDC waiver 0.012 -0.007 0.008 0.015 0.008 0.012 -0.004 0.006 -0.019** -0.050* 
 (0.012) (0.181) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.098) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.028) 
TANF       -0.009 -0.01 -0.009 -0.110** 
       (0.017) (0.010) (0.026) (0.043) 
Treatment -0.038*** -0.171 0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.015 -0.106*** 0.031*** -0.001 0.033* 
 (0.006) (0.123) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.040) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) 
AFDC * Treatment 0.004 -0.292 -0.003 -0.014 -0.003 -0.118 -0.013 -0.027*** 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.202) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.092) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.041) 
TANF * Treatment       0.030** 0.028*** 0.274*** 0.571*** 
       (0.015) (0.009) (0.101) (0.213) 
           
Observations 29483 29483 29597 29597 29597 29597 69149 69586 27423 27423 
R-squared 0.052 0.014 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.026 0.023 0.011 0.005 
195
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Each regression includes controls for child’s age, sex, race, mother’s age and a vector of state characteristics including the seasonally-adjusted unemployment 
rate, real median wages, the maximum value of the federal and state EITC for a single mother with two children, the income eligibility limit for Medicaid 
eligibility for pregnant women, the annual employment growth rate, the amount of federal housing money spent per 1,000 residents in the state, and the 
simulated fraction of children who would be eligible for SCHIP or Medicaid at the state/year/age level.  The treatment group is defined as the children living 
in a family headed by a single mother who has less than a high school degree.  The control group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a 
single mother who has high school education or more. All regressions are estimated using linear probability model for categorical dependent variables and 
OLS for continuous dependent variables on weighted data and include state and year fixed effects.  The first six regressions use data from 1990-1996 and the 
latter four regressions use data from 1990-2002. 
 
  
While the number of doctor visits are decreasing, more children seem to have 
gotten at least one doctor visit in the past year.  This is a favorable outcome 
considering the fact that children are recommended to have an annual routine checkup 
or preventive care by a physician.  Perhaps due to this increased use of preventive 
care, children’s use of curative care and hospitals is decreasing.15   However, one 
cannot be completely sure whether this reflects a causal relationship between health 
care use and welfare reform.  On one hand, increased labor force participation due to 
welfare reform may have increased awareness among mothers which in turn led to an 
increase in the use of preventive care for their children.  Increase in income may also 
have allowed mothers to allocate more money to their children’s preventive health 
care.  As it will be discussed further in the later section, alternative specifications 
generally produce consistent results for preventive and curative care; there is 
reasonably convincing evidence that the relationship is not a statistical artifice.  
However, results for hospital care is quite sensitive to different specifications and 
therefore it is not possible to completely rule out the possibility of spurious effects, 
especially for hospital care.   
Results from Table 3.6 shows that welfare reform had an inconsistent effect on 
children’s health status for all children.  AFDC waiver had a statistically insignificant 
effect on the proportion of children with excellent health but TANF implementation 
increased the proportion by 3 percentage points.  The result for activity limitation is 
puzzling since AFDC waiver and TANF implementations have an effect in the 
opposite directions with the similar magnitude, ultimately canceling each other out to 
end up with zero net effect.  Several possible explanations for AFDC waiver and 
                                                 
15 Miller and Zhang (2007) suggested in their study that after welfare reform, the quality of parental 
inputs improved and the children’s use of time changed in a beneficial way, most likely the result from 
improved parental disciplining, role modeling or newly introduced structure and stability in children’s 
lives, which ended up more than offsetting the negative effects of decreased maternal time available to 
children after the welfare reform.   
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TANF having opposite effects are discussed in the later section.  TANF had a fairly 
big impact on the proportion of children with lost school days due to illness with an 
increase by 27 percentage points but the number of such days did not increase as much 
(about half a day).  Therefore the effect on children’s health status is inconsistent with 
some positive effects (e.g. more children in excellent health) and some negative 
effects (e.g. more school days lost due to illnesses).   
Moving on to the immigrant children, Table 3.7 shows that due to a much 
smaller sample size than for all children, most effects of welfare reform are 
imprecisely estimated.  The only statistically significant effects are for AFDC waivers 
which indicate that fewer immigrant children have activity limitation.  This effect of 
AFDC waivers on activity limitation is in fact puzzling considering the fact that 
immigrant children continued to enjoy the same benefits as native children after 
AFDC waivers (treatment changed for immigrant children only after TANF).  The 
relationship indicated here between welfare reform and activity limitation among 
immigrant children is most likely spurious.   
 
Table 3.7 The Effect of TANF on Children’s Health Status for Immigrant 
Children 
 Excellent Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
   
AFDC waiver 0.017 0.025 
 (0.032) (0.016) 
TANF 0.046 -0.023 
 (0.042) (0.018) 
Treatment -0.110*** 0.020** 
 (0.018) (0.009) 
AFDC * Treatment 0.005 -0.045*** 
 (0.032) (0.016) 
TANF * Treatment 0.026 0.015 
 (0.031) (0.015) 
   
Observations 11285 11395 
R-squared 0.045 0.028 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes. 
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For all children sample, there is some evidence that AFDC waiver and TANF 
implementation had a differential effect on certain outcomes such as activity limitation 
and excellent health (although the effect of AFDC waiver is not statistically 
significant).  For those states that had both AFDC waiver and TANF implementations, 
this may be reflecting the fact that the welfare reform policies had different short term 
and long term effects.16  Recall that AFDC waiver dummy turns on when the AFDC 
waiver is implemented and stays turned on for the succeeding years even after the 
TANF implementation.  It is possible that the AFDC waiver dummy is reflecting the 
short term effect and the TANF dummy is reflecting the long term effect of the 
welfare reform.  For example, children’s health may have deteriorated after AFDC 
waiver implementation due to decreased quantity and quality of mother’s time with 
the children, but by the time TANF was implemented, the increased income may have 
compensated for the decreased care time above and beyond what was lost, ultimately 
improving children’s health.  Another possibility for those states that had both AFDC 
waiver and TANF implementations is that the perceptions of the reporting adult 
member on the child’s health may have changed with AFDC waiver and TANF 
implementations.  For example, because many mothers had entered the work force 
after AFDC waiver implementation, they may not have been able to notice the child’s 
limitation in activities as much as they had been able to before.  However, again by the 
time TANF was implemented, they had become more used to their work schedules 
and were therefore more able to accurately detect children’s activity limitations.   
In summary, while all effects on children’s health care use were imprecise, 
there is a weak indication that welfare reform increased preventive care use and 
reduced curative and emergency health care among all children.  The effect of welfare 
                                                 
16 60% of the states implemented the AFDC waiver before TANF. 
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reform on children’s health status is inconsistent for all children and immigrant 
children. 
3.10. Possible Mechanisms 
In this section, the possible mechanisms in which welfare reform may have affected 
children’s health including mother’s employment, family income and health insurance 
status are explored.17  Although the effect of welfare reform on children’s health care 
use and health status was inconsistent and negligible, it is nevertheless interesting to 
find out whether there were any effects of welfare reform on the potential pathways in 
which it may have affected children’s health.  A dummy indicating whether the 
mother is working, the number of children in the family, family income as percentage 
of federal poverty level and a dummy indicating whether the child has any health 
insurance are used as outcome variables.  The existing literature suggests that welfare 
reform led to an increase in mother’s labor force participation (e.g. Schoeni and Blank 
2000), little to no (decreasing) effect on fertility rates (e.g. Kearney 2004, Joyce, 
Kaestner and Korenman 2002), an increase in family income (Schoeni and Blank 
2000), although there is some evidence of a decrease in family income among blacks 
(Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes 2003) and a decrease in health insurance coverage (e.g. 
Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes 2004).   
Table 3.8 shows results.  The results for mother’s labor force participation, 
fertility rates and health insurance are consistent with the literature.  TANF 
implementation increased the proportion of working mothers, decreased the number of 
children in the family and decreased children’s health insurance coverage.  However, 
contrary to most previous studies, this study finds that welfare reform decreased 
family income.  This may be due to the oversampling of Blacks and Hispanics in 
                                                 
17 Since NHIS has information on health insurance status only from 1992, the analysis on children’s 
health insurance status uses data from 1992-2002. 
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NHIS; some earlier studies found reductions in income among Blacks (Bitler, Gelbach 
and Hoynes 2003).  Overall, these results suggest that the effect of welfare reform had 
expected effects on the potential mechanisms in which children’s health care use and 
health status may have been affected.  But these effects did not translate into changes 
in children’s health care use and health status outcomes. 
 
 
Table 3.8 The Possible Mechanisms of the Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF 
Implementations on Children 
 Mother Working # of Children Family Income (%FPL) 
Any Health 
Insurance 
     
AFDC waiver 0.029*** -0.049* 6.352** 0.019** 
 (0.010) (0.025) (2.93) (0.008) 
TANF -0.031** -0.006 5.226 -0.026** 
 (0.015) (0.038) (4.849) (0.011) 
Treatment -0.317*** 0.599*** -58.742*** -0.013* 
 (0.006) (0.019) (1.175) (0.007) 
AFDC * Treatment 0.002 0.123*** -14.974*** -0.027** 
 (0.014) (0.043) (3.336) (0.012) 
TANF * Treatment 0.077*** -0.211*** -8.492** -0.028** 
 (0.014) (0.044) (3.608) (0.011) 
     
Observations 66990 69586 68567 54158 
R-squared 0.184 0.095 0.22 0.040 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes. 
 
3.11. Results from Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the results, several sensitivity analyses were 
conducted.   
First, as mentioned earlier, this study tests whether using alternative definitions 
of treatment and control groups affect the results.  Three alternative definitions are 
considered; 1) the treatment group is defined as the children living in a family headed 
by a single mother who has less than a high school degree and the control group is 
defined as the children living in a married family where the mother has less than a 
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high school degree; 2) the treatment group is defined as the children living in a family 
headed by a never married mother who has less than a high school degree and the 
control group is defined as the children living in a family headed by never married 
mother has high school education or more; and 3) the treatment group is defined as the 
children living in a family headed by a never married mother who has less than a high 
school degree and the control group is defined as the children living in a married 
family where the mother has less than a high school degree.  Appendix Tables A.1 to 
A.3 present these results.  The estimates are still very imprecise for all the regressions 
especially those using alternative definition 2 where the sample size is very small.  
The only consistent effect seen for all the regressions is the increase in school days 
lost to illness, statistically insignificant decrease in the number of doctor visits and 
statistically insignificant decrease in the number of short stay hospital days.  Recall 
that the results from the main specification weakly suggest that the welfare reform 
decreased the use of curative and hospital care while it increased the use of preventive 
care for all children.  Although the increased use of preventive care and the decreased 
use of curative care are weakly supported by the results using alternative treatment and 
control group definitions, the results for hospital care are quite sensitive to the 
definition of treatment and control groups.  The effect of welfare reform on children’s 
health remains inconsistent in all specifications.   
Second, difference in difference in difference (DDD) method is used following 
Kaushal, Gao and Waldfogel (2007) to control for the state level time varying factors 
that may have affected children’s health care use and health status differently by 
mother’s education status.  Specifically, in the DDD model, in the first difference, 
time varying factors that affected both low educated and high educated single mothers 
similarly are controlled (i.e. comparing pre and post outcomes for the children with 
low educated single mothers and pre and post outcomes for the children with high 
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educated single mothers).  In the second difference, time varying factors that affected 
low and high educated mothers differently during the time period other than welfare 
reform are controlled (i.e. controlling for pre and post outcomes for the children with 
low educated married mothers vs pre and post outcomes for the children with high 
educated married mothers since married mothers are less likely to be on welfare).  In 
the third difference, assuming that gaps in outcomes between low and high educated 
mothers are similar regardless of marital status, the gaps in outcomes for children with 
low versus high educated single mothers with the gaps in outcomes for children with 
low versus high educated married mothers are compared.  The results are shown in 
Appendix Table A.4.   The results are consistent with the main results from the study.  
Children of single mothers who are high school dropouts increased doctor visits in the 
past year by 6 percentage points and decreased the number of hospital days in the past 
year by 0.2 days after the AFDC waivers.   
Third, this study tests whether the results stay the same when the combined 
AFDC waiver and TANF implementation variable is used for the analyses of 
children’s health status measures.18  The results are shown in Appendix Table A.5.  
Although the results are still imprecisely estimated, the general pattern of the results 
remains the same; welfare reform had inconsistent effects on children’s health status. 
Fourth, this study tests whether there is any effect of AFDC waivers on 
outcome for immigrant children during the years between 1990-1996.  Since there was 
no change in the treatment of immigrant children after AFDC waivers, if identification 
strategy is correct, then one should not see any effect for pre TANF years.  The results 
in Appendix Table A.6 show no effect of AFDC waivers on immigrant children’s 
health care use.  These results add credibility to the identification strategy used in this 
study. 
                                                 
18 All the measures of health care use only examine the effect of AFDC waiver in this study. 
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Lastly, this study follows Kaushal and Kaestner (2007)’s specification of the 
sample immigrant children and treatment and control groups and examines how the 
results change when conditions are changed one by one.  Specifically, specification  
used by Kaushal and Kaestner (2007) is: 1) The sample of children include children 
between ages 0-14 with foreign born mothers between ages 18 and 54; 2) Treatment 
and control groups are defined as children with single mothers with 15 or less years of 
education and children with married mothers with the same amount of education, 
respectively; 3) Instead of AFDC waiver dummy variable remaining one when TANF 
is implemented as in the main specification (i.e. coefficient on TANF indicates the 
incremental effect of TANF above and over those of AFDC waiver), here it is set to 
zero when TANF is implemented (i.e. the effects of AFDC waiver and TANF are 
separately estimated); 4) Data from 1997 is also removed from the sample; and 5) 
Time effects are controlled by state specific time trends.  Moreover, outcomes for 
hospital episodes and days are treated as consistently measured variables.  Appendix 
Table A.7 shows the results.  The first three columns are results from regressions 
using Kaushal and Kaestner (2007)’s specifications.  The succeeding columns present 
results when conditions are lifted one by one.  Results from the first three columns are 
similar to those of Kaushal and Kaestner (2007).  A small difference in magnitude for 
poor/fair health in this study and their study may be due to differences in control 
variables for state level characteristics.  Results from succeeding columns show that 
results do not change much when conditions are lifted one by one although statistical 
significance disappears.  Overall similarity of these results suggest that unconventional 
conditions used in Kaushal and Kaestner (2007)’s main specification do not have 
much impact on results that they would have gotten using specifications used by 
earlier studies.  However, their treatment of inconsistently measured outcomes as 
consistently measured may still be problematic.  Extent of the problem caused by 
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using inconsistently measured outcomes to examine the effect of TANF cannot be 
verified here due to data limitations.  
In summary, results from robustness checks show that results are quite 
sensitive to different treatment and control groups’ definitions, especially for reported 
use of hospital care and health status, although DDD estimation of the effects of 
welfare reform on children’s health care use and health status for all children were 
consistent with the study’s main findings.  For immigrant children, robustness checks 
provided suggestive evidence of validity of the study’s identification strategy.  
Moreover, unconventional specifications used in Kaushal and Kaestner (2007)’s main 
model did not seem to significantly impact findings estimated here using more 
conventional specifications.  However, not much can be inferred about the extent of 
the problem that arises from using inconsistently measured outcomes over time.  In 
general, however, with the absence of consistent and statistically significant set of 
findings, it can be concluded that welfare reform did not affect children’s health care 
use and health status for all children and immigrant children. 
 
3.12. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
This study examines the causal effect of welfare reform on children’s use of health 
care and health status in the U. S. by using the 1990-2002 National Health Interview 
Survey.  For all children, there were no statistically significant effects on their health 
care use.  If anything, welfare reform led to an increase in the reported use of 
preventive care but a decrease in the reported use of curative care and an ambiguous 
effect on the use of hospital care but these effects were too imprecisely estimated to 
make any concrete conclusions.  Welfare reform did not have a consistent effect on 
children’s health status for all children and immigrant children.  In general, with the 
absence of consistent and statistically significant set of results, none of the findings 
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were strong enough evidence to conclude any effects of welfare reform on children’s 
health care use and health status for all children and immigrant children.  This was 
true despite the fact that there was an indication of changes in children’s family 
environment and health insurance status due to the welfare reform that may have 
affected their use of health care and health status. 
This study’s results for all children confirm the previous studies that found no 
significant effects on children’s health care use and health status.  Lack of effects is 
consistent with the previous studies that found only a small adverse effect of welfare 
reform on the insurance coverage of low income children (e.g. Kaushal and Kaestner 
2003, Cawley, Schroeder and Simon 2006) and a small positive to no effect of health 
insurance coverage on health care use and no effect of health insurance on health (See 
Levy and Meltzer 2001 for a review).19  Moreover, similar to Kaushal and Kaestner 
(2007)’s finding, this study found no effect on immigrant children’s health even after 
addressing some issues that may have affected their results.  Lack of effects on 
immigrant children’s health in this study is consistent with Kaushal and Kaestner 
(2007)’s study that found no effects of welfare reform on immigrant children’s health 
insurance status.20   
The welfare reform led to various changes in low income children’s lives, 
including increased mother’s labor force participation and reduced welfare benefit.  
Immigrant mothers faced more restrictive policies under the new welfare laws 
compared to the native mothers, creating a much more vulnerable situation for the 
immigrant children compared to the native children.   However, fortunately, children’s 
                                                 
19 For example, Cawley, Schroeder and Simon (2006) found that there were no effect of AFDC waivers 
on children's health insurance coverage, but TANF implementation decreased welfare-eligible child's 
insurance coverage by 3 percentage points and decreased their Medicaid coverage by 3.6 percentage 
points. 
20 Kaushal and Kaestner’s earlier study (2005) using CPS found an increase in the uninsurance rate 
among immigrant children after welfare reform.  Kaushal and Kaestner (2007) suggest that the 
differences in the results for immigrant children’s health insurance found in two studies may be due to 
differences in sample compositions and sample sizes.   
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health care use and health status have not had major negative consequences due to the 
welfare reform.  If anything, the findings from this study back up the study by Miller 
and Zhang (2007) which suggest that welfare reform improved children’s lives by 
introducing structure and stability in daily lives through increased mother’s 
employment, improved parental disciplining, role modeling and the quality of parental 
inputs.   
APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 The Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF Implementations on Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status 
(Treatment/Control Group Definitions: Alternative 1) 
 Any Doctor Visits 
# of Doctor 
Visits 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
# of 
Hospital 
Days 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Any Lost 
School 
Days 
# of Lost 
School 
Days 
AFDC waiver -0.002 -0.097 0.002 0 0.003 0.032 0.003 -0.011* -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.180) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.080) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.028) 
TANF       -0.008 -0.002 0.022 -0.007 
       (0.017) (0.009) (0.035) (0.083) 
Treatment 0.064*** 0.533*** 0.007** 0.013** 0.007** 0.043 -0.056*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.090*** 
 (0.007) (0.107) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.039) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.019) 
AFDC * Treatment 0.018 -0.27 0.005 0 0.005 -0.061 0.012 -0.005 0.012 0.017 
 (0.016) (0.184) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.082) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.039) 
TANF * Treatment       -0.008 0.014 0.236** 0.432* 
       (0.014) (0.009) (0.102) (0.224) 
           
Observations 28542 28542 28658 28658 28658 28658 62938 63456 25774 25774 
R-squared 0.076 0.027 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.023 0.033 0.017 0.011 
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes with the exception of treatment and control group 
definitions.  Here, the treatment group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a single mother who has less than a high school degree and the 
control group is defined as the children living in a married family where the mother has less than a high school degree. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2 The Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF Implementations on Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status 
(Treatment/Control Group Definitions: Alternative 2) 
 Any Doctor Visits 
# of Doctor 
Visits 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
# of 
Hospital 
Days 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Any Lost 
School 
Days 
# of Lost 
School 
Days 
AFDC waiver 0.047** -0.002 0.004 0.036 0.004 0.336 0.035* 0.003 -0.029* -0.058 
 (0.019) (0.293) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.249) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.061) 
TANF       -0.028 -0.002 0.039 0.032 
       (0.028) (0.015) (0.062) (0.098) 
Treatment -0.019* 0.209 0.011** 0.023** 0.011** 0.086 -0.056*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.072** 
 (0.010) (0.194) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.073) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.033) 
AFDC * Treatment -0.01 -0.451 0.008 -0.016 0.008 -0.392 -0.086*** -0.017 0.01 -0.05 
 (0.021) (0.312) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.255) (0.023) (0.014) (0.019) (0.071) 
TANF * Treatment       0.078*** 0.012 0.381** 0.928** 
       (0.023) (0.015) (0.176) (0.465) 
           
Observations 9892 9892 9937 9937 9937 9937 23009 23160 7521 7521 
R-squared 0.086 0.042 0.01 0.007 0.01 0.005 0.028 0.032 0.027 0.016 
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes with the exception of treatment and control group 
definitions.  Here, the treatment group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a never married mother who has less than a high school degree 
and the control group is defined as the children living in a family headed by never married mother has high school education or more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3 The Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF Implementations on Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status 
(Treatment/Control Group Definitions: Alternative 3) 
 Any Doctor Visits 
# of Doctor 
Visits 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
# of 
Hospital 
Days 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Any Lost 
School 
Days 
# of Lost 
School 
Days 
AFDC waiver -0.003 -0.099 0.002 0 0.002 0.024 0.008 -0.011* -0.001 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.195) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.088) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.028) 
TANF       -0.022 0.003 0.021 -0.01 
       (0.019) (0.009) (0.035) (0.084) 
Treatment 0.055*** 0.607*** 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.126* -0.035*** 0.050*** 0.030*** 0.128*** 
 (0.010) (0.187) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.071) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.035) 
AFDC * Treatment 0.032* -0.378 0.012 0.004 0.012 -0.066 -0.029 -0.002 0.015 -0.022 
 (0.019) (0.272) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.121) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.060) 
TANF * Treatment       0.017 0.002 0.384** 0.854* 
       (0.019) (0.012) (0.179) (0.501) 
           
Observations 23754 23754 23847 23847 23847 23847 51916 52334 20930 20930 
R-squared 0.081 0.029 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.024 0.032 0.017 0.012 
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes with the exception of treatment and control group 
definitions.  Here, the treatment group is defined as the children living in a family headed by a never married mother who has less than a high school degree 
and the control group is defined as the children living in a married family where the mother has less than a high school degree. 
 
 
 
Table A.4 Difference in Difference in Difference Estimation of the Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF Implementations on 
Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status 
 
Any Doctor 
Visits 
# of Doctor 
Visits 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
# of 
Hospital 
Days 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Any Lost 
School 
Days 
# of Lost 
School 
Days 
AFDC waiver 0.004 0.107 0.004* 0.007** 0.004* -0.003 -0.004 0 -0.008** -0.022** 
 (0.005) (0.092) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.024) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) 
TANF       -0.003 -0.001 0.034** 0.060* 
       (0.008) (0.004) (0.014) (0.033) 
Single 0.033*** 0.552*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.093*** -0.073*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.084*** 
 (0.003) (0.063) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.023) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
HS dropout -0.080*** -0.232*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.046* -0.130*** 0.029*** -0.001 0.028*** 
 (0.004) (0.058) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
Waiver * Single -0.004 -0.182 0.007 0.01 0.007 0.096 -0.015 0.008 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.164) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.074) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.020) 
TANF * Single       -0.012 -0.005 -0.04 -0.165*** 
       (0.009) (0.005) (0.028) (0.046) 
Waiver * HS dropout -0.011 -0.181 -0.005 -0.008* -0.004 0.022 -0.041*** -0.018*** -0.012** -0.021 
 (0.010) (0.128) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.067) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.019) 
TANF * HS dropout       0.023*** 0.007 0.003 -0.028 
       (0.009) (0.004) (0.036) (0.083) 
Waiver * Single * HS 
dropout 0.060*** -0.031 -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 -0.214** 0.063*** -0.014 0.016 0.032 
 (0.017) (0.210) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.104) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.040) 
TANF * Single * HS 
dropout       0.005 0.022** 0.271** 0.594*** 
       (0.017) (0.010) (0.108) (0.228) 
           
Observations 148692 148692 149266 149266 149266 149266 327613 329844 134989 134989 
R-squared 0.058 0.015 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.041 0.019 0.006 0.004 
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes with the exception of treatment and control group 
definitions.   
 
Table A.5 The Effect of Combined AFDC Waiver and TANF Implementations on Children’s Health Status 
 
Excellent 
Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
Any Lost 
School Days 
# of Lost 
School Days 
AFDC waiver / TANF -0.01 0 -0.020** -0.059** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.027) 
Treatment -0.106*** 0.031*** 0 0.033* 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) 
AFDC/TANF * Treatment 0.01 -0.006 0.013 0.019 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.040) 
     
Observations 69149 69586 27423 27423 
R-squared 0.026 0.023 0.009 0.005 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes.  
 
Table A.6 The Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF on Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status for Immigrant 
Children 
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Any 
Doctor 
Visits 
# of Doctor 
Visits 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
# of 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
# of 
Hospital 
Days 
       
AFDC waiver -0.011 0.421 -0.006 -0.02 -0.006 -0.113 
 (0.039) (0.395) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014) (0.375) 
TANF       
       
Treatment -0.038** -0.046 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.056 
 (0.016) (0.229) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.086) 
AFDC * Treatment -0.023 -0.094 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.506 
 (0.034) (0.363) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.489) 
       
Observations 4196 4196 4217 4217 4217 4217 
R-squared 0.111 0.062 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.009 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes. 
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Table A.7 The Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF Implementations on Immigrant Children’s Health Care Use and Health 
Status (Following Kaushal and Kaestner 2007)  
 Poor/ Fair Health 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
Poor/ 
Fair Health 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
Poor/ 
Fair Health 
Any 
Hospital 
Episodes 
Any 
Hospital 
Days 
TANF * Treatment -0.017*** -0.009* -0.009* -0.016*** -0.010** -0.010** -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
          
Treatment/control groups: single/married 
mothers with years of ed<=12       X X X 
Child’s age <=14 X X X X X X X X X 
Mother’s age bet 18 & 54 X X X X X X X X X 
Treatment/control groups: single/married 
mothers with years of ed<=15 X X X X X X    
Drop 1997 X X X       
          
Observations 39832 35142 35142 43866 38958 38958 21004 18751 18751 
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 
 Poor/ Fair Health 
Any Hospital 
Episodes 
Any Hospital 
Days 
Poor/ 
Fair Health 
Any Hospital 
Episodes 
Any Hospital 
Days 
TANF * Treatment -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
       
Treatment/control groups: single/married 
mothers with years of ed<=12 X X X X X X 
Child’s age <=14 X X X    
Mother’s age bet 18 & 54       
Treatment/control groups: single/married 
mothers with years of ed<=15       
Drop 1997       
       
Observations 21135 18859 18859 24756 22276 22276 
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.012 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes.
A. Any Doctor Visits Past Year B. # of Doctor Visits Past Year 
C. Any Hospital Episodes Past Year D. # of Hospital Episodes Past Year 
 
E. Any Hospital Days Past Year F. # of Hospital Days Past Year  
 
 
Figure A.1 Change in Children’s Health Care Use and Health Status by Different 
Definitions of Treatment and Control Groups for All Children 
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G. In Excellent Health H. Any Activity Limitation  
 
I. Any Lost School Days Past 2 Weeks J. # of Lost School Days Past 2 Weeks  
 
Figure A.1 (Continued) 
 
 
3.13. Key Changes of PRWORA 
 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
1. Purpose: “[To] provide assistance to needy families so that children may be 
cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; [to] end the 
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job 
preparation, work, and marriage; [to] prevent and [to] reduce the incidence of 
out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for 
preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and [to] encourage 
the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.” (H.R.3734 SEC. 401.) 
2. Time limits: Federal time limit of 5 years; states may set their own guidelines. 
3. Work requirements: Recipients must start working or be involved in work 
related activities within 2 years of cash assistance.  Penalty may apply for non-
compliance.  
4. Family cap: States have the option to make cash assistance on per family bases 
and not on number of children. 
5. Unmarried minor parents: Must live at home with a responsible adult and 
participate in educational or training activities to receive assistance. 
Child Care 
1. Eliminated entitlements for recipients 
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2. Increased Child Care and Development Fund levels 
Child Support 
1. Strengthened child support enforcement 
2. Noncooperation penalty is imposed for single mothers who do not cooperate in 
paternal establishment 
Food Stamps 
1. Reduced maximum benefit and limited deductions 
2. Benefits limited to 3 months for able-bodied adults without children unless 
working at least 20 hours per week 
3. Reduction of benefit levels and allowances for reductions in food stamp 
benefits for families penalized under TANF rules (Smith et al 2000).   
Medicaid 
1. Delinked Medicaid eligibility from welfare 
2. States may set higher income eligibility standards 
Supplemental Security Income 
1. Restricted standards of disability for children 
2. More frequent review of disability status for children and adults 
Immigrants 
1. Legal immigrants only eligible for Supplemental Security Income, food stamps 
2. Legal immigrants are not eligible for TANF, Medicaid, and Title XX services 
for 5 years after arriving in the U. S.  Federal benefits are denied to all illegal 
immigrants. 
  
 
 
3.14. Findings from Nonlinear Models  
 
In the main text, all categorical dependent variables are estimated using linear 
probability models.  The study uses linear probability models for ease of interpretation 
of difference in difference (DD) estimate which is the interaction term between 
treatment and post dummies.  Difficulty in using nonlinear models is that coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term cannot simply be interpreted as the DD estimator.  
The coefficient on interaction term will not represent the full interaction effect, the 
sign will vary for different values of the covariates and the statistical significance will 
be erroneous (Angrist 2001, Ai and Norton 2001, Norton, Wang and Ai 2004).  In 
essence, full interaction effect is the entire cross-partial derivative of the expected 
value of dependent variable and this interaction effect is conditional on all 
independent variables.  The coefficient of the interaction term is only a portion of full 
interaction effect that may not even remotely represent the true interaction term due to 
signs and magnitudes of the additive terms not taken into account.   
 Despite the difficulties in the use of nonlinear methods in a DD model where 
the interaction term is crucial, it is nevertheless informative to find the results using 
nonlinear methods.  The study uses logit regression for binary outcome variables and 
computes interaction effects and standard errors following inteff STATA command 
developed by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004).  Since inteff command does not support 
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two interaction terms (e.g. AFDC waiver – post and TANF – post), for this exercise, 
only one policy dummy variable is used; it equals one if either AFDC waiver or TANF 
is in place in state s in year t and zero otherwise.     
 
Table A.8 The Effect of AFDC Waiver and TANF Implementations on 
Children’s Health Status Using Logit Regression 
 Excellent Health 
Activity 
Limitation 
AFDC waiver / TANF -0.044 0.012 
 (0.040) (0.067) 
Treatment -0.451 0.349 
 (0.030) (0.047) 
AFDC/TANF * Treatment 0.051 -0.075 
 (0.039) (0.064) 
   
Observations 69149 69586 
Wald Chi2 1458.60 1281.65 
Pseudo R-squared 0.019 0.035 
   
Interaction effect (IE) 0.012 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
SE 0.009 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Z-statistics of IE 1.330 -1.187 
 (0.051) (0.030) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; See Table 5 for notes. 
 
 
Table A.8 shows results from logit regressions.  Main interaction term for 
excellent health is statistically insignificant at 0.05.  However, when full interaction 
effect is calculated, the magnitude decreases by a fifth (mean effect).    Full interaction 
effect varies moderately; for those children with predicted probability of being in 
excellent health is 0.2, interaction effect varies from 0.008 to 0.01 whereas for those 
with predicted probability of 0.5, interaction effect is around 0.012 (Figure A.2 Panel 
A).  In general, the magnitude of the effect is smaller for children in the tails of 
predicted probability distribution but the effect is consistently statistically insignificant 
(Figure A.2 Panel B).  For activity limitation, the main interaction effect is statistically 
insignificant at -0.075.  Similar to the results found for excellent health, magnitude 
decreases when full interaction effect is calculated with the mean effect around -0.007 
and varies to some extent.  Figure A.3 Panel A suggests that children with higher 
predicted probability of having activity limitation have experienced greater negative 
effect of welfare reform.   However, again consistent with the earlier results for 
excellent health, interaction effects for children in all predicted probabilities are 
statistically insignificant (Figure A.3 Panel B).   
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A. Interaction Effects    B. Z-Statistics of Interaction Effects 
 
Figure A.2 Interaction Effects and its Z-Statistics from Logistic Regression for 
Excellent Health 
 
      
A. Interaction Effects    B. Z-Statistics of Interaction Effects 
 
Figure A.3 Interaction Effects and its Z-Statistics from Logistic Regression for 
Activity Limitation 
 
 When these results from logit regressions are compared with main results, 
general conclusions remain the same.  Recall that the main results suggested that 
welfare reform had net positive effect (statistically significant) on the probability that 
the child is in excellent health and net zero effect on the probability (statistically 
significant) that the child has activity limitation.  Although all findings from logit 
regressions are statistically insignificant, both linear and nonlinear models suggest 
that, if anything, the welfare reform had a slight positive effect on children’s health. 
 
 
3.15. More on Identification  
 
To find out the effect of welfare reform on children’s health care use and health, one 
cannot simply regress children’s health care use and health on indicators for whether a 
state has implemented AFDC waivers or TANF using a dataset that has observations 
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from different years and states.   This is because the timing of welfare reform 
implementation may have been correlated with many things including state’s anti-
welfare sentiment, economic conditions and other policy changes.  This study uses 
difference in difference method (DD) for identifying the effect of welfare reform on 
children’s health care use and health.  It includes state and year fixed effects and 
controls for state characteristics.  Inclusion of state and year dummy variables and 
state level characteristic variables control for static and varying state level 
characteristics (e.g. state’s anti-welfare sentiment and unemployment rate) as well as 
any correlates that are unique to each year (e.g. flu epidemic that happen across the 
country in particular year).  Even with these control variables, however, there may still 
be unobserved varying state characteristics that may have affected welfare receiving 
children’s use of health care and health after the welfare reform.  To address this 
possibility, treatment and control groups are used.  If unobserved varying state 
characteristics affected the treatment and the control groups in the same way, then 
comparing outcomes of two groups within each state provides estimates of the true 
effect of the welfare reform.  One may naturally think of defining treatment and 
control groups using actual welfare status of children (i.e. participants vs. non-
participants).  However, this is problematic because even if they appear similar in 
observed characteristics, they may differ in many unobserved ways.  There may be 
individual and welfare system level characteristics that may influence welfare 
participation such as the level of individual motivation and the degree of involvement 
by welfare officers.  If these unobserved characteristics have any effect on children’s 
health care use and health, then there will anyway be a difference in outcomes 
between the two groups in absence of the welfare reform (i.e. selection effect) which 
makes it difficult to tease out the true effect of welfare reform.  Therefore to control 
for these selection effects (both self selection and systematic selection by welfare 
officers), treatment and control groups are defined as groups that are comparable in all 
possible ways (both observed and unobserved) other than their probability of receiving 
welfare without using actual welfare status that typically reflects difference in 
unobserved characteristics.         
Identification from DD welfare reform studies comes from variation in the 
timing of welfare reform implementation across states.  It essentially compares 
children before and after welfare reform for each state after controlling for other 
macro level changes that occurred around the same time as welfare reform by 
including year fixed effects and state characteristics.  With the use of within state 
control groups, it controls for any other state level changes that may not be captured 
by state and year fixed effects and state characteristic controls if these changes 
affected both treatment and control groups in the same way.   
Estimates of the effects produced by DD method are for children who were 
most likely affected by the welfare reform and not for the average child.  The 
estimated effects are for the treatment group, those who were most likely affected by 
welfare reform, and not for the average child.   
The main assumption on which the DD method is built is that children in the 
treatment and the control groups have the same trajectories in outcomes over time in 
the absence of the welfare reform.  The only difference between the two groups should 
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be that children in the treatment group were affected by the welfare reform whereas 
those in the control group were not.  Therefore it is extremely important to select 
groups that are comparable to each other.  Moreover, compositions of treatment and 
control groups should not change due to welfare reform.  If group compositions 
change because of the effect the welfare reform had on the parameters that define the 
treatment and the control groups (i.e. mother’s marital status and education), then 
comparing changes in outcomes of the two groups over time will not produce valid 
estimates.  This is because if group compositions change, then for each group, one 
would be comparing outcomes of two different sets of children before and after 
welfare reform and therefore comparisons of these ‘differences’ would produce no 
meaningful results.   
Despite the extensive measures taken to isolate the effect of welfare reform on 
children’s health care use and health, DD estimates may still be biased for several 
reasons.  First, assumptions of the method may be violated.  The treatment and control 
groups may not have the same trajectories in outcomes in the absence of the welfare 
reform.  Since there is no way to verify this, it is impossible to be completely sure that 
this assumption holds.  Moreover, the welfare reform may have affected mother’s 
marital status and education which changed the composition of the treatment and the 
control groups.  Previous studies have not come to a consensus on the effect of the 
welfare reform on a mother’s marital status.  Whereas some studies show that the 
welfare reform decreased female headship (e.g. Schoeni and Blank 2000), some found 
no effects (e.g. Grogger et al 2002).  There are not many studies on mother’s 
education; one study found an association between welfare reform and decrease in 
dropout rates among minor mothers although this was only a correlation and not a 
causation (Koball 2007).  Although this study follows previous studies in defining 
treatment and control groups, this would be a problem if welfare reform did indeed 
affect these key defining parameters.   
Second, like all other studies that examine the effect of government policies, 
there is always a possibility of policy endogeneity (Besley and Case 2000).  The 
timings of welfare reform implementation by state governments may have been 
intentional.  States may have implemented the welfare reform with the intention of 
impacting children’s health related outcomes.  With some of PRWORA’s stated goals 
involving improvement of children’s wellbeing, it is difficult to eliminate this 
possibility.  If implementation of welfare is indeed non-random, then estimates may 
not be capturing the effect of welfare reform per se but rather some other factor that is 
correlated with the timing of the welfare reform implementation.    
Third, as mentioned earlier in the main text, there are also difficulties in 
isolating the effect of the welfare reform because many state level changes occurred 
during the welfare reform years.  Even with all the controls used in this study, it is not 
completely clear whether AFDC waiver and TANF dummy variables will truly 
capture the effect of welfare reform without confounding effects from other factors.  
Another related issue to keep in mind is that since there may have been possible 
interactions that occurred between these economic and other policy changes and the 
welfare reform, the method used in this study will not capture these effects.  Although 
these interaction effects by themselves may not necessarily affect the direct effect of 
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the welfare reform, it is nevertheless important to keep in mind the possibility of other 
effects that welfare reform may have had in conjunction with other factors.  
Fourth, if outcomes are serially correlated, without correction for the problem, 
DD estimates will have smaller standard errors which will lead to overestimation of t-
statistics and significance levels (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004). This will 
lead to finding ‘significant’ effects when there is none, implying increase in type I 
errors.   
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